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执行蒙特利尔议定书
多边基金执行委员会
第五十六次会议
2008 年 11 月 8 日至 12 日，多哈

2008 年完成项目综合报告

目录

附件：

执行摘要

1. 与 2007 年收到的 71 份相比，本报告的目的是向执行委员会概括介绍在本报告期内即从 2007 年 11 月第五十三次会议以来所收到完成项目报告中报告的结果。2008 年在投资项目方面收到的完成项目报告总数下降到 29 份，而在完成投资项目方面应收到但仍未收到的完成项目报告总数已从 46 份下降到 34 份。就非投资项目而言，2008 年收到的完成项目报告数量从 51 份下降到 49 份，而待收完成项目报告的数量从 89 份增加到 123 份。

2. 2008 年已收到完成项目报告数量下降的部分原因是截止日期（2008 年 9 月 20 日）太早，因为第五十六次会议安排在 11 月份召开，而且投资项目的应收完成项目报告的数量也出现下降。另外，开发计划署和环境规划署在 2008 年前三个季度也未完全按照商定的交付时间表交付项目。

3. 在投资项目方面，已经收到的 29 份完成项目报告介绍了已经实现的淘汰情况、执行延误、信息的完整性和数据的一致性、总体评估和所学到的经验和教训等情况。报告介绍了许多有趣的经验和教训。有些报告谈到政策问题，有些报告则谈到了总体项目和项目执行方式的各个方面。提供信息最多的报告载于附件二-A。本报告第七部分对这些报告中的部分进行了概括介绍。

4. 在有关非投资项目的 49 份完成项目报告中，大部分报告都载有实质性信息和分析。尤其谈到在监测亚洲消耗臭氧层物质区域贸易、制冷剂管理计划执行情况、以及哈龙管理和融资项目等各项目中学到的经验和教训。附件二-B 载有所学到的经验和教训的部分清单。全部清单可在向基金秘书处提出请求后从秘书处内部网完成项目报告之下的评估部分获取。各执行机构本次未报告从执行多年期协定中学到的经验和教训。

5. 在执行委员会第三十二次会议上批准的体制建设项目结束性报告和延长申请的格式继续用于展期请求。从目前已经提交的展期请求来看，虽然在介绍已实现成果和已规划未来行动方面提供的信息及详细程度在质量上有一定改进，但在已经收到的结束性报告和行动计划当中，有许多在质量和完整性方面仍然参差不齐。为了能够及时审查和批准延长申请，各机构被鼓励继续改进其对体制建设报告的质量控制。各机构还应该利用可在现阶段完成日期之前提前 6 个月提交体制建设延长申请的程序，以避免在体制建设项目的人员配备和活动方面出现中断。

6. 在本文件结尾处建议执行委员会做出的决定涉及到各机构提交下一年度完成项目报告的时间安排、进一步改进数据一致性、提供遗漏信息以及在未来的项目编制和执行过程中利用在完成项目报告中所报告已经学到的经验和教训。

一、 导言

7. 本报告的目的是向执行委员会概括介绍在本报告期内即从 2007 年 11 月第五十三次会议以来所收到完成项目报告中报告的结果。本报告的草案已经发给各执行机构及双边机构。收到的评论意见在最后敲定本报告时得到了考虑。表四和附件一介绍了为各执行机构在 2009 年提交完成项目报告安排的时间表。

二、 已收到的和应收到的完成项目报告的概况

8. 与 2007 年的 71 份相比，2008 年在投资项目方面收到的完成项目报告总数下降到 29 份，而在完成投资项目方面应收到但仍未收到的完成项目报告总数已从 46 份下降到 34 份。就非投资项目而言，2008 年收到的完成项目报告数量从 51 份下降到 49 份，而待收完成项目报告的数量从 89 份增加到 123 份。

9. 2008 年已收到完成项目报告数量下降的部分原因是截止日期（2008 年 9 月 20 日）太早，因为第五十六次会议安排在 11 月份召开，而且投资项目的应收完成项目报告的数量也出现下降。另外，开发计划署和环境规划署在 2008 年前三个季度也未完全按照商定的交付时间表交付项目（见附件一中的表一）。

10. 截至 2008 年 9 月 20 日，到目前为止执行投资项目最多的开发计划署提交了 11 份投资项目和 23 份非投资项目的完成项目报告，而计划在今年 9 月底之前提交的投资项目和非投资项目的完成项目报告分别为 27 份和 31 份。环境规划署在今年 7 月底之前提交了 9 份非投资项目的完成项目报告，而计划提交的是 22 份，联合国工发组织提交的投资项目和非投资项目的项目完成报告分别为 3 份和 9 份，而计划提交的是只有 1 份投资项目的完成项目报告，实际比计划多提交了 9 份非投资项目的项目完成报告。世界银行提交了 5 份投资项目的完成项目报告，而计划在今年 9 月底之前提交的是 8 份。

11. 自从多边基金成立以来，截止 2008 年 9 月 20 日，各执行机构和双边机构提交的投资项目和非投资项目的完成项目报告分别为 1,768 份和 728 份，在 2007 年 12 月 31 日之前完成的所有投资项目和非投资项目中，占所有投资项目应提交完成项目报告的 98.1%（去年为 97.4%），占所有非投资项目应提交完成项目报告的 85.5%（去年为 88.3%）。

12. 下文表 1 和 2 更加详细地介绍了各机构的数据，包括前两个报告期的比较数字。

表 1

投资项目概况

（多年期项目除外）

机构	2007 年 12 月之前完成的项目	已经收到的关于 2007 年 12 月之前已完成项目的完成项目报告总数	应收到但仍未收到的完成项目报告	在报告期内收到的完成项目报告		
				2006 年	2007 年	2008 年[1]
法国	14	9	5	1	0	0
德国	19	16	3	7	6	0
国际复兴开发银行	450	435[2]	15	26	20	14
意大利	6	5	1	0	1	0
日本	6	5	1	1	0	0
联合王国	1	1	0	1	不详	不详
开发计划署	884	875[3]	9	11	32	11
工发组织	420	420[4]	0	26	12	4
美国	2	2	0	1	不详	不详
总计	**1,802**	**1,768**	**34**	**74**	**71**	**29**

[1] 执行委员会第五十三次会议之后（2007 年 11 月 8 日至 2008 年 9 月 20 日）。

[2] 另外，世界银行提交了 2 份关于已取消项目的完成项目报告。

[3] 另外，开发计划署提交了 2 份关于已取消项目和 1 份关于在线项目的完成项目报告。

[4] 另外，工发组织提交了 1 份关于一个已取消项目的完成项目报告和 9 份取消报告。

13. 环境规划署拖欠的应提交完成项目报告最多（70 份关于非投资项目的完成项目报告），然后是开发计划署，在 2007 年底之前已经完成的投资项目和非投资项目中，它拖欠了 9 份投资项目和 27 份非投资项目的完成项目报告。世界银行拖欠了 15 份投资项目和 4 份非投资项目的完成项目报告。就工发组织和若干双边机构而言，应提交但尚未提交的投资和非投资项目完成项目报告合并数量为 1 到 9 份不等（见表 1 和表 2）。

表 2

非投资项目概况

（项目编制、国家方案、多年期项目、网络建设和信息交换中心活动等在建项目以及体制建设项目除外）

机构	2007 年 12 月之前完成的项目	已经收到的关于 2007 年 12 月之前已完成项目的完成项目报告总数	应收到但仍未收到的完成项目报告	在报告期内收到的完成项目报告		
				2006 年	2007 年	2008 年[1]
澳大利亚	8	8[2]	0	6	不详	1
奥地利	1	1	0	不详	不详	不详
加拿大	50	44	6	6	2	2
丹麦	1	1	0	不详	不详	不详
芬兰	3	2	1	0	0	0
法国	17	13	4	2	2	0
德国	39	33	6	2	3	0
国际复兴开发银行	30	26	4	2	0	2
以色列	1	1	0	不详	不详	不详
日本	7	6	1	不详	0	0
波兰	1	1	0	1	不详	不详
新加坡	2	0	2	0	0	0
南非	1	1	0	不详	不详	不详
西班牙	1	0	1	不详	不详	0
瑞典	4	4	0	0	0	3
瑞士	3	3	0	不详	不详	不详
开发计划署	207	180[3]	27	8	21	23
环境规划署	337	267	70	8	7	9
工发组织	98	97	1	3	16	9
美国	40	40	0	2	不详	不详
总计	**851**	**728**	**123**	**40**	**51**	**49**

[1] 执行委员会第五十三次会议之后（2007 年 11 月 8 日至 2008 年 9 月 20 日）。

[2] 另外，澳大利亚提交了 1 份取消项目报告。

[3] 另外，开发计划署提交了 2 份关于被移交项目的完成项目报告。

三、 对投资项目的完成项目报告的分析

(a) 已收到和应收到的完成项目报告

14. 提交关于投资项目的完成项目报告数量最多的是开发计划署，特别是在泡沫和制冷剂项目方面。但是，泡沫仍是应提交但尚未提交完成项目报告数量最多的一个行业，然后就是熏蒸剂项目。泡沫项目（12）和制冷剂项目（9）在 2007 年底之前已经完成的投资项目的所有机构应提交但尚未提交的 34 份完成项目报告中共占到 62%（见附件一的表二）。有关在 2001 年底之前完成早期投资项目的完成项目报告积压已经被消除，只有 4 份有关 2005 年之前完成的项目的完成项目报告仍未提交。

