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执行蒙特利尔议定书
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第五十四次会议
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关于体制建设项目评价的案头研究

目 录

执行摘要和执行委员会预期将采取的行动

1. 这一案头研究是评价的第一阶段，内容涉及体制建设项目迄今为止的结果和成就，以及关于体制建设项目在最终淘汰各类氟氯化碳和开始淘汰各类氯氟烃期间的未来范围、管理和供资的建议。评价的第二阶段将包括以向所有国家臭氧机构发出的一份调查表加以补充的进一步文件分析和 2008 年期间在区域网络会议上与国家臭氧机构、执行机构和其他方面进行的一系列个别和集体面谈，以及若干项国家案例研究。

2. 为编写案头研究报告，审查了以 20 个体制建设项目的结束报告和延长申请所构成的样本提供的资料。还考虑到了执行委员会的有关决定和基金秘书处的文件。与执行机构的电话访谈和向 24 个选定的国家臭氧机构发出且其中 16 个作了答复的试验性调查表则成为这一资料的补充。

3. 所分析的结束报告和延长申请提供了关于国家臭氧机构在多边基金支持下富有创造性和干劲实足地推动它们国家遵照《蒙特利尔议定书》淘汰臭氧消耗物质的丰富资料。所有接受访谈的方面和所收到的 16 份调查表确认，得到执行机构和区域网络支持的体制建设项目均已成为胜利执行《蒙特利尔议定书》的不可或缺的组成部分。

4. 对结束报告及延长申请和所收到调查表的审查已经查明了若干需在评价的第二阶段进行更为详尽调查的重要问题。这些问题包括：

(a) 体制建设项目的成果和影响；

(b) 政治和行政背景；

(c) 体制建设项目的规划和报告；

(d) 执行问题；

(e) 今后工作；和

(f) 供资问题。

5. 这次评价的关键问题是，1992 年以来，特别是 2000 年最后一次评价以来体制建设资金在能力建设方面取得了什么成就、其可持续性情况如何和为在 2010 年及以后实现淘汰和履约目标还需开展什么工作。过去几年的体制建设项目提供了什么起作用和什么不起作用的丰富资料。重要的是洞察、理解和使用这些资料前瞻多边基金领导下的下一阶段的体制建设项目。

6. 成功与否（从实现和维持履约方面加以界定）不仅取决于国家臭氧机构的表现，还取决于其他因素，例如宏观经济条件、政治和行政架构、立法、执法和利益相关者的合作。评价因而将试图确定国家臭氧机构——通过体制建设的支持——是否及在何种程度上参与：

(a) 构建政治和行政架构；

(b) 发展立法从而使它以确保履约为目的顺理成章地创建起来并得到便利执行；

(c) 确保立法和其他政策文件得到执行；以及

(d) 便利和促进利益相关者合作。

7. 评价应审查取得的成果，利用上文第 6 段所述各项因素利方面的体制建设项目的样本，试图收集尽可能客观的资料，为此单独征求利益相关者、与国家臭氧机构协作的其他政府机构、与国家臭氧机构同一部委的上级高级官员和公司或行业协会的私营部门代表，以及执行机构的意见。

8. 下一批步骤将是：

(a) 参照从一系列初步访谈和所收到调查表中获得的资料和反馈最终敲定评价文书（问题清单和调查表）；

(b) 向其余所有国家臭氧机构分发经修订的调查表并确定进一步访谈的合作伙伴；

(c) 在网络会议上及在编写国家案例研究的过程中收集资料；视需要利用其他通讯手段，例如传真和电子邮件；

(d) 为所有区域编写案例研究报告；以及

(e) 编写含有调查结论和建议的综合评价报告，供执行委员会第五十六次会议审议。

9. 谨建议执行委员会注意 UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/54/13 号文件提交的关于体制建设项目评价的案头研究所提供的信息，包括为评价第二阶段提出的评价问题和工作计划。

一. 背景和方法

10. 继对 2010 年后体制建设支助方案进行讨论之后，执行委员会决定在其第五十三次会议上请基金秘书处审查为能力建设可能作出的供资安排和数额，并探索为供资可能考虑采取的任何其他措施的范围、性质和合宜程度，以便部署氟氯烃淘汰活动。执行委员会还要求作为 2008 年监测和评价工作方案的组成部分评价以往的成果和成就。

11. 这一案头研究的目的是编写这一评价报告，特别是：

(a) 审查和概要介绍基金秘书处现有的体制建设项目的资料；

(b) 以文件允许的程度尽可能回顾以往体制建设项目评价的后续行动和第 30/7 号决定的各项建议；以及

(c) 确定全面评价体制建设项目的各项问题，包括一项拟议的实地访问计划。

12. 这一案头研究所用资料的来源：

(a) 执行委员会和缔约方会议的文件和报告；

(b) 20 个体制建设项目的代表性样本的结束报告和延长申请；

(c) 1999-2000 年的体制建设项目评价的评价报告和数据；

(d) 关于国家淘汰计划评价的案头研究（2007 年 2 月）；

(e) 与执行机构的电话讨论；以及

(f) 16 个国家臭氧机构填写完毕的试验调查表。

13. 顾问回顾了这些文件，分析了体制建设项目的演变，并回顾了执行委员会关于核准、延长、资助的标准和报告要求的各项决定。她还回顾了执行委员会关于制冷剂管理计划、行业淘汰计划、国家淘汰计划和结束性淘汰管理计划的各项决定，因为这些决定涉及与体制建设项目密切相关的活动。她还对 20 个国家所组成样本的结束报告及延长申请，以及曾被要求填写作为试验样本的调查表的 24 个国家臭氧机构中的 9 个机构及时返回的调查表中的资料进行了分析。最后，与执行机构的代表进行了访谈，以了解他们对体制建设项目的以往成就、当前问题和未来前景的看法和想法。

二. 体制建设项目概览

14. 自 1992 年起，执行委员会为 141 个第 5 条缔约方核准了 580 个体制建设项目（包括所有的延长）。年复一年，核准项目的数量逐步增加，从 1992 年的 10 个项目增加到 2007 年的 61 个项目。在 580 个项目中，截至 2007 年 12 月已完成了 351 个项目 (60.5 %)。

15. 为 580 个项目核准了共计 63,921,291 美元，其中 43,506,248 美元(68.06 %)已支付，并且 484,348 美元 (0.75 %)已归还。核准的体制建设项目（及资金）按机构分列：法国 1 个（38,874 美元）、美利坚合众国 1 个（350,000 美元）、德国 4 个（447,393 美元）、工发组织 31 个（4,580,600 美元）、世界银行 35 个（6,178,769 美元）、开发计划署 129 个（26,022,767 美元）和环境规划署 379 个（26,302,888 美元）。

16. 经核准，103 个国家的体制建设项目由环境规划署执行，24 个国家的由开发计划署执行，11 个国家的由工发组织执行，7 个国家的由世界银行执行，2 个国家的由德国执行，1 个国家的由法国执行，以及 1 个国家的由美利坚合众国执行。

按机构分列的体制建设核准情况

	法国	德国	世行	开发署	环境署	工发组织	美国	总数
1992 年			4	5			1	10
1993 年			2	9	8	2		21
1994 年	1			5	13			19
1995 年				2	9	2		13
1996 年			1	9	11	1		22
1997 年			1	4	16			21
1998 年			2	11	16	1		30
1999 年			3	5	22	3		33
2000 年			2	13	19	3		37
2001 年			2	6	16	3		27
2002 年		1	2	12	37	1		53
2003 年	1	1	3	6	35	2		47
2004 年			3	12	45	3		63
2005 年			4	7	35	4		50
2006 年		2	2	10	53	2		69
2007 年			3	12	42	3		61
总数	**1**	**2**	**7**	**24**	**103**	**11**	**1**	**143**

注：一些国家的体制建设由不止一个机构执行

17. 在 580 个体制建设项目中，为非洲国家核准了 205 个项目（供资总额 17,986,103 美元），为亚洲和太平洋核准了 179 个项目（22,527,742 美元），为拉丁美洲和加勒比核准了 158 个项目（19,373,105 美元），以及为欧洲核准了 38 个项目（4,034,341 美元）。

18. 351 个已完成项目的平均耽搁期为 12.3 个月。这种情况在各个阶段有所不同，第一阶段为 20.85 个月，第二阶段为 9.2 个月，第三阶段为 6.08 个月，第四阶段为 4.97 个月，第五阶段为 7.17 个月，以及在第六阶段为 2.32 个月。这显示，主要的耽搁更有可能发生在体制建设项目的初期阶段并在随后阶段有所改进。

19. 351 个已完成项目的耽搁分布情况显示如下：

(a) 提前完成 21

(b) 按时完成 72

(c) 1-6 个月的耽搁 74

(d) 7-12 个月的耽搁 68

(e) 13-24 个月的耽搁 60

(f) 25 个月或更长的耽搁 56

20. 下表按区域概要分列了执行耽搁情况，它显示，将超过完成日期的月数与核准的项目期相比，平均耽搁率为 39 %。附件一（续）提供了每个国家的详细情况。虽然不同区域之间有一些差异，特别是非洲和亚洲及太平洋，但所有区域均出现了重大耽搁。

按区域分列的体制建设项目执行耽搁情况

区域	核准的国家数	耽搁的国家数	核准的项目期（月）	耽搁月份总数	耽搁月份百分比
非洲	52	52	5,397	2,313	43%
亚洲和太平洋	44	40	4,480	1,506	34%
欧洲	12	9	1,042	417	40%
拉丁美洲和加勒比	33	33	4,134	1,587	38%
共计	**141**	**134**	**15.053**	**5,823**	**39%**

21. 在总数达 26%的项目按时或甚至于提前完成的同时，一些项目却出现重大耽搁，对全面评价来说，探讨这种情况的原因颇有裨益。其重要的原因是，耽搁的可能结果是干扰淘汰活动，不管怎么样都会损耗国家臭氧机构现有的资源。

22. 秘书处在审查执行机构提交的年进度报告的过程中注意到了体制建设项目的耽搁。如果超过了计划的完成日期，则要求提交一份状况报告，并且该项目将继续受到监测，但没有被取消的风险，即使再出现进一步的耽搁（第 32/44 号决定）。

三. 执行委员会关于体制建设项目的各项决定

23. 1991 年，执行委员会认为体制建设作为特例可以成为实现《蒙特利尔议定书》目标中的基本要素。它们认为基金在考虑到下列方面的情况下可以提供有限的资金或援助：

(a) 该国消费的受控物质数量，以及

(b) 体制建设和具体执行项目之间的联系。[1]

24. 体制建设并没有明确列入缔约方第四次会议 1992 年 11 月通过的增支费用类别的提示性清单中。缔约方同意，如果该清单以外的增支费用可以辨别并确定数量，执行委员会将决定多边基金是否可支付这种费用。开辟为体制建设增支费用供资的可能性是鼓励及早采用臭氧保护技术。[2]

25. 直至 1996 年，执行委员会决定，体制建设项目可按照第一次核准时的相同数额按两年期延长，其条件是提交一份进度报告和一份今后行动的计划[3]。

[1] （UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/5/16，第28(d)段）。（有关文件：UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/7/20），（UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/7/Inf.3）。

[2] 《保护臭氧层国际条约手册》，第六版（2003 年），环境规划署，第 300 页。

[3] （UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/19/64，第19/29号决定，第54段）。

26. 上一个体制建设项目评价的最后报告提交给了执行委员会第三十会次会议。建立在所有区域的国家案例研究基础上的调查结论和建议受到了广泛讨论，并且执行委员会通过了第 30/7 号决定。这一决定试图确保通过体制建设项目受到资助的国家臭氧机构在其国家中拥有所需的身份、地位、影响和关系，从而带来确保履约所需的变化。它还要求国家臭氧机构建立收集和监测臭氧消耗物质数据的制度，并要求执行机构更加积极和反应灵敏地支持国家臭气机构。第 30/7 号决定的全文载于附件八。

27. 第 30/7 号决定首次规定须全面说明体制建设项目的需求，并且执行机构须将其规定纳入与各国政府就新的和延长的体制建设项目所签订的协定。然而，意识到体制建设项目执行的灵活性需要，执行委员会指出，这些协定应该适宜并适应于不同国家的具体情况。