15. 在本报告期（2007 年 11 月 8 日至 2008 年 9 月 20 日）内收到的 29 份完成项目报告涉及在 15 个国家已经完成的项目；其中一半以上涉及在 3 个国家（中国、巴基斯坦和突尼斯）执行的项目。

(b) 已完成淘汰的消耗臭氧层物质

16. 在大多数情况下，29 个完成项目报告所涉项目中淘汰的消耗臭氧层物质都是按照计划进行的，报告的淘汰总量略低于计划总量（见下表 3）。但是，当技术转换前后的单位生产量和消耗臭氧层物质消费数据未提供时，关于完成项目报告中实现的淘汰数量的信息在有些情况下是不完整的（见附件一中的表九）。另外，在 2007 年进度报告中报告的消耗臭氧层物质数据中，29 份报告中有 9 份完成项目报告中所报告的消耗臭氧层物质淘汰数量是不同的。虽然在有些情况下这是由于数字的不同舍入造成的，但发现有 3 个项目出现的差别很大，有关机构正在对此进行说明。不过，出现这种差别的情况数量和差别的数量还是少于去年。

表 3

已提交完成项目报告的项目所淘汰的消耗臭氧层物质

机构	项目数量	完成项目报告		2007 年进展报告	
		计划淘汰消耗臭氧潜能值	淘汰耗臭氧潜能值	计划淘汰消耗臭氧潜能值	淘汰耗臭氧潜能值
开发计划署	11	1,616.8	1,594.3	1,617.0	1,617.0
工发组织	4	630.0	630.0	630.0	630.0
世界银行	14	1,499.6	1,509.2	1,769.6	1,518.2
总计	**29**	**3,746.4**	**3,733.5**	**4,016.6**	**3,765.2**

(c) 执行延误

17. 在 29 个项目中，有 26 个项目延误 9 个月至 93 个月不等；有 2 份完成项目报告没有在实际完成日期进行报告，有 1 份完成项目报告没有在已批准的计划完成日期报告。在 29 个项目中，有 82%的项目延误在 12 个月以上，而去年收到完成项目报告中只有 54%的项目出现这种情况。2008 年的完成项目报告中报告的平均延误从 22 个月增加到 37 个月，而平均项目持续时间也从 55 个月增加到 69 个月（见下表 4）。

18. 平均延误时间增加的原因是有 10 个项目的延误时间为 49 个月至 93 个月不等;其中 6 个是由世界银行、3 个由开发计划署和 1 个由工发组织执行的。这些项目都是位各国且涉及若干行业，特别是制冷、泡沫和气雾剂等行业，包括 4 个总体项目，泡沫和气雾剂行业各有 2 个，并且还有 2 个跨行业项目。

19. 分析中所涉及到完成项目报告的数量有限，从而无法对任何趋势问题展开讨论。造成延误最主要的原因往往是接收企业（20 个）、然后是供应商（11 个）、外部因素（8 个）、政府（6 个）、执行机构（2）和供资（1）。从完成项目报告中还可以明显看出，总体项目和跨行业项目有时会因为受益人企业之间存在的差异而面临特殊困难。

表 4

执行延误

（括号里的总数字显示与去年比较）

机构	项目数量	根据完成项目报告得出的平均延误时间（月）	根据 2007 年进度报告得出的平均延误时间（月）	根据完成项目报告得出的平均持续时间（月）	根据 2007 年进度报告得出的平均持续时间（月）
开发计划署	11	34.28	32.37	66.19	64.11
工发组织	4	23.67	29.67	57.56	63.90
世界银行	14	42.47	41.03	74.94	74.50
总计	**29 (70)**	**37.47 (22.04)**	**36.18 (20.93)**	**69.44 (55.19)**	**69.10 (54.25)**

(d) 信息的完整性

20. 提供关键信息的情况比去年更普遍，例如，有 82.8%的完成项目报告提供被毁设备清单，而去年的数字是 48.6%（见下表 5）。提供关于消耗臭氧层物质和替代品的年度消费清单的情况没有去年普遍（今年为 72.4%，而去年为 74.3%）。信息不完整的情况仍时有发生，特别是在消耗臭氧层物质和替代品的年度消费量（占完成项目报告的 17.2%，而 2007 年为 20%）、被毁设备（占完成项目报告的 6.9%，而前一年为 30%）、经营成本和节余（占 13.8%，2007 年为 14.3%）以及固定设备清单（占 6.9%，2007 年为 11.4%）方面。

表 5

在本报告期内已收到的完成投资项目报告报告中提供的信息

（括号里的总数字显示与去年比较）

	提供		不完整		未提供		“ 不适用”*	
	项目数量	百分比	项目数量	百分比	项目数量	百分比	项目数量	百分比
消耗臭氧层物质和替代品年度消费量清单	21	72.4 (74.3)	5	17.2 (20.0)	1	3.4 (0.0)	2	6.9 (5.7)
固定设备清单	27	93.1 (88.6)	2	6.9 (11.4)	0	0.0 (0.0)	0	0.0 (0.0)
经营成本详细情况	20	69.0 (64.3)	4	13.8 (14.3)	2	6.9 (5.7)	3	10.3 (15.7)
被毁设备清单	24	82.8 (48.6)	2	6.9 (30.0)	3	10.3 (1.4)	0	0.0 (20.0)

* 根据执行机构的指示值。

(e) 总体评估和等级评定

21. 在本报告期内，执行机构评定有 20.7%的项目非常满意，前一年被评为非常满意的项目占 31.4%；被评为满意的项目占 72.4%，2007 年的这一数字为 61.4%，有 6.9%的项目被评定为不太满意，而前一年的这一数字为 7.2%（见下表 6）。

表 6

各机构按照新的完成项目报告格式对项目执行情况的新的总体评估

（括号里的总数字显示与去年比较）

评估	开发计划署	工发组织	世界银行	总计	总的百分比
非常满意		2	4	6	20.7 (31.4)
满意	9	2	10	21	72.4 (61.4)
不太满意	2			2	6.9 (7.2)
总计	**11**	**4**	**14**	**29**	**100.0**

四、 对完成非投资项目报告的分析

(a) 概况

22. 收到非投资项目的完成项目报告 49 份，其中大部分为主要由开发计划署和环境规划署执行的技术援助项目。环境规划署今年提交的完成项目报告略多于往年，但积压的延误完成项目报告数量显著增加。就双边技术援助项目而言，仍有 15 个应当提交的完成项目报

告没有提交，并且还有 5 个关于培训项目的完成项目报告（见附件一的表三）。这次审查不包括国家方案、项目编制，也不包括根据第 29/4 号决定不需要完成项目报告的环境规划署经常发生的活动（包括建立网络在内）。

(b) 供资、延误、淘汰和评估

23. 据报告，在已经提交完成项目报告的所有已完成非投资项目中，实际支出总额中有 91.5%属于计划支出，这表明了总体上有一定的节省（见表 7）。一旦有了最终的财务数字，这些数据需要重新证实。

表 7

在已收到的非投资项目的完成项目报告中报告的预算、淘汰和延误情况

（括号里的总数字显示与去年比较）

机构	项目数量	批准资金（美元）	支付资金（美元）	即将淘汰的消耗臭氧潜能值（ODP 吨）	淘汰的消耗臭氧潜能值（ODP 吨）	平均延误时间（月）
双边	6	1,129,966	1,061,684	394.4	394.4	32.97 (20.80)
开发计划署	23	4,147,634	3,848,573	541.9	523.3	12.69 (7.38)
环境规划署	9	878,930	654,681	0.0	0.0	26.16 (15.81)
工发组织	9	865,225	820,975	265.9	265.9	20.74 (9.46)
世界银行	2	458,130	458,056	9.1	9.1	43.62 (N/A)
总计	**49**	**7,479,885**	**6,843,969**	**1,211.3**	**1,192.7**	**20.89 (11.06)**

24. 在项目执行过程中出现的延误继续表明存在极大差异。在 49 个非投资项目中，有 3 个项目在计划日期之前完成，有 7 个项目准时完成。有 36 个项目出现 6 个月至 59 个月的延误，有 3 个项目没有在实际完成日期报告。有 33 个项目延误时间超过 12 个月，占项目总数的 67.3%。有 11 个项目报告延误时间为 37 个月至 59 个月不等。所涉机构为开发计划署以及澳大利亚和加拿大，开发计划署主要负责制冷剂管理计划中有关制冷剂回收和再循环的执行和监测、技术援助或培训以及哈龙库的管理等方面的工作。

25. 开发计划署的项目平均延误时间有所增加（今年的延误时间为 12.69 个月，去年为 7.38 个月）。环境规划署项目的平均延误时间从 15.81 个月增加到 26.16 个月，工发组织的项目延误时间从 9.46 个月增加到 20.74 个月。非投资项目的总体平均延误时间为超出计划完成日期 20.89 个月，这与 2007 年的 11.06 个月相比有了显著增加。

26. 计划淘汰和报告完成淘汰的消耗臭氧潜能值之间出现差异的原因几乎完全是由于开发计划署执行的 2 个项目，据报告，其实际淘汰的消耗臭氧层物质少于计划淘汰的数量。

27. 有 16%的项目被评定为“非常满意”，这比去年的数字（44%）少了很多；35%的项目被评定为“按计划达到满意效果”，去年的数字为 40%；31%的项目被评定为“虽然满意但未达到计划效果”，去年的数字为 12%（见表 8）。这些评估的正确性只能在评价期间加以核实。在几年被评定为“虽然满意但未达到计划效果”的项目中，没有提供有关这一评定结果的明确解释。在 49 个非投资项目中，有 9 个没有报告任何评估结果。

表 8

对各机构执行的非投资项目的总体评估

（括号里的总数字显示与去年比较）

评估	双边	开发计划署	环境规划署	工发组织	世界银行	总计	在总数中所占的百分比
非常满意	1	3	1	2	1	8	16 (44)
满意或满意且达到计划效果	2	8	4	3		17	35 (40)
虽然满意但未达到计划效果	3	5	4	3		15	31 (12)
不满意						0	0 (4)
未提供		7		1	1	9	18 (0)
总计	**6**	**23**	**9**	**9**	**2**	**49**	**100**

(c) 已收到信息的质量

28. 大部分关于非投资项目的完成项目报告载有实质性信息和分析。关于延误原因和所采取补救行动的部分仍然在提供的详细资料方面存在很大差异。通常情况下，政府和其他因素被作为延误的主要原因。

29. 国家臭氧机构对 49 份已收到报告中的 28 份（占 51%），执行机构对 49 份已收到报告中的 31 份（占 63%）完成项目报告的草案提出了评论意见。与去年相比，这是一个进步，因为当时国家臭氧机构只为 50 份已收到报告中的 15 份（占 30%）提出了评论意见。但是，执行机构提出评论意见的情况没有去年多，当时为 50 份已收到报告中的 43 份（占 86%）提出了评论意见。据报告称，所学到的经验和教训在很多情况下是非常有趣而且具有重要意义，见附件二-B。在编写非投资项目的完成项目报告时所采用的准则可能也对这一积极事态进展起到了作用。

(d) 体制建设

30. 根据第 29/4 号决定，体制建设项目要在提出延长项目请求的同时提交有关前一阶段的结束性报告（见表 9）。

表 9

体制建设项目报告概况

机构	在第 29/4 号决定之前已经收到的关于体制建设项目的完成项目报告	已收到在 2007 年 12 月之前已完成项目的结束性报告且同时收到延长项目申请的项目 [1]	在 2008 年收到结束性报告且同时收到延长项目申请的项目 [2]
法国	1	0	0
德国	0	2	1
国际复兴开发银行	7	20	3
开发计划署	1	99	9
环境规划署	10	240	20
工发组织	2	18	2
美国	0	1	0
总计	**21**	**380**	**35**

[1] 在正在完成阶段意义上完成。
[2] 不包括只批准一年的启动项目。在此种情况下，不提交结束性报告。

31. 在执行委员会第三十二次会议上批准的结束性报告格式和体制建设项目延长申请格式继续用于展期申请。从目前已经提交的展期请求来看，虽然在介绍已实现成果和已规划未来行动方面提供的信息及详细程度在质量上有一定改进，但在已经收到的结束性报告和行动计划当中，有许多在质量和完整性方面仍然参差不齐。另外，它们在时间长短、资料的详细程度以及后勤结构方面也存在很大差别。在介绍目标和结果时往往只介绍质量方面，不提体制建设项目对整个国家臭氧机构业务动作的作用。也很少具体提到那些可能需要对实际状况进行更深入评估并因此需要对已规划和已开展活动进行更实际评价的问题、制约因素、风险或失误。在有些情况下，所提供的信息显然是对先前已提供信息的重复，没有对其进行更新。

32. 另外，还有一些机构在规定的截止期限（执行委员会会议开始之前 8 周）之后提出延长申请。提交的申请材料中缺乏有据可查的证明文件可能意味着因缺少信息而无法及时处理延长申请从而致使国家在获得批准方面受到延误，秘书处对此表示关切。因此，鼓励各机构继续改进其对体制建设报告的质量控制，并确保在结束性报告中适当突出已经取得的成果、学到的经验和教训以及剩余的各种问题。各机构还应该注意这样一个事实，即可在现阶段完成日期之前提前 6 个月提交体制建设延长申请，以避免在体制建设项目的人员配备和活动方面出现中断。

五、 2009 年提交完成项目报告的时间表

33. 各执行机构应和往年一年提交有关应提交完成项目报告的时间表。附件一的表四介绍了 2007 年 12 月 31 日之前已完成项目的应提交完成项目报告，并且考虑到了 2008 年 9 月 20 日之前未提交完成项目报告的数量。除了上述时间表之外，各执行机构还将在 2009 年提交在 2008 年内已经完成的完成项目报告。

六、 改善完成项目报告和年度进度报告中所报告数据的一致性

34. 第 53/6(b)(i)号决定请各执行机构与基金秘书处合作，在 2008 年 1 月底之前使完成项目报告、库存报告和年度进度报告中报告的数据完全一致。基金秘书处向各机构提供了有关数据完整性以及已收到完成项目报告与库存和进度报告相比存在的不一致之处的详细信息。在 2003 年收到的完成项目报告中存在的所有不完整信息和不一致数据现都已经解决，不过，开发计划署（仍在对 2004 年和 2005 年收到的一些完成项目报告）和世界银行（对 2005 年内收到的一些完成项目报告（见附件一的表五和表六）仍在继续开展这项工作），与此同时，还有几个机构对 2006 年内收到的完成项目报告（见附件一的表七）、世界银行也在对 2007 年内收到的一些完成项目报告（见附件一的表八）进行这项工作。

35. 在本报告期内，有 27 份完成项目报告提供的信息不完整，有 73 份完成项目报告提供的数据不一致（见附件一的表九）。就提供信息不完整的完成项目报告而言，其数量随着收到的完成项目报告数量的减少而下降（今年有 27 份完成项目报告提供的信息不完整，而去年有 48 份）。提供的数据不一致的完成项目报告的总数目也有下降，但收到的完成项目报告总数量增加了（今年有 73 份完成项目报告出现此种情况，而去年有 100 份）。

36. 为了改进数据的一致性和方便编写完成项目报告，从 2004 年 7 月起，各机构可以从基金秘书处下载关键项目数据。在表明项目数量或标题时，完成项目报告表格的首页可以根据基金秘书处项目库存数据库中的数据自动填写，包括上一次进度报告的实际数据和评论。但是，提供不一致数据的报告数量仍然很多似乎表明这一便利措施没有得到普遍利用。

七、 学到的经验和教训

(a) 投资和非投资项目

37. 相当多的完成项目报告中报告了所学到的经验和教训，并且对项目执行进程的各个方面提出了重要和有益的意见。有的意见涉及各项政策和管理条例对项目成功的影响或对项目执行的难度所进行的反思，有的意见则涉及国家和区域一级在控制跨国界非法贩运消耗臭氧层物质方面所做的工作。虽然附件二载有关于已报告经验和教训的编辑文本，但下文还是通过以下几个标题对部分经验和教训进行了总结。来自完成项目报告数据库的全部清单可在提出请求后获取，包括在 2008 年 9 月 20 日截止日期之后收到的完成项目报告中

报告的经验和教训在内。这些经验和教训还将被放在基金秘书处内部网中完成项目报告下面的评价部分。

(一) 消耗臭氧层物质控制政策的重要性

38. 巴基斯坦在一个制冷剂项目中报告的重要教训中强调指出，项目的执行工作本应该伴随政策措施，以避免延误，特别是要对各类氟氯化碳实施进口限制或增税以便加快相对于替代品的成本增长速度。在巴基斯坦政府通过其定额制度并从 2002 年开始减少授权进口数量之后，氟氯化碳的价格慢慢开始上涨，受益公司也在项目执行过程中更加配合和主动。

39. 智利也在一个关于 TECFIN II 项目的完成项目报告中强调了制定适当政策框架的重要性。这一项目所基于的一项假定是，加快氟氯化碳淘汰时间表的地方法律一时得以实施，它便会向公司拍卖授权提供一个强大的激励框架。由于该法律所花的时间比预期要长，故有必要花更的资源来宣传这一授权方案的好处。

40. 在执行萨尔瓦多最新制冷剂管理计划期间，据观察，再循环的氟氯化碳的数量没有预期多。查明的原因有三个：

(a) 进口氟氯化碳的供应量仍然很大，价格偏低，在经济上减少了对再循环的鼓励；

(b) 缺少促使必须回收的强制执行措施；和

(c) 被选作再循环经营者的消耗臭氧层物质进口商没有得到作为再循环中心的奖励，因为出售未加工过的氟氯化碳更容易和更有利可图。

(二) 需要让主要利益攸关方参与进来

41. 在印度尼西亚实施的关于加强进出口控制的项目证实，每年都有一定数量的未注册各类氟氯化碳被进口到印度尼西亚。对分配给注册进口商并由其使用的进口配额进行核查工作无法像在其他国家那样进行，因为所有配额都会进入一个从未进口过消耗臭氧层物质的公司，从而无法提供准确的进口信息，已经采取或建议采取的措施是加强环境部与贸易部以及与海关之间的合作，以便制定出对非法进口进行严厉处罚的进口管理条例，对海关人口进行培训，提供测漏仪，并加强在印度尼西亚和本区域各类氟氯化碳主要出口国家之间的信息交流，特别是交流合法进口商和计划出口的清单。