28. 为改进体制建设项目的报告和规划，执行委员会第三十二次会议核准了体制建设项目的结束报告和延长申请的订正格式（第 32/17 号决定）。这些格式仍在使用，并且 20 个国家的这种报告组成的样本在本案头研究期间受到了分析。

29. 继针对第 5 条缔约方的第一项控制措施（冻结各类氟氯化碳消费）于 1999 年 7 月生效之后，执行委员会制定了该战略规划框架。它以建立在行业和国家淘汰计划之上的国家驱动办法取代了“项目循序渐进”的办法。执行委员会在 2001 年第五十三次会议上决定按 30%的幅度增加对所有体制建设项目和延长项目的资助，以帮助各国掌握新的战略规划框架，并增加用于提高公共意识等关键活动的资源。他们同意，这一新的资金数额至少应广泛实行到 2010 年，即使一些国家已实行提早淘汰。作为该一揽子计划的组成部分，执行委员会临时同意，未来非投资活动（包括体制建设项目）应分得一笔按 12.10/ODP 公斤的费率计算的“臭氧消耗物质淘汰金额”[4]。然而，考虑到低消费量国家目前的臭氧消耗物质消费量颇低，执行委员会随后决定不将此种做法适用于它们。

30. 2004 年，执行委员会决定，极低消费量国家和低消费量国家每年应获得至少 30,000 美元的体制建设资助，这与实际消费数额无关，条件是：

(a) 该国派遣一名全职官员管理臭氧机构；

(b) 该国实行许可证制度以控制臭氧消耗物质进口[5]。

31. 当一些国家不履约时，执行委员会核准体制建设供资申请以一年期取代两年期。这种做法已在 27 个个案中实行（19 个国家，其中 8 个国家的体制建设项目两度延长，每次延长一年）。此外，24 个国家，通常是极小国家和新缔约方的 29 个体制建设项目提出其他一些问题，并被核准仅延长一年。

[4] 12.1 美元/公斤是基金会所核准的投资项目平均成本效益值的三分之一。
[5] （UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/43/61，第 43/37 号决定，第 128 段）。（有关文件：UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/43/49）。

四. 20个选定国家的体制建设项目文审查

四.1 选定的样本和分析的文件

32. 为进行这一案头研究，顾问审查了 20 个国家组成的代表性样本的近一时期的结束报告和延长申请，自多边基金 1992 年 2 月就中国核准了其第一个体制建设项目起，它已设立了 101 个单独的体制建设项目。样本中的国家属于消费量大小不一的消费者，一些国家的体制建设项目的经验很长，其他一些国家则在最近刚开始。样本涵盖了所有四个主要执行机构和一个双边机构领导的体制建设项目，并包括所有地区的国家（详情见附件三）。

33. 基金秘书处所掌握这些国家体制建设项目的其他一系列材料也被作了回顾，包括：

(a) 执行机构的进度报告；

(b) 提交执行委员会的项目概览；

(c) 关于履约、臭氧消耗物质消费和批准现况的数据摘要；和

(d) 基金秘书处和执行机构为澄清项目报告问题的换函。

34. 这些材料是第 5 条缔约方如何执行体制建设项目的丰富资料来源。它们显示了国家臭氧机构如何创造性地利用各种机会，包括多边基金和执行机构的支持，实现在其国家胜利执行《蒙特利尔议定书》。

35. 结束报告和延长申请并不包含理解和评价体制建设项目所需的所有资料。关于履约、消费量及趋势、批准现况和投资及其他项目的进度的重要资料存在于其他地方，包括存在于执行机构的进度报告中。基金秘书处为协助执行委员会将所有这些材料有益地汇集了起来。一些执行机构的进度报告和基金秘书处的概览包含着未见诸结束报告的关于体制建设项目的重要资料。对全面评价来说，探讨一下如何将这一资料更容易地汇集以及为什么国家臭氧机构会在其结束报告中少报重要或令人颇感兴趣的资料将获益匪浅。

四.2 履约和批准的现况

36. 体制建设项目的主要目标是支持各国实现和维持履约。其目标还在于大力鼓励批准该议定书的修正案。20 个样本国家似乎取得了成功，因为仅有两个国家（智利和菲律宾）存在着暂时的履约问题。关于批准的记录也令人鼓舞，虽然改进将不无裨益。

样本国（20 国）中已批准下列文书的国家数			
《伦敦修正案》（1990 年）	《哥本哈根修正案》（1992 年）	《蒙特利尔修正案》（1997 年）	《北京修正案》（1999 年）
20	20	18	15

37. 全面评价应该探讨为什么一些国家臭氧机构促使其政府批准了修正案，而其他一些国家臭氧机构则继续报告遇到了困难，虽然批准似乎不止一次成为其体制建设项目的目标。全面评价应探索在体制建设资助中纳入旨在促进早日和迅速通过各项修正案的激励措施的可能性。

四.3 体制建设项目耽搁

38. 在为样本国家核准的 101 个体制建设项目中，52 个项目（51.5％）显示曾出现过某种耽搁，例如在预定的完成日期之后完成。在一些个案中，耽搁仅仅是数月并且可能是因逾期未缴最后付款或丢失报告而造成的。在其他一些个案中，耽搁要严重得多，时间长达数年，而不是数月。如果该国未收到为支持实现和维持履约而核准的资金的话，这种耽搁就会变得颇为严重。考虑到项目耽搁是执行委员会评判表现时注意到的情况之一，耽搁还有可能损害国家和执行机构的声誉。可考虑以不同的办法来减少或消除这种耽搁。

四.4 体制建设一年期延长

39. 在一国履约出现问题的情况下，执行委员会通常将体制建设项目延长一年而不是两年。抽样中的两个国家，即智利和菲律宾有四个这种项目。在这两个个案中，两国在两年后均恢复了正常的两年期周期，因为国家臭氧机构成功地采取行动加速淘汰并恢复履约。

40. 案头研究并没有详细探讨项目耽搁和一年期延长，但这些问题应在全面评价的过程中加以探讨，从而更好地理解：

(a) 为什么体制建设项目受到耽搁，如何才能减少耽搁，以及耽搁会对国家臭氧机构和体制建设活动产生什么影响；

(b) 将体制建设项目延长一年而不是两年对该国和国家臭氧机构的影响。这一政策将在何种程度上从正面激励解决履约问题，以及是否还存在着其他机制。

四.5 体制建设项目的目标

41. 顾问详细探讨了结束报告和延长申请样本中的目标、活动、预期成果和取得的成果。在延长申请中，各国必须表明与遵守《蒙特利尔议定书》有关的主要项目目标，并在逐年的行动计划中提出详细的目标、活动和预期成果。

42. 同样的模式应适用于结束报告，其中将再次请各国陈述其主要项目目标和行动计划所规定的详细目标，随后将它们与取得的成果进行比较。

43. 总之，在审查的 20 个国家中，18 个国家就其结束报告和延长申请使用了建议的格式，这使比较变得颇为容易。两个国家使用了其自己（但相关）的格式，它们涵盖大多数的相同题目，但更为详细。但在一个个案中，报告似乎没有完成并且未经执行机构签署。对全面评价来说，审查执行机构在完成这些报告中的作用及它们对所报告内容的完整性和准确性负有何种程度的责任将颇有裨益。

44. 在顾问所审查的结束报告和延长申请中，关于目标、活动和成果的信息的详尽程度、清晰性和功效的差异很大。附件四列出了见诸这些报告的主要目标。

45. 考虑到国与国之间和结束报告和延长申请之间的目标的类似性，评价应进一步分析体制建设规模框架是否鼓励各国选择反映其自己需求和优先事项的目标，或事实上许多国家的需求是否有类似性，这表明就类似活动采取更加标准化或区域化做法是可行和适宜的。在样本中，仅两个国家按行业分列其目标，并且这是一种令人信服的做法。一个国家对其目标的说明用了数页篇幅，而另一个国家仅用了寥寥数行。总之，未能更加广泛地见到“建立国家臭氧机构的能力”和“组织和监测培训活动”等目标使人颇为惊讶。

46. 国与国之间认识的清晰程度和深度的差异也很大。目标应该用‘鲜明的’词语加以表述：

(a) 明确（清晰、不含糊、具体）；

(b) 可衡量（你可以衡量发生了什么变化）；

(c) 可实现（你知道它可以实现，并且如何实现它）；

(d) 现实（这么做能产生实效并且你拥有这么做的资源）；以及

(e) 具体时限（它规定了最后期限）。

47. 鲜明的目标使工作计划和活动变得明确和清晰。注意到在样本中的 20 个国家中，13 个(65 %)国家具有不同程度的‘鲜明’目标，这使人感到鼓舞。然而，不同的结束报告和延长申请的目标和活动的数目的差别很大。

	目标数			活动数		
	平均	最少	最多	平均	最少	最多
结束报告	7.6	3	15	16.75	5	38
延长申请	8.5	2	16	21.9	6	65

48. 两年内实现 15 项目标或完成 30 多项活动的清单可能会给人以深刻印象，但它们可能雄心勃勃了一些，并可能意味着缺乏侧重点。人们会质疑，a)考虑到资源束缚，它们是否可以实现，以及 b)它们是否意味着将有限的资源集中用在了能够带来最大变化的地方。

49. 虽然大多数国家单独列出了项目每一年的目标，但一些国家仅提出一张简略提及预定完成日期的综合清单。然而，一个国家却提到了每一项拟议活动的可能持续时间并预测了完成日期，显示出进行过审慎和有益的规划。对样本中 20 个国家来说，出现以下情况：

	是	否	不清楚
证据表明体制建设项目的目标和活动逐年取得进展	11	9	0
证据表明体制建设项目的目标和活动随项目向前递进	11	8	1

50. 下一步，将计量体制建设项目的预期成果数并将它们划分成可衡量的类别或将它们表述成能够知道它们是否已实现的状况。审查 20 个述评中的样本国家的预期和已实现的成果显示出以下差别。

	预期成果数			其中可衡量的比例 (%)		
	平均	最少	最多	平均	最少	最多
结束报告	17.1	6	31	75	0	100
延长申请	18.8	0	43	75	33	100

51. 虽然国与国之间（而不是机构与机构之间）在体制建设项目的目标、活动和预期成果的数目、范围、详细程序和雄心上存在着相当大的差异，但申报已取得的成果则显示出较大的一致性。平均看来，81 % (31 % 至 100 %)的预期成果据报告是完成的。大多数体制建设项目的这一鼓舞人心的成就在下表中进一步细分为：

据报告已完成的预期成果	国家数
100 %	6
80 – 99 %	7
60 – 79 %	6
<60%	1

四.6 用‘ 逻辑链’ 制订规划和提交报告

52. 顾问考察了某些种类的因果逻辑链关联目标、活动和成果的程度。如果报告完成并适当地提交，人们应能够看到拟议的活动将产生预期的成果，以及这些成果是如何导致目标实现的。对 20 个样本国家评估如下：

目标、活动和预期成果之间的关联质量		
清晰	部分清晰	不清晰
6	9	5

53. 将做法种类分成“清晰”、“部分清晰”和“不清晰”可能不无助益。“提高意识”活动以某种形式成为所有体制建设项目的组成部分，它是一个很好的示例。谨指出，以下示例仅在于说明问题，并不代表任何一个国家或执行机构的做法。

	目标	活动	成果	
评估			预期	实现
清晰	提高公众对臭氧消耗和国家根据《蒙特利尔议定书》所承担义务的认识	印制传单和海报，为报纸撰写文章和举办传媒讲习班	印制 4 份传单，2 份海报并定期为报纸撰写文章	印制了 4 份传单、3 份海报，并隔周发表文章。传媒讲习班导致更多和更好地报道《蒙特利尔议定书》的活动。
部分清晰	继续开展提高公众意识的活动	召开会议以庆祝国际臭氧日	传媒将报道国际臭氧日从而使公众更多了解情况	臭氧日受到广泛报道，包括电视报道。
不清晰	提高公众意识	庆祝国际臭氧日	增进公众的臭氧意识	公众更多意识到臭氧问题。

54. 在体制建设项目未在目标、活动和成果之间建立明确联系的地方，人们就难以判断其是否成功，了解什么起作用和什么不起作用，并评价该项目对实现履约的总体贡献。在请执行委员会核准、延长或增加对体制建设项目的供资时，希望看到这些项目是既有必要又可能取得成功的证据是合情合理的。期望国家臭氧办和执行机构采取一致办法制订目标，规划活动，衡量及报告成果并说明资金的分配和支付也是合情合理的。