42. 促进南亚和东南亚在监测和控制消耗臭氧层物质消费和防止非法贸易方面开展区域合作的项目得到了瑞典提供的资金支助，该项目报告称，事实证明，举行定期但不经常举行的、由来自本区域所有国家与会者参加的研讨会对提高认识和交流信息非常有效。这一项目取得成功的主要因素之一是尽可能让那些以前参加过此种研讨会的官员参加所有研讨会。设立项目指导小组并由与会者轮流担任小组成员对于项目获得所有国家的认可极其重

要，其中就有一个国家最初不愿意分享被视为机密的信息。寻求具体问题的解决办法使各国主动将某些问题提交给缔约方会议，从而导致缔约方会议就正在开展的非法贸易问题做出决定。与区域情报联络处开展合作等一些活动正在一些不同区域加以推广，例如，拉丁美洲目前正在执行一个类似项目。该项目在国际刑警组织和世界海关组织内部形成的认识正在使它们将环境犯罪列入其议事日程，同时也使臭氧干事更加了解可以用于打击环境犯罪的具体工具，例如，国际刑警组织的生态信息系统和区域情报联络处的海关执行风格。

43. 关于向环戊烷转换问题，报告强调，地方消防局部和劳动安全检查部门必须参与项目设计工作，从而缩短批准和设备试运行的时间，避免出现像中国制冷剂项目那样的长期执行延误。

44. 从印度执行的一个溶剂技术援助项目中，报告称行业的买进与合作对执行成功的四氯化碳调查极其重要。报告建议利用一个行业协调中心来开展调查工作，并在国家臭氧机构的监督下将调查结果提供给广大社区。

(三) 适当技术的重要性

45. 巴基斯坦的一个项目认为，在总体项目中涉及拥有不同程度的技术和管理能力的受益人，则选择设备的决定应该根据个案具体情况做出，并且在做出决定时要考虑处理和维持高科技设备的企业的技术能力。如果企业被视为甚至是在经过培训之后也无法处理精密机械，则应该选择与其能力相适应的设备。另外，与那些掌握基本技能和能力的较小接受者的团体打交道的政策也需要简化。

46. 关于液态二氧化碳技术，利比亚的一个项目报告称，根据所处位置的不同，租借或购买液态二氧化碳储藏罐的成本可能极高，这可能会使一个本来成本效益很高的项目变得无法执行。在这种情况下，企业可能在财务无法支付因购买液态二氧化碳储藏罐带来的额外成本，并且还有人担心整个项目可能因此受到损害。今后，任何液态二氧化碳项目都应该精心规划，以便将供应液态二氧化碳储藏罐作为设备供应中的一部分。

47. 墨西哥国家哈龙管理和哈龙库方案报告称，顺利解决了因为设备故障引起的一个严重问题，这证实了在国际投标分析开始时决定只选择那些得到公认的、著名的和经过检验证明的设备供应商提供设备的正确性。在此情况下，供应商承担全部责任，并且在收到墨西哥发送出去的缺陷设备部件之后立即诊断出故障所在，并迅速拿出一个技术解决方案。

48. 中国的一家制冷剂厂商认为，在原项目执行计划中，由对方资助的土木和电气工程考虑不够充分，特别是在向环戊烷转换时与电接地系统有关的某些安全要求方面。

(四) 从执行制冷剂管理计划中学到的经验和教训

49. 关于制冷剂管理计划或其组成部分的完成项目报告称它们学到一些有趣的经验和教训，如伯利兹项目，开发计划署通过该项目结束了该国技术人员得到设备却没有事先接受

培训的状况，因为在执行培训方案方面出现了延误。为了更好地使相关活动的时间安排能够同步进行，强烈建议由负责投资部分的执行机构来开展培训活动。

50. 孟加拉国制冷剂管理计划中的国家回收和再循环项目报告称，需要有财务激励措施来鼓励开展回收和再循环活动，小规模的电气回收机构更适合在发展中国家开展回收活动，提高认识和持续监测都是极其重要的活动。

51. 关于萨尔瓦多制冷剂管理计划的完成项目报告认为，应该继续支持制冷维修行业在该国最重要的地区成立制冷技术人员协会，因为它们可以起到推广行业正式做法的作用，并且还可以成为一个沟通渠道，并且可以在国内执行《蒙特利尔议定书》的框架内起到行动放大器的作用。

52. 尼日尔的项目报告称，回收袋太容易坏，有必要将留出再循环中心某些收益与用于购买零部件的义务结合起来。

(b) 多年期协定

53. 各执行机构这次没有按照第 48/12 号决定的要求，报告从执行多年期协定中学到的经验和教训。世界银行报告称，困难是年度执行报告所采用的格式没有预计到要介绍所学到的经验和教训，这信息原计划在最后完成报告中提供。这使得可以在对协定之下已经完成的所有各次付款进行总体审查时提供这些信息，而且它们似乎更适合由财务代理人来执行和报告。

八、 希望执行委员会采取的行动

54. 谨建议执行委员会考虑：

(a) 注意到包括提交附件二中所列到期完成项目报告的时间表及所学到的经验和教训在内的 2009 年度完成项目综合报告；

(b) 请有关执行机构和双边机构：

(一) 与多边基金秘书处合作，在 2009 年 1 月底之前使完成项目报告中、库存中和年度进度报告中报告的数据完全一致；

(二) 在 2009 年 1 月底之前提供在许多完成项目报告中仍然缺失的信息；

(三) 在2009年1月底之前清理关于在2006年底之前已完成项目的完成项目报告积压。

(c) 请所有参与项目编制和执行工作的人员在今后编制和执行项目时考虑从完成项目报告中学到的经验和教训。

Annex I

STATISTICS

Table I

SCHEDULE FOR PLANNED SUBMISSION OF PCRS IN 2008 AND ACTUAL DELIVERY

	Schedule	Sector	Investment PCRs		Non-Investment PCRs	
			Schedule	Received	Schedule	Received
UNDP	January	Aerosol (2) Foam (8) Methyl Bromide (3) Refrigeration (1) Recovery/Recycling (3) RMP (9) Technical Assistance (2)	17	2 ARS 3 FOA 3 REF	11	 6 RMP 3 TAS
		* In addition UNDP will submit 30 PCRs for 2007 completions in 2008	10		20	
	April-May					4 TAS
	September			2 FOA, 1FUM		8TAS, 2TRA
	Total		**27**	**11**	**31**	**23**
Status at September 20, 2008				**-16**		**-8**
	Schedule	**Sector**	**Investment PCRs**		**Non-Investment PCRs**	
			Schedule	**Received**	**Schedule**	**Received**
UNEP	December 2007	Refrigeration Several			4 2	1 TRA (REF) 3 TAS (SEV)
	January 2008					2 TRA
	March 2008	Refrigeration Halon			4 1	1 TAS (SEV) 1 TRA (PHA)
	July 2008	Refrigeration Solvent Several			8 1 2	1 TAS
	December 2008	Technical Assistance Several			5 3	
	Total				**30**	**9**
Status at September 20, 2008						**-13**
	Schedule	**Sector**	**Investment PCRs**		**Non-Investment PCRs**	
			Schedule	**Received**	**Schedule**	**Received**
UNIDO	January 2008	Refrigeration	1			
	August 2008			1 FOA		5 TAS
	September 2008			1SOL, 1FUM		4TAS
	Total		**1**	**3**	**0**	
Status at September 20, 2008				**+2**		**+9**
	Schedule	**Sector**	**Investment PCRs**		**Non-Investment PCRs**	
			Schedule	**Received**	**Schedule**	**Received**
World Bank*	March	Refrigeration (1) Foam (1)	2		-	
	July	Aerosol (2)	2		-	
	August			5 FOA		
	September	Methyl Bromide (2) Foam (2)	4		-	
	October	Solvents (1), Sterilants (1)	2		-	
	December	Foam (3)	3		-	
	Total		**13**	**5**	**-**	
Status at September 20, 2008				**-3**		**N/A**

* Table includes expected PCRs for projects completed up through December 2006 with outstanding PCRs (30 total) and takes care of the number of outstanding PCRs as of September 2007 *minus* PCRs that will be submitted by 31 December 2007 (expected 17). The Bank will, in addition to the above schedule, be submitting PCRs in CY2008 for projects completed through 2007 and up to 30 June 2008.