55. 确保体制建设项目得到审慎规划和监测的另一个理由是，只有这样，国家臭氧办、国家和执行机构才能产生信心：实现和维持履约所需的所有步骤都已列入，不存在着漏洞或重叠。一些项目已经采取了某种‘逻辑链’方法来显示投入（例如员工、金钱）、产出（例如提高公众意识等活动）和履约等长期成果之间的联系。逻辑链方法在附件五中举例说明。

56. 在赞同就项目规划、监测和记录采取系统做法过程中，人们不应假定事事都可以预作安排。延长申请表(Q6)承认了这一点，它预留空白处以报告任何在行动计划中未料到的结果。但这用得不太多。在审查的 20 个国家中，仅 8 个国家报告了补充结果，例如：

(a) 更新消费数据；

(b) 与私营部门组织合作从而将臭氧消耗物质淘汰与节能结合起来；

(c) 培训了比预期还要多的制冷技术人员；

(d) 通过环境规划署网络帮助其他国家；以及

(e) 没收非法的氟氯化碳容器并减少非法进口。

57. 用逻辑链在目标、活动和成果之间形成一致的关联关系的项目规划和报告对体制建设项目的成功颇为重要。在全面评价期间应该评价这种做法的效用。

四.7 规划未来

58. 下一个问题是看国家臭氧机构，为履行其未来的《蒙特利尔议定书》承诺，正在多大程度上利用其体制建设项目预先作出规划。顾问观察了体制建设报告是否提及氟氯烃、甲基溴、四氯化碳和三氯乙酸。结果是：

任务涉及	**提及的国家数**
甲基溴	12 个国家
四氯化碳	8 个国家
三氯乙酸	5 个国家
氟氯烃	6 个国家

59. 全面评价应该询问国家臭氧机构和执行机构有关淘汰臭氧消耗物质的现有和已规划活动的情况，包括执行氟氯烃控制将带来什么样的特殊挑战，以及体制建设项目可将氟氯化碳淘汰中汲取的何种经验教训运用到氟氯烃淘汰之中。

五. 预算结构和资金分配

五.1 预算结构

60. 结束报告和延长申请提供了各国如何在不同预算项目之间分配其体制建设资金的详细情况。20 个样本国家每一个近期的结束报告和延长申请中的这些情况总结如下。

	所有报告(40)				**结束报告(20)**				**延长申请(20)**			
预算项目	**#**	**分配资金%**			**#**	**分配资金%**			**#**	**分配资金%**		
		平均	最少	最多		平均	最少	最多		平均	最少	最多
专业人员	40	27.4	8	57	20	27.9	8	51	20	26.9	10	57
支助人员	33	11.7	0	30	15	11.6	0	29	18	11.8	0	30
顾问	33	11.0	0	57	15	11.3	0	57	18	10.9	0	49
设备	36	7.8	0	33	17	7.64	0	32	18	8.72	0	33
业务费用	39	18.7	0	52	19	17.1	0	52	20	19.3	3	46
提高公共意识	37	15.32	0	38	19	17.1	0	38	18	13.5	0	31
应急	19	7.16	0	33	6	11.3	0	33	13	5.23	0	20
其他	27	15.29	0	45	12	17.2	0	45	15	13.8	0	40

61. 从这一数据得出的评论包括：

(a) 平均而言，各国使用其 27.4 %的体制建设资金雇佣专业人员(幅度为 8 % to 57 %)。总之，50.1 %的体制建设资金用于雇佣工作人员（专业人员、支助人员和顾问）。

(b) 样本中的每个国家均使用体制建设资金雇佣专业人员，并且 80 %以上的国家使用该资金雇佣或预期将雇佣支助人员和顾问。

(c) 最终报告（过去）和延长申请（未来）在使用资金雇佣专业人员和支助人员及顾问上并无重大差别。但更多的国家预期将雇佣顾问。

(d) 平均而言，各国仅将略多于三分之一的其体制建设资金用于非工作人员项目（设备、业务费用和提高公众意识），但各国之间存在着重大差异。一些国家报告其这些项目的开支为零，尽管在某个个案中，“业务费用”类别占该国支出的 52 %，并且对所涉内容未作进一步解释。

(e) “其他支出”通常不作具体说明，它平均使用 15 %体制建设资金（幅度为 0-45 %），而平均 19%的支出留作“应急”，对这一部分试图涵盖的风险语焉不详。将资金列作“应急”和“其他支出”之用的国家数在最终报告和延长申请之间有所增长，但将资金用于这些目的的总的百分比下降幅度很大。

五.2 工作人员费用的份额

62. 一个国家获得的体制建设资金总额和用在工作人员身上的百分比之间是否存在着任何关系的问题令人颇感兴趣。曾有人争辩说，体制建设预算比较小的低消费量国家可能会将其大多数体制建设资金用于雇佣工作人员，使其他活动的资金所剩无几。这种情况如果属实，将影响体制建设预算的灵活性（工作人员费用往往是非常固定的），并且将在没有外部体制建设资金的情况下影响持续雇佣训练有素的工作人员的保障程度。考虑到该资金用于工作人员支助的百分比很大和体制建设支助的总目标，人们同样会颇感兴趣地提出一个问题：用在工作人员的百分比和一个国家维持履行《蒙特利尔议定书》，包括及时提交第 7 条数据和建立许可证制度的总体能力之间是否存在着任何关系。

63. 这一资料见诸以下图表。

图 1

体制建设资金总额和用于工作人员费用的份额(%)之间的关系



图 2

政府（对应）资金和用于全体工作人员的%之间的关系



64. 体制建设资金总额或（政府）对应资金与用在在工作人员的资金份额之间似乎并无明显关系。这是全面评价应更详细探讨的一个领域。

五.3 资金来源

65. 对绝大多数国家来说，大多数资金来自多边基金，并有一些来自政府补贴（包括实物捐助）。尚未提到过第三方资金，例如来自其他国际基金或本国产业界的资金。政府提供的体制建设资金总额的比例显示如下：

政府提供的体制建设资金总额	国家数
0 %	4
<20 %	3
20 – 39 %	8
40 – 59 %	5
60 – 79 %	0
>80 %	0

66. 国与国之间的差异同样很大。一个国家的政府提供 56 %的国家臭氧机构资金总额，使其（而不是多边基金）成为主要的资金来源。样本中的五个有大有小的国家，政府提供 40 %以上的体制建设资金。一个国家将维持体制建设项目以外的国家臭氧机构业务作为自己的一项目标，将该业务作为该部经常业务的组成部分。与此形成对照的是，大小不等和发展水平不同的四个国家从其自己政府那里得不到任何资金，使国家臭氧机构完全依赖于多边基金。人们将饶有兴趣地了解，低消费量国家的政府对体制建设项目资源的捐款份额是否通常比大消费量国家的捐款份额要小。

67. 人们从这些报告中可以清楚地看到，对政府以实物形式提供的支助，包括办公场地、运输、供应品和服务等事项可能报告得不够充分。许多国家提到这一点，但很少有国家对其价值作财务概算。政策领域有一种众所周知的看法，在必须提供财政捐助时，决策者就会更加认真地对待。从体制建设的范围看，这可能意味着当各国政府向体制建设项目提供对应资金时，会形成更多和更高层次的国内“买进”。各国政府和机构的更好协作/合作被引证为国家臭氧机构的最有意义的问题之一。在分担体制建设费用变得可行时，这一问题应予考虑。

68. 将报告作为关于每个国家资金数额和分配的资料来源会带来若干问题。首先，不同国家和或许不同机构的支出分类方式不太一致。一些国家将长期顾问列入‘专业人员’并将支助人员列入‘业务费用’或‘其他支出’。预算项目‘设备’和‘业务费用’被用来涵盖同样的东西，而‘提高公众意识’则界定得比较宽泛。一些国家避免使用体制建设资金资助出席国际会议，而其他一些国家则将此列入其目标。为确保执行委员会作出公平的供资决定，可能值得进一步审查如何将体制建设资金用于旅行支出（与其他体制建设活动相比，有多少趟差旅，差旅费用总额）。对国家臭氧机构和执行机构的日常活动来说，这些差异可能无关紧要，但在整个多边基金方案内，它们会在理解体制建设资金的用途方面造成重大困难。还应进一步探索如何促进提交报告方面的一致性。

六. 国家臭氧办人员配置

69. 结束报告和延长申请均要求国家臭氧机构报告由体制建设项目和在某些情况下由政府资助的专业人员、支助人员和顾问的人数。在 20 个国家的样本中，总共提到了 141 名工作人员（76 名专业人员、48 名支助人员和 17 名顾问）。他们按国家的分布情况如下。

每个国家的工作人员数	国家数	
	结束报告	延长申请
0 - 2	1	1
3 – 5	6	6
6 – 8	6	6
9 – 11	2	1
12 – 14	2	1
15 – 18	0	2
19 – 22	1	1
>22	2	2

70. 顾问比较了每个国家的结束报告和延长申请中提到的工作人员配置数目，以观察这些国家是否希望在将来增加或减少工作人员名额。考虑到答案的范围，这可能也是一个作进一步考虑的领域。在样本中的 20 个国家中：

(a) 八个国家希望保持相同的工作人员名额；

(b) 八个国家希望增加工作人员名额；

(c) 三个国家希望减少工作人员名额；

(d) 一个国家不可比（结束报告和延长申请中说明工作人员的情况有出入）。

(e) 考虑到长期专业人员的费用平均占体制建设资金总额的 27.4 %左右，在一些国家这一比例正在超过 40 %，这应该成为在全面评价中加以调查的又一题目。

71. 此外，许多国家臭氧机构得到了各机构、大学和实验室等的专家咨询和支持。

七. 国家臭氧机构的报告和审计

72. 通过使用为 20 个国家作分析的结束报告和延长申请中的资料，我们考虑了国家臭氧机构在一个典型年份编写和提交的报告数目和类型。数据显示：

报告提交对象	**报告总数#**	**所占份额%**
政府	60	31
基金秘书处	23	12
臭氧秘书处	24	12
执行机构	59	30
其他方面	28	14
共计	**194**	**100**

73. 每年的报告数概括如下：

每年的报告	**国家数**
0 – 5	6
6 - 10	9
11 - 15	3
16 – 20	1
21 – 25	0
26 - 30	1
Total	**20**

74. 所有这些报告是否都的确是需要的，或在 2010 年淘汰了大部分的臭氧消耗物质之后这些报告中的一部分是否将不再需要或将变得简单一些，在全面评价中提出这样的问题是适切的。

75. 20 个国家的结束报告就审计提供以下信息：

(a) 九项报告的审计来自其自己政府；

(b) 七项报告的审计来自其执行机构；

(c) 六项审计在报告中提到但未进行；以及

(d) 一项审计未在报告中提到。

76. 三个国家既由其自己政府，又由执行机构作了审计。七个由执行机构作了审计的国家要么是由开发计划署，要么是由世界进行的。应对这些审计的质量、成果和后续行动进行观察，以确定它们是否有用，是否重叠和是否包括了所有的相关个案和领域。

八. 国家臭氧机构和和项目管理机构之间的关系

77. 在体制建设项目开始时，它们是就投资项目以外的任何事情从多边基金向各国提供财政支持的惟一渠道。但自那时起，执行委员会核准在国家或行业淘汰计划和结束性淘汰管理计划下设立项目管理机构。项目管理机构的资金可以支付工作人员和顾问的监测和提交报告等活动的费用，形成了与国家臭氧机构的体制建设资金的紧密并行和重叠的潜在可能性。

78. 在 20 个样本国家中，仅 3 个国家在其体制建设项目的结束报告或延长申请中提到了项目管理机构。其中一个国家报告说，国家臭氧机构合并体制建设和结束性淘汰管理计划的资金以增加预算的灵活性并雇佣更多的工作人员。另一个国家报告说，其大部分现有资金从属于不同的淘汰计划和各项目管理机构，国家臭氧机构则在战略一级对它们进行有效管理。