Table II

PCRS FOR INVESTMENT PROJECTS RECEIVED AND DUE BY IMPLEMENTING AGENCY, SECTOR AND YEAR (FOR PROJECTS COMPLETED UNTIL THE END OF 2007)

Agency	Sector	PCR(s) Received in:												PCR(s) Due in[1]:							
		1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
UNDP	Aerosol	1	-	9	4	11	-	-	4	3	6	2	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Foam	20	34	79	83	117	87	82	77	7	21	5	512	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	6
	Fumigant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
	Halon	-	-	3	13	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Refrigeration	1	22	2	33	9	22	39	42	1	4	3	178	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	Solvent	3	-	-	19	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Sterilant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	**25**	**56**	**93**	**152**	**137**	**110**	**122**	**126**	**11**	**32**	**11**	**875**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**3**	**6**	**9**
UNIDO	Aerosol	6	6	10	6	4	2	-	7	-	1	-	42	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Foam	8	22	3	22	11	15	11	14	8	2	1	117	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Fumigant	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	1	-	6	1	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Halon	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Process Agent	-	-	-	-	1	3	2	4	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Phase-Out Plan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Refrigeration	12	25	11	32	14	22	24	34	7	4	-	185	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Solvent	5	13	5	3	3	5	5	4	9	-	1	53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	**32**	**66**	**29**	**63**	**35**	**48**	**42**	**64**	**25**	**13**	**3**	**420**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**
World Bank	Aerosol	4	6	6	-	1	-	2	5	2	-	-	26	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	3
	Foam	18	25	38	20	20	18	8	26	12	6	5	196	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	4
	Fumigant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	2
	Halon	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
	Multiple Sectors	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Others	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Process Agent	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Production	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Refrigeration	18	24	22	26	15	16	12	21	9	7	1	171	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	3
	Solvent	15	4	3	1	-	-	-	3	-	1	-	27	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
	Sterilant	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
	Total	**59**	**60**	**73**	**48**	**36**	**34**	**23**	**56**	**24**	**16**	**6**	**435**	**-**	**-**	**2**	**6**	**3**	**3**	**1**	**15**
Bilateral	Aerosol	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Foam	-	-	3	2	2	2	-	5	6	6	-	26	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	2
	Fumigant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Halon	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Phase-Out Plan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
	Refrigeration	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	5	-	-	9	1	-	-	1	-	2	1	5
	Solvent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	2
	Total	**-**	**1**	**5**	**2**	**3**	**2**	**-**	**7**	**11**	**7**	**-**	**38**	**1**	**1**	**-**	**1**	**1**	**3**	**3**	**10**
Grand Total		**116**	**183**	**200**	**265**	**211**	**194**	**187**	**253**	**71**	**68**	**20**	**1,768**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**7**	**4**	**9**	**10**	**34**

[1] 6 months after projects completion according to the Progress Report

Table III

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RECEIVED AND DUE FOR NON-INVESTMENT PROJECTS (FOR PROJECTS COMPLETED UNTIL THE END OF 2007)

Agency	Sector	See PCR(s) Received so far for Year Due												PCR(s) Due in[1]									
		1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total	Before 1997	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
UNDP	Demonstration	-	-	5	-	-	7	1	2	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	2
	Technical Assistance	-	6	39	17	7	5	1	15	8	21	20	139	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	1	19	23
	Training	-	18	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
	Total	**-**	**24**	**50**	**17**	**7**	**12**	**2**	**17**	**8**	**21**	**22**	**180**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**1**	**-**	**3**	**1**	**22**	**27**
UNEP	Technical Assistance	9	53	3	18	22	18	5	6	1	7	2	144	-	1	1	1	2	2	8	8	9	32
	Training	8	34	1	2	21	15	20	10	5	4	3	123	-	-	-	-	-	3	7	18	10	38
	Total	**17**	**87**	**4**	**20**	**43**	**33**	**25**	**16**	**6**	**11**	**5**	**267**	**-**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**5**	**15**	**26**	**19**	**70**
UNIDO	Demonstration	-	-	-	6	7	3	3	3	-	-	-	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Technical Assistance	-	6	8	-	4	1	3	4	3	15	9	53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
	Training	-	1	1	-	5	6	7	1	-	1	-	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	**-**	**7**	**9**	**6**	**16**	**10**	**13**	**8**	**3**	**16**	**9**	**97**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**1**	**-**	**1**
World Bank	Demonstration	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Technical Assistance	5	4	6	-	1	-	2	1	1	1	-	21	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	2	4
	Training	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	**6**	**7**	**6**	**-**	**1**	**-**	**2**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**-**	**26**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**1**	**-**	**-**	**1**	**2**	**4**
Bilateral	Demonstration	5	5	12	-	3	1	1	-	2	-	-	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
	Technical Assistance	-	-	13	1	1	9	14	15	8	5	5	71	1	-	1	-	-	2	3	2	6	15
	Training	1	3	19	1	9	6	5	6	6	2	-	58	1	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	-	5
	Total	**6**	**8**	**44**	**2**	**13**	**16**	**20**	**21**	**16**	**7**	**5**	**158**	**2**	**-**	**1**	**1**	**-**	**3**	**3**	**5**	**6**	**21**
Grand Total		**29**	**133**	**113**	**45**	**80**	**71**	**62**	**63**	**34**	**57**	**41**	**728**	**2**	**1**	**2**	**2**	**4**	**8**	**21**	**34**	**49**	**123**

[1] 6 months after projects completion according to the Progress Report.

Table IV

SCHEDULE FOR SUBMISSION OF OUTSTANDING PCRS IN 2009 (FOR PROJECTS COMPLETED UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 2007)

	Schedule	Sector	Investment PCRs	Non-Investment PCRs
UNDP				
	Total			
Total PCRs Due as of September 20, 2008			**9**	**27**
	Schedule	**Sector**	**Investment PCRs**	**Non-Investment PCRs**
UNEP	Oct 2008	TAS		1
	Dec 2008	TAS		7
		TRA		1
	Feb 2009	TAS		5
		TRA		4
	Mar 2009	TAS		12
		TRA		9
	Apr 2009	TAS		1
		TRA		9
	Jun 2009	TAS		1
		TRA		13
	Jul 2009	TAS		2
		TRA		2
	Total			67
Total PCRs Due as of September 20, 2008			**N/A**	**70**
	Schedule	**Sector**	**Investment PCRs**	**Non-Investment PCRs**
UNIDO				
	Total			
Total PCRs Due as of September 20, 2008			**N/A**	**1**
	Schedule	**Sector**	**Investment PCRs**	**Non-Investment PCRs**
World Bank	Mar	Halon (1)	2	--
		Refrigeration (1)		
	Sep	Foam (1)	3	--
		Methyl bromide (1)		
		Refrigeration (1)		
	Oct	Halon (2)	4	--
		Sterilants (1)		
		Methyl bromide (1)		
	Dec	Aerosol (3)	3	--
	Total		**12**	**--**
Total PCRs Due as of September 20, 2008*			**15**	**4**

*Table includes expected PCRs for projects completed up through December 2007 with outstanding PCRs (19 total) and takes care of the number of outstanding PCRs as of September 2008 *minus* PCRs that will be submitted by December 31, 2008 (expected 7). The Bank will, in addition to the above schedule, be submitting PCRs in CY2009 for projects completed through 2008 and up to June 30, 2009.

Table V

SUMMARY OF PCRs RECEIVED IN 2004 WITH DATA PROBLEMS
(As of 20 September 20 2008)

	Canada		Germany		Japan		UNDP		UNEP		UNIDO		World Bank		Total	
	Problems with PCRs	**Problems with PCRs Solved**	**Problems with PCRs**	**Problems with PCRs Solved**	**Problems with PCRs**	**Problems with PCRs Solved**	**Problems with PCRs**	**Problems with PCRs Solved**	**Problems with PCRs**	**Problems with PCRs Solved**	**Problems with PCRs**	**Problems with PCRs Solved**	**Problems with PCRs**	**Problems with PCRs Solved**	**Problems with PCRs**	**Problems with PCRs Solved**
Incomplete Information			2	2	1	1	46	46			28	28	9	9	86	86
Solved as % of Total				**100%**		**100%**		**100%**				**100%**		**100%**		**100%**
Data Inconsistencies																
Planned Date of Completion	1	1	1	1							1	1	3	3	6	6
Revised Planned Date of Completion	1	1	3	3	1	1	15	15	4	4	2	2	24	24	50	50
Date Completed	1	1	3	3			11	10	1	1			9	9	25	24
Funds Approved							2	2			3	3	6	6	11	11
Funds Disbursed	2	2					9	9					6	6	17	17
ODP To Be Phased Out							2	1			2	2			4	3
ODP Phased Out							1	0			4	4	3	3	8	7
Total	**5**	**5**	**7**	**7**	**1**	**1**	**40**	**37**	**5**	**5**	**12**	**12**	**51**	**51**	**121**	**118**
Solved as % of Total		**100%**		**100%**		**100%**		**93%**		**100%**		**100%**		**100%**		**98%**

Table VI

SUMMARY OF PCRs RECEIVED IN 2005 WITH DATA PROBLEMS
(As of 20 September 2008)