79. 对国家淘汰计划的管理、监测和核查进行的评价发现，国家臭氧机构和管理管理机构的关系有三种典型情况。在模式 A 中，项目管理机构完全是国家臭氧机构的组成部分并接受其问责。在模式 B 中，项目管理机构在职能和实体上与国家臭氧机构分离，但接受其问责。在模式 C 中，国家臭氧机构和项目管理机构在是分开的，并且国家臭氧机构无权管辖项目管理机构或对其进行问责。国家臭氧机构和项目管理机构反而都接受政府等级架构的高层的问责。

80. 由于国家臭氧机构预期并且向其提供资助的确是为了负责实现和维持国家遵守《蒙特利尔议定书》，它们应该能够影响或管理项目管理机构的活动。在这运转顺畅的地方，项目管理机构在工作人员和专门知识方面向国家臭氧机构提供了额外的有益资源。在其他个案中，项目管理机构可能仅仅是国家臭氧机构预期将协调的一个颇为复杂的合作伙伴和利益相关者团体的又一添加部分。

81. 管理这些不同的合作伙伴和利益以确保它们都致力于按照相同议程开展工作可能会成为一项复杂挑战。在试点调查表中，四个国家臭氧机构回答了关于项目管理机构的下列问题：

(a) 平均而言，其项目管理机构每个都有 4 名工作人员（3 至 6 个）。鉴于这些工作人员往往是高素质人员或专门人员，对这些国家臭氧机构来说，这意味着大量的额外资源，条件是它们能够获得这些资源。

(b) 它们关于项目管理机构预算的答复不太明确，尽管一个国家报告了 2900 万美元的预算，另一个报告了 26,000 美元的预算。这些国家臭氧机构并不充

分了解项目管理机构预算，也不了解它们政府是否向项目管理机构提交资金，这种情况可能颇为重要。

(c) 所有答复的方面都说，它们“对国家臭氧机构和项目管理机构之间的工作安排感到满意”。四个国家中有三个国家还说，它们计划在 2010 年关闭项目管理机构将不会影响国家臭氧机构的工作。

82. 需要开展更多工作以了解项目管理机构的存在（和在 2010 年后的可能的不存在）将如何影响国家臭氧机构的工作及这种情况对未来的体制建设项目的影响。一些执行机构说，它们高度评价与项目管理机构的协作，因为：

(a) 它们职责分明，负责交付项目，并有着明确的基于绩效的安排；

(b) 工作人员往往是合同工，所以专门从事特定工作，按业绩付酬，并不会被指派担任其他工作；

(c) 项目管理机构处在一般的政府决策机制之外，这意味着它们往往对执行机构作出更快和更多的响应；

(d) 项目管理机构能够支付附加薪水，这使它们与大多数政府相比，能够招聘到素质更高、经济更丰富和更加专业的工作人员。

九. 汲取的经验教训

83. 结束报告记录了汲取的经验教训，它们被界定为“主要成就和困难，以及为增进下一阶段的效率和影响从中可汲取什么经验教训”。样本中的每份报告都载有关于成就和改进建议的资料。很少有报告承认遇到了任何困难或说明它们是如何被克服的，若干报告在这方面不具体，没有太大用处。报告提及的汲取的经验教训列在附件九。

十. 全面评价体制建设项目的建议办法

十.1 全面评价的目的

84. 案头研究采访过的每个人都确认体制建设是协助第 5 条国家实现履约的基本工具。然而，可直接归因于体制建设项目的具体成果往往难以确定，特别是在其促进履约方面。这是因为成功与否（从实现和维持履约方面加以界定的）不仅取决于国家臭氧机构的表现，还取决于其他因素，例如宏观经济条件、政治和行政架构、立法、执法和利益相关者的合作。

85. 评价因而应该试图确定国家臭氧机构——通过体制建设支助——是否和在何种程度上参与： a) 构建政治和行政架构，b) 发展立法从而使它以确保履约为目的顺理成章地创建起来并顺利得到执行，c) 确保立法和其他政策文件得到执行，以及 d) 便利和促进

利益相关者合作。换言之，评价将查明政府是否本应在没有对国家臭氧机构的体制建设支持的情况下从事一部分或全部这一类活动，例如制定臭氧消耗物质立法，以及如果政府本不会这么做的话，那么多边基金资助的体制建设支助是如何改进其在这些领域的实效的？

十.2 评价问题

86. 评价应观察体制建设项目的下列各方面：

(a) **体制建设项目迄今为止的成果和影响。**调查什么受到资助和迄今为止取得的什么成就可全部或部分归因于体制建设资助。查明并列出证据证明，在广大的第 5 条国家中，体制建设项目哪些方面促进《蒙特利尔议定书》的执行和履约成就。查明最佳惯例、共同困难（及消除困难的办法）和汲取的经验教训，以及可能的话，查明可用于显示体制建设项目价值的可计量的衡量标准。

(b) **政治和行政方面。**评价第 30/7 号决定迄今为止是如何执行的，特别是国家臭氧机构如何设法将其工作计划纳入国家当局的国内规划进程。分析将臭氧问题纳入国家规划和预算在何种程度上得到了实现。调查国家臭氧机构的影响和与政府和行业的决策者的协作。审查国家臭氧机构与国家、区域和国际各组织的协作范围和成就。分析国家臭氧机构和项目管理机构之间的联系和项目管理机构在完成淘汰计划后关闭时对国家臭氧机构和体制建设活动的可能影响。

(c) **体制建设项目的规划和报告。**评价国家臭氧机构和执行机构是如何规划体制建设项目从而尽最大可能促进实现和维持履约的。观察国家臭氧机构如何理解目标、活动和预期成果之间的联系，以及它们是否受益于‘逻辑链’方法。评价向国家臭氧机构、执行机构和执行委员会所提交结束报告的质量和实用性。

(d) **执行问题。**审查本案头研究突出标明的执行问题，并查明问题的原因，包括：

(一) 执行耽搁的范围、原因和重要影响及其对履约的影响（平均而言，体制建设项目的耽搁期是其预期持续期的三分之一以上）；

(二) 国家臭氧干事和国家臭氧机构工作人员的招聘、就职、培训和留用；

(三) 关于国家臭氧机构的报告需求的范围、重叠情况、所涉资源问题和实用性；

(四) 如何充分利用国家臭氧机构和项目管理机构，以及在体制建设项目和多边基金支助的其他项目之间联系；

(e) **未来工作。**调查对国家臭氧机构的需求将来会如何变化，包括实行氟氯烃管制，以及这些变化对体制建设项目和国家臭氧机构的组织、活动、问责和供

资的影响。评估着重淘汰各类氟氯烃的新侧重点对国家臭氧机构的任务量和构成的影响，并确定是否有可能收缩通过体制建设项目支持的各项活动。评估通过跨国家臭氧机构/区域的强化活动（例如提高公众意识）所获得的效益。

(f) **供资问题。**审查体制建设资金的当前使用情况和实现的资金效益。结合优先需求评价资金供应情况，包括追加（对应）捐款的范围。评价各国一直并且现在是如何借助第 35/57 号决定和随后增加的体制建设资金促进提高公众意识活动和执行在该决定中通过的战略举措。调查下列方面的激励作用：㈠将供资与臭氧层消耗物质消费挂钩；㈡保持供资数额不变；㈢当各类氟氯烃仍是即将淘汰的惟一主要化学剂类别时根据国家臭氧机构的活动和表现逐步减少供资等可能的替代办法会造成的影响。查明如果不能得到或全部得到现有形式的体制建设资金的话可能产生的后果，以及可能鼓励国家臭氧机构实现长期自给的因素，其中要考虑极低消费量国家和低消费量国家的不同需求。与淘汰氟氯化碳方面的情况相比，查明在淘汰氟氯烃方面核准/支付体制建设资金可能需要满足的技术条件，例如建立许可证制度或其他基本的监管措施，从而提高效率和体制建设的价值。

(g) **结论。**从结果和影响及其在 2010 年后的价值方面评价体制建设项目的价值。提出关于标准和适应于未来体制建设项目活动的体制建设资金数额的建议。制订有成效和高效率地执行项目的要求。

87. 围绕着这些问题开展全面评价的详细问题清单载于附件十一。

十.3 拟议的评价工作计划

88. 在国家案例研究期间，评价应收集尽可能客观的资料，为此征求利益相关者、与国家臭氧机构协作的其他政府机构、与国家臭氧机构同一部委的上级高级官员和公司或行业协会的私营部门代表，以及执行机构的意见。区域网络会议提供了会见第 5 条国家的臭氧干事、区域履约援助方案工作队成员和在一个区域内工作的执行机构的代表的良好和合乎成本效益的机会。在网络会议期间，还可以设法了解到哪个国家臭氧机构可被视为区域内的最佳点子来源，或被视为拥有区域内管理得最好的国内方案，并且为什么。

89. 精确规划数据收集工作并将其标准化可能是有难度的，因为利益相关者在不同的国家中发挥着不同的作用并代表着不同的利益，并且现有信息量将取决于能否拥有获得大量信息的渠道。因此，要为每一类利益相关者制定单独的访谈条例未免规定太死和过于繁琐。附件十一中的评价问题清单须灵活使用，以便从若干角度探讨各种问题，并与将访问的每个国家中的不同访谈伙伴进行交谈。

90. 体制建设评价将采用的依据是为臭氧机构、个人和区域会议上的团体讨论制定的调查表和若干国家案例研究。需对这些国家进行选择，以便就规模（国家大小和臭氧消耗物质的消费量）、区域代表性、体制建设项目的经验和执行机构及双边机构的参与情况作出很好的平衡，侧重点放在就体制建设项目的规划、执行、监测和提交报告选择令人特别感

兴趣、新颖或成功的做法上。样本还应涵盖关于体制建设项目和项目管理机构之间关系的许多不同做法，从而查明可能与执行未来氟氯烃淘汰计划有关的最佳惯例和经验教训。

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Annex I

GRAPHICAL OVERVIEW OF IS PROJECTS






Funds Approved VS Disbursed
12,000,000
10,000,000
8,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000
2,000,000
0
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Disbursed
Approved


IS Projects Approved by Agency
Number of Projects
400
300
200
100
0
France
Germany
IBRD
UNDP
UNEP
UNIDO
USA
Agency

Annex I (cont'd)

IMPLEMENTATION DELAYS OF IS PROJECTS BY COUNTRIES

Country	Number of Phases Approved	Number of Phases Delayed	Approved Durations (Months)	Total Months Delayed	Percentage of Months Delayed
Afghanistan	4		67		0%
Albania	4	2	73	20	28%
Algeria	4	3	112	60	54%
Angola	2	2	62	13	22%
Antigua and Barbuda	3	3	87	30	35%
Argentina	5	3	136	59	43%
Bahamas	4	3	81	53	65%
Bahrain	5	2	136	21	16%
Bangladesh	5	3	136	41	30%
Barbados	4	3	98	109	110%
Belize	4	2	111	13	12%
Benin	5	5	135	34	26%
Bhutan	3		73		0%
Bolivia	6	4	161	47	29%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	2	62	68	110%
Botswana	3	2	85	96	113%
Brazil	5	4	135	89	66%
Brunei Darussalam	2	2	62	49	79%
Burkina Faso	7	3	187	12	6%
Burundi	4	2	112	11	10%
Cambodia	4	2	87	9	11%
Cameroon	7	3	161	46	28%
Cape Verde	3	2	62	65	105%
Central African Republic	4	3	112	51	45%
Chad	3	1	85	42	49%
Chile	8	3	198	21	11%
China	7	4	187	37	20%
Colombia	6	4	163	41	25%
Comoros	5	2	136	6	4%
Congo	5	2	135	32	24%
Congo, DR	4	2	86	41	47%
Cook Islands	3	2	37	21	58%
Costa Rica	7	4	198	46	23%
Cote D'Ivoire	5	4	111	68	62%
Croatia	5	4	141	28	20%
Cuba	6	4	161	54	33%
Djibouti	2	1	62	8	13%
Dominica	4	3	86	55	64%
Dominican Republic	4	3	114	54	47%
Ecuador	4	3	98	58	59%
Egypt	6	3	172	32	18%
El Salvador	5	4	138	34	25%
Equatorial Guinea	1	1	12	1	8%
Eritrea	1	1	13	12	92%
Ethiopia	5	4	123	68	55%
Fiji	6	2	137	46	33%
Gabon	5	2	136	11	8%

Country	Number of Phases