	Canada		Germany		Japan		UNDP		UNEP		UNIDO		World Bank		Total	
	Problems with PCRs	**Problems with PCRs Solved**	**Problems with PCRs**	**Problems with PCRs Solved**	**Problems with PCRs**	**Problems with PCRs Solved**	**Problems with PCRs**	**Problems with PCRs Solved**	**Problems with PCRs**	**Problems with PCRs Solved**	**Problems with PCRs**	**Problems with PCRs Solved**	**Problems with PCRs**	**Problems with PCRs Solved**	**Problems with PCRs**	**Problems with PCRs Solved**
Incomplete Information	1	1	1	1	1	1	33	28			32	32	11	10	79	73
Solved as % of Total		**100%**		**100%**		**100%**		**85%**				**100%**		**91%**		**92%**
Data Inconsistencies																
Date Approved	3	3					3	3							6	6
Planned Date of Completion			1	1			15	15			2	2	2	1	20	19
Revised Planned Date of Completion	3	3			2	2	23	21	3	3			27	26	58	55
Date Completed	2	2	1	1	2	2	22	22	1	1	1	1	6	6	35	35
Funds Approved	1	1	1	1									6	6	8	8
Funds Disbursed	1	1					4	4			1	1	5	5	11	11
ODP To Be Phased Out							2	2					3	3	5	5
ODP Phased Out							4	4			1	1	3	3	8	8
Total	**10**	**10**	**3**	**3**	**4**	**4**	**73**	**71**	**4**	**4**	**5**	**5**	**52**	**50**	**151**	**147**
Solved as % of Total		**100%**		**100%**		**100%**		**97%**		**100%**		**100%**		**96%**		**97%**

Table VII

SUMMARY OF PCRs RECEIVED IN 2006 WITH DATA PROBLEMS (As of 20 September 2008)

	Australia		Canada		France		Germany		Japan		Poland		UNDP		UNEP		UNIDO		World Bank		Total	
	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved
Incomplete Information	1	1	1	1	2		8	8					5		1		9	9	35	16	62	35
Solved as % of Total		**100%**		**100%**		**0%**		**100%**		**N/A**		**N/A**		**0%**		**0%**		**100%**		**46%**		**56%**
Data Inconsistencies																						
Date Approved	1	1			1		1	1											3	2	6	4
Planned Date of Completion	1	1	2	2	1										1				17	4	22	7
Revised Planned Date of Completion	1	1	5	5	1		4	4							3		1	1	43	8	58	19
Date Completed	2	2			2		3	3	1	1	1						1	1	5	3	15	10
Funds Approved			2	2	1		1	1											4	0	8	3
Funds Disbursed			4	4	1										1				4	0	10	4
ODP To Be Phased Out							2	2									1	1	5	2	8	5
ODP Phased Out			1	1	1		8	8	1	1							1	1	5	2	17	13
Total	**5**	**5**	**14**	**14**	**8**	**0**	**19**	**19**	**2**	**2**	**1**	**0**			**5**	**0**	**4**	**4**	**86**	**21**	**144**	**65**
Solved as % of Total		**100%**		**100%**		**0%**		**100%**		**100%**		**0%**		**N/A**		**0%**		**100%**		**24%**		**45%**

Table VIII

SUMMARY OF PCRs RECEIVED IN 2007 WITH DATA PROBLEMS (As of 20 September 2008)

	Canada		France		Germany		UNDP		UNEP		UNIDO		World Bank		Total	
	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved
Incomplete Information	2	2			7	7	26	26			3	3	10		48	38
Solved as % of Total		**100%**				**100%**		**100%**				**100%**		**0%**		**79%**
Data Inconsistencies																
Date Approved									1	1			1		2	1
Planned Date of Completion									1	1			1		2	1
Revised Planned Date of Completion	1	1					1	1			5	5	15		22	7
Date Completed			1	1	6	6	9	9	1	1	1	1	5		23	18
Funds Approved											1	1	3		4	1
Funds Disbursed									1	1			4		5	1
ODP To Be Phased Out			1	1	2	2	12	12	2	2	1	1	2		20	18
ODP Phased Out			1	1	7	7	12	12			1	1	1		22	21
Total	**1**	**1**	**3**	**3**	**15**	**15**	**34**	**34**	**6**	**6**	**9**	**9**	**32**	**0**	**100**	**68**
Solved as % of Total		**100%**		**100%**		**100%**		**100%**		**100%**		**100%**		**0%**		**68%**

Table IX

SUMMARY OF PCRs RECEIVED IN 2008 WITH DATA PROBLEMS (As of 9 October 2008)

	Australia		Canada		France		Sweden		UNDP		UNEP		UNIDO		World Bank		Total	
	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved
Incomplete Information	1	1	1	1					17	9	1	1	4	1	3		27	13
Solved as % of Total		**100%**		**100%**						**53%**		**100%**		**25%**				**48%**
Data Inconsistencies																		
Date Approved									1	1			1	1	1		3	2
Planned Date of Completion	1	1	1	1			1	1	2	2			2	2	1		8	7
Revised Planned Date of Completion									6	6	3	3	1	1			10	10
Date Completed	1	1			1				14	9					1		18	10
ODP To Be Phased Out			1	1					12	10	2	2			1		16	13
ODP Phased Out			1	1					14	11	2	2			1		18	14
Total	**2**	**2**	**3**	**3**	**1**		**1**	**1**	**49**	**39**	**7**	**7**	**4**	**4**	**5**		**73**	**56**
Solved as % of Total		**100%**		**100%**				**100%**		**80%**		**100%**		**100%**				**77%**

Annex II

LESSONS LEARNED REPORTED IN PROJECT COMPLETION REPORTS

A. INVESTMENT PROJECTS

(a) To avoid delays, project implementation should have been accompanied by policy measures to promote conversion, for example, import restrictions of CFCs to accelerate a cost increase in comparison to substitutes or an increase of duties for CFCs. After the Government of Pakistan adopted its quota system with reductions starting in 2002, prices slowly began to rise and COOL became much more cooperative and proactive in project implementation. (PAK/REF/23/INV/19).

(b) TECFIN II was structured on the assumption that a local law accelerating the CFC phase-out schedules was to enter into force in order to provide a strong framework of incentives for the grants auction to take place. Since that law took longer than expected, it was necessary to spend resources to promote the advantages of the grants programme. (CHI/MUS/19/INV/14 and CHI/MUS/26/INV/37)

(c) Comprehensive consultation with affected stakeholders and open and transparent dialogue with related public institutions builds positive working relationships that in turn inspire confidence in alternatives. (PER/FUM/31/INV/28)

(d) In retrospect, with the recently approved accelerated HCFC phase-out schedule for Article 5 countries, the enterprises might have been better informed at the stage of technology choice about the long-term risks of converting to HCFCs – namely the possibility that this substance would also be phased out. Enterprises, including small enterprises that may have capacity and resource limitations for certain technologies, should be informed early on about the cost and benefits of technologies not only in terms of product quality, operating costs, etc.; but also in terms of long-term environmental consequences, if any, of alternative technologies (and associated costs). (TUN/FOA/32/INV/36, 32, 38, 39, 40)

(e) The project as originally approved did not contain a flexibility clause allowing for the addition or substitution of additional enterprises within the approved project budget. Through this project the necessity of such a clause was demonstrated in order to handle the addition of otherwise eligible enterprises within the context of the approved project. Subsequent terminal umbrella projects have contained the so-called “flexibility clause” to allow for more flexible project implementation to achieve the desired project objectives. (PAR/REF/34/INV/12)

(f) While dealing with group or umbrella projects with beneficiaries having varied degrees of capacity, the selection of the equipment should be decided on a case-by-case basis by looking at the technical capability of the enterprise(s) to handle and maintain high-tech equipment. If the enterprise is deemed to be not capable to handle sophisticated machinery even with training, then in such cases equipment that is more aligned with the overall capacity should be selected. Also, policies need to be simplified to deal with groups and smaller recipients with basic skills and capacity. (PAK/FOA/23/INV/20 and PAK/FOA/25/INV/25)

(g) Implementation of similar umbrella projects with the requirement of industrial rationalization within a group of enterprises requires longer time for implementation. (CPR/FOA/35/INV/379)

(h) Delayed implementation – for whatever reason – can change the scope of work in group projects considerably. Also group projects are not well suited to address individual requirements. (IDS/FOA/23/INV/78)

(i) The reimbursement of expenses avoided losses, but extended the project a year or two unnecessarily. This required more trips by the foreign consultant and was more costly than necessary. Had we advanced each enterprise a sizeable part of their local expense budget, that could have resulted is some losses, but would have been far less expensive than the repeated visits by foreign consultants. (IND/ARS/38/INV/358)

(j) Regarding the flammable (such as cyclopentane) conversion project, local firefighting bureaus and labor safety inspection agencies must be involved with the design so as to shorten the time to approve and commission. This project has experienced a time as long as 37 months to apply and finally obtain approval from these agencies. (CPR/REF/23/INV/226)

(k) Taken into consideration the complicated situation, it is better to set a longer implementation period during the project preparation. In addition, it is more rational to make the equipment supplier responsible to install the equipment until it meets the requirement of this project completely. This would simplify the process and save time. (CPR/REF/25/INV/249)

(l) Yangzhou Kelon has the following suggestions for future ODS phase-out projects:

(i) In the original project implementation plan, the counterpart financed works of cyclopentane system was not sufficiently considered, especially the electric grounding problem. For example at O area and I area, the equipment electric grounding system was not separated with power grounding system. Fortunately during the inspection carried out by Yangzhou Kelon the problem was discovered and the problem corrected.

(ii) Since 2001, many Chinese cities adjusted the urban development plan due to rapid economic development in the past few years, which usually involves the relocation of industrial factories from urban center to suburban area. Some reforms go smoothly with little negative impact on the conversion projects. But some enterprises were greatly affected and the conversion projects came to a standstill. (CPR/REF/34/INV/378)

(m) In this project, delays in project implementation were caused mainly by implementation delays in a project in another country in the region (Malawi). It is important to closely monitor all projects in a region with related implementation issues (common equipment supplier is a major potential issue). If implementation delays in one project are causing a cascading delay effect among other projects, actions may be required to assure that other projects are not negatively impacted by one enterprise's delays. (URT/FOA/31/INV/13)

(n) Many lessons were learned relative to liquid carbon dioxide (LCD) technology. It was most importantly discovered that, depending on location, it may be extremely costly to lease or purchase storage tanks for the liquid carbon dioxide, which can cause an otherwise cost-effective project to become difficult to implement. In this case, the enterprise was financially unable to make up the added cost to purchase the LCD tank, and it was feared that the entire project goal could be jeopardized as a result. Any future LCD projects should be carefully planned to include supply of the LCD tank as part of the equipment supply. (LIB/FOA/35/INV/15)

(o) The lessons learned for future action in project CPR/FOA/29/INV/304 are as follows:

(i) Getting supervision from UNDP and technical assistance from the international experts in time is very important for project implementation;

(ii) Coordination and management from the government and DIA is very necessary for project implementation;

(iii) The situation that DIA and the procurement agent is the same organization is good for project implementation;

(iv) Technical strength, operation and management scale and active cooperation and understanding of the beneficiary enterprises are the foundation for successful implementation of the project.

B. NON-INVESTMENT PROJECTS

(a) The adoption of a harmonized legislation on ODS import in Western and Central French-speaking countries makes the enforcement of national regulations easier. The adoption of local regulations has been facilitated through this project. (AFR/SEV/32/TAS/28)

(b) Regional cooperation for monitoring and control of ODS consumption and preventing illegal trade in South-East and South Asia:

(i) As requested by the countries, providing more time between workshops allowed countries to better follow-up and prepare their input to the subsequent meeting. Providing more time between workshops also meant that additional bilateral and small group meetings could be organised discussing specific problems between countries and this was perceived as very useful by the countries. As implementing agency we had recommended more frequent meetings as this was believed to keep the participants more active and also minimize the risk of participants forgetting what was discussed at previous meeting or of participants being changed.

(ii) The planned activity on enforcement tools proved difficult to implement. This was partly due to countries being at different levels with regards to the amount of ODS being imported/exported and also their monitoring possibilities and capabilities. With regards to the initial ideas for setting-up a website or a database, another reason why that was difficult was that long-term commitment and ownership is important in order to solve issues of credibility, maintenance and security and that this is difficult to arrange when the recipient and user is a network with a three year programme.

(iii) One of the main pillars of the success of the project is the insistence on having the same officers attend all the workshops. This allowed for deeper understanding of the specific problems, created a big capacity building of those officers, allowed for a mutual search for solutions, with officers taking a very active role. The project did of course see a number of country participants being changed but on the whole the majority of the participants remained the same during the project period.

(iv) Initially, the establishment of a project steering group was crucial to get the project set up accepted by some of the participating countries (for the SEAP region in 2001). Especially one country made it clear that they were unwilling to meet within the proposed network and exchange information on trade data and other information that could be regarded as confidential. Even if we stressed the fact that the network had no intentions of requesting countries to provide sensitive data and that the aim was primarily on capacity building, one country was unwilling to attend. We therefore suggested the establishment of a steering committee (SC) with participants from two countries (rotating) – one LVC and one HVC – plus UNEP and Sida/SEI as implementing agencies and donor in order to increase the countries control over the project. The role of the SC would *inter alia* be to comment on agendas, suggest suitable speakers and experts and help identify stakeholders and participants for the project meetings. With this arrangement, all countries agreed to participate. The establishment of the SC was also positive in that it increased countries active participation in the project.

(v) As the project worked closely on regional cooperation involving customs officers and international organizations, the assistance of a consultant with specific background in customs work, within the region has proven very effective in taking specific activities forward, such as the desk study, or the cooperation with the Regional Intelligence Liaison Office (RILO) and other enforcement agencies.

(vi) Outreach was not limited to national/regional implementation. The search of solutions on specific issues led countries to take the initiative to bring certain problems to the Meeting of the Parties which subsequently led to MoP decisions on illegal trade being taken.

(vii) Informing other regional networks worldwide about the activities of the project, led to a request by other regions to implement similar project. Some activities are being replicated such as cooperation with RILO offices in different regions through formalised agreements. Countries in the Latin America region are currently implementing a similar project.

(viii) Other MEA secretariats also showed interest in being involved, while the participating countries felt the need to extend the concept of cooperation between officers responsible for MEA implementation and customs to specifically the Rotterdam, Stockholm and Basel Conventions. This has now also been realised through the Sida funded extension of the project to include other MEAs.

(ix) The project generated awareness raising within organizations, including Interpol and WCO, to put environmental crime on their agenda. However, awareness raising works both ways. The environment side needs to have an understanding of what other organizations do, including specific tools they make available which could be useful in tackling environmental crime, such as the Ecomessage of Interpol and the Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) of RILO.

(x) Use of such tools for combating environmental crime will give a clear sign to those organizations about the importance that member countries attach to environmental crime. This in turn may lead those organizations to allocate more resources to environmental crime, giving it attention in their work programmes. (ASP/SEV/34/TAS/42)

(c) Strengthening of import/export control in Indonesia:

(i) Analysis of global trade data points to a large scale and entrenched illegal trade in Indonesia. Despite significant fluctuations in the yearly figures, the trade data analysis confirms that a certain amount of unregistered CFC are imported to Indonesia annually. It further shows a discrepancy between reported exports by producer countries and reported imports by Indonesia, further suggesting that most of the trade goes unreported in Indonesia. The current value of this data for verification of imports is limited due to apparently consistent mistakes in recording HS codes.

(ii) To allow for the legal and verifiable import of adequate amounts of ODS, all other systems in the region and around the world rely on historical and periodically updated information from registered importers. This is currently not possible under the Indonesia previous regulation, because all quotas are going to one company that has historically not imported ODS and cannot be a source of accurate import information. A sample of six regional import systems showed an average of over 15 registered CFC importers per country, most with a fraction of Indonesia's consumption.

(iii) Training of custom officers has been done in this project, and the outcome shows that it could prevent the CFC illegal imports more effectively. However, since the number of custom officers and ports is large, more training related to information on environmental issues, especially those related to Montreal Protocol, has to be done.

(iv) Custom need ODS portable detectors: Custom offices in at least 6 ports need portable ODS detectors, so that the officers could test the suspect tanks in efficient and effective ways. Current custom laboratory has limited gas chromatograph availability so that the test result may come weeks later delaying the process in the port.

(v) Close collaboration between MOE, MOT, and Custom: Close collaboration has to be strengthened between Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Trade and Custom Office, in order to share the ODS imports information.

(vi) Strong penalty should be applied to illegal importers. The penalty should be part of new ODS import regulations.

(vii) Sharing on import information should be strengthened between Indonesia and exporter countries. This could be done by sharing the information on name and address of legal importers and producers. Further, it should be agreed between the countries that the ODS can be exported and imported through legal companies only. (IDS/SEV/37/TAS/149)

(d) Much of the materials used for the training of customs officers can also be used to train environmental inspectors and investigators, although the emphasis with the latter group needs to be more technical in nature. In the case of a country like Benin which consumes CFCs only in refrigeration and air conditioning, it is important for environmental inspectors and investigators to understand where, why and how CFCs are used, and the basic fundamentals of good practices. (BEN/REF/32/TRA/11)

(e) National R&R project under the refrigerant management plan (RMP) in Bangladesh:

(i) Financial incentive is required to encourage R&R;

(ii) Awareness and constant monitoring are essential;

(iii) Small size electric recovery machine is better for recovery activities in developing countries. (BGD/REF/29/TAS/10)

(f) The refrigeration servicing sector in Bhutan requires further training as only 33 have been trained so far. It would be beneficial to have institutions offer such training as part of their curriculum so that sustainability is ensured and the sector benefits immensely with the availability of trained technicians in this sector for domestic as well as industrial purposes. (BHU/REF/45/TAS/06)

(g) Implementation of RMP in Belize:

(i) UNDP ended up in a situation where it was not possible to provide training to the technicians, and the equipment was distributed without having received prior training, because of delays in the implementation of the training programme. It is strongly recommended that the training activities are implemented by the Implementing Agency that is in charge of the investment component.

(ii) Technicians prefer oil-less recycling equipment so that they can work on both liquid and gas charging of the refrigeration or air conditioning equipment being serviced. (BZE/REF/44/TAS/12)

(h) RMP update in El Salvador:

(i) The quantities of recycled CFC are not as high as expected. Three reasons have been identified: a) the supply of imported CFC is still high and the prices low, which reduces the economic incentive of recycling, b) the absence of any enforcement measure to make recovery mandatory, and c) the ODS importers, who were chosen as the recycling operators, do not have an incentive to function as recycling centers because it is easier and more profitable to sell virgin CFC.

(ii) The use of CFC-11 for flushing purposes continues to be widespread. The maintenance workshops claim that, apart from the fact that they do not know of a better cleaning agent, CFC-11 is available in convenient small packaging, and nitrogen, for example, only comes in big cylinders that require a large cash deposit.

(iii) The ODS Import Quota System still needs fine tuning concerning the improvement of customs import control and recording, introduction of export controls and tightening of CFC-11 quota levels, in order to achieve its full potential.

(iv) The existence of much CFC-based commercial, industrial and domestic equipment is a cause of concern and needs to be addressed in order to prevent the negative impact on the end user when the scarcity of CFC starts to show.

(v) The number of companies that requested assistance for conversion of their CFC-based refrigeration equipment was much less than expected. After verification with potential companies that did not apply for assistance, it was confirmed that the "call for expression of interest" needed to be published for a longer period of time and that this effort needed to be coupled with direct contact with some enterprises in addition to explanatory meetings.

(vi) The support that is being provided to the refrigeration sector in the way of recovery equipment and technical assistance should be extended to the private technical training institutions that are credited by INSAFORP, such as Universidad Don Bosco, Instituto Tecnológico Centroamericano and Instituto Técnico Ricaldone, which cover an important percentage of the industry's needs for qualified personnel.

(vii) The refrigeration servicing sector should also continue to be supported in the creation of refrigeration technicians associations in the most important regions of the country, since these institutions serve to promote a more formal practice of the trade and also serve as a channel of communication and multiplier of actions in the framework of the implementation of the Montreal Protocol in the country.

(viii) During the final years of the CFC phase out schedule, the government will need to focus the technical assistance for conversion of CFC-based critical refrigeration equipment on two key sectors of the economy and social services, namely the industrial fishing fleet, in particular the installed bank of cold rooms both onboard and on shore.

(ix) The network of public hospitals with CFC-based refrigeration equipment used for the conservation of vaccines and other uses has sought government assistance. The drastic elimination of CFC import permits in 2006 and the suspected increase in illegal CFC trade call for improved assistance to the customs department both at the national level and in the efforts for regional integration. (ELS/REF/42/TAS/13)

(i) RMP monitoring cannot be limited to a short-lived project because the RMP establishes systems (R&R, import licenses, etc.) are expected to function successfully during the whole phase-out process and must therefore be monitored on a more regular and permanent basis. (ELS/REF/42/TAS/15)

(j) The need to adapt the environmental initiatives to the prevailing characteristics of the country was once again proven by the fact that the planned scheduled for technical training had to be changed from working days to week-ends due to the impossibility of technicians to abandon their daily obligations in order to attend optional training. (ELS/REF/42/TRA/14)

(k) Study on development of ODS phase-out strategy for SMEs by UNEP:

(i) The SME issue is complex in general and studies of such a broad nature (all SMEs, global coverage, different sectors) are difficult to narrow down. In the future, such projects should be more narrowly focussed at the outset to yield clearer results.

(ii) The methodology of the study was largely based on participatory stakeholder consultations that drew on the knowledge and experience of those who have been most directly involved in various SME-focused efforts over the years. In the future, for such an approach sufficient time should be allotted in the schedule for this type of data collection.

(iii) Outside of the Montreal Protocol community, the issue of MEA compliance in relation to SMEs is not well known by those organizations working with small companies (they tend to focus on primary environmental issues). Accordingly,

additional time/energy is needed to explain the issue (build their capacity) just to understand what we are seeking. (GLO/SEV/34/TAS/230)

(l) Implementation of the RMP in Niger: It might be useful to consider or to propose in the next RMP-type of projects how the national authorities should organize the replenishment of spare parts stocks as well as oil for the equipment. It was also reported that the recovery bags were too fragile and that it would be necessary to incorporate the obligation of setting aside some of the income of the recycling centres to provide for the purchasing of spare parts. (NER/REF/27/TAS/06 and 07)

(m) The fact that some technicians in small workshops only spoke Hindi and Urdu was not anticipated early in the project. This information will be factored into future projects. Proper monitoring and timely field visits helped mitigate this as well as other challenges. (OMA/REF/34/TAS/05)

(n) The key to effective training development and management has been through mobilising the right expertise, training the right person, putting key concepts into practice, transparent evaluation of training, confidence building through increasing capacity and post training monitoring. (KAM/REF/41/TAS/05)

(o) RMP implementation in Kyrgystan:

(i) It is better to distribute CFC detectors to State Customs and State Ecological Inspection as it has their representatives at entry points and it will facilitate the customs clearance and improve CFC control.

(ii) In accordance with the local legislation the CFC detectors must be submitted for metrological check up and it is necessary to establish procedures for analysis of ODS. (KYR/REF/37/TRA/03)

(p) In our opinion it is important to extend support for the training programme, by including senior students of refrigeration and ecology sector. (KYR/REF/37/TRA/06)

(q) Demonstration activities take as much time and resources as phase-out projects. It would be wiser to have projects where the first phase helps to test/demonstrate the alternatives to mitigate risk, and where the second phase can rightly engage in phase-out through alternative technologies. (CHI/FUM/25/DEM/35)

(r) The MDI Transition Strategy and the MDI Conversion Project for Cuba were the first projects in the MDI sector submitted to the Multilateral Fund for consideration for funding. The resolution of many of the issues confronted in the preparation of these projects facilitated the preparation and submission of other projects in the same sector. Many of the lessons learned in the preparation of these projects were used in the preparation of the guidelines for the preparation of MDI projects. In particular the issues related to the technology transfer to produce CFC-free MDIs were the ones that showed most difficulty and in which more progress has been achieved in the sector. Many of the technical aspects related to product development prepared for the first time in these projects are now used as reference in new MDI projects. (CUB/ARS/36/TAS/19)

(s) With the funds allocated to the Halon Banking and Recycling Centre (HBRC), the equipment that could be procured was a Getz Model HR1L 1301/1211 Recovery/Recycle Unit complete with air driven double acting pump, heavy duty hoses and quick connects, plus input strainer/particulate filter and moisture filter/dryer as well as an air compressor,

model Contract HF2 rated at 20cfm, 100PSI, power supply 220/1/60. Nevertheless, the proper functioning of the HBRC required the following additional equipment: 10 240 lbs. capacity tanks for halon 1211 rated at 260 PSI, suitable for 1211 only, 20 100 Lbs. capacity tanks for halon 1301 rated at 400 PSI, suitable for 1301 & 1211, halon tank adapters fitting package, spares for halon recovery unit, bench scale and halon identifier equipment. Therefore, the project called for complementary resources that would ensure the procurement of the additional equipment required, and hence, the proper functioning of the HBRC. This need was addressed through a phase II project approved by the Executive Committee at its 51st Meeting. (DOM/HAL/38/TAS/32)

(t) National Halon Management and Banking Programme in India:

(i) India, with of course the help of the fire industry suppliers who had commercial dollars in their mind when pushing the range of new halon alternative technologies, changed must faster than anyone anticipated with dependence on halon rapidly diminishing. The India halon banking project should have followed on very quickly from the other halon equipment manufacturing conversion projects in the country.

(ii) It appears that once the project was completed and handed over with all funds depleted, other projects took priority over the actual operation of the facility. The actual selection process of the local organization to manage and operate the bank perhaps could be considered for other projects. The proposal to study the management and viability of halon banking projects already implemented to ascertain reasons for viability or lack thereof will be a useful adjunct to experiences gained in this particular project. (IND/HAL/32/TAS/281 and IND/HAL/32/TAS/278)

(u) National Halon Management and Banking Programme in Mexico:

(i) Upon failure of one of the equipment items on start-up, it was necessary for that equipment to be exported back to the USA for repair which also included the provision of an alternative type of refrigerant chemical which subsequently was ascertained was not on the local approved list.

(ii) Upon re-import back into Mexico it was held up in customs for several months not only because of the alternative refrigerant problem but customs had deemed the equipment to be different thereby attracting significant import taxes even though the exact same equipment item had already been previously imported satisfactorily and then exported. This particular experience is a lesson learned for anyone else in ensuring local customs regulations are explored in detail.

(iii) One other lesson learnt regarding the equipment failure was the decision taken at the outset of the international bid analysis stage, as with all other projects, to only specify recognized, reputable and proven equipment suppliers. In this case, the supplier accepted total responsibility and upon receipt of the equipment item back from Mexico, immediately diagnosed the fault and moved quickly to develop a technical solution. (MEX/HAL/35/TAS/104)

(v) Buy-in and cooperation of industry is critical for successful CTC survey. It would be a good idea to use one industry nodal point to undertake the survey and provide the results under the supervision of NOU. (IND/SOL/35/TAS/343)

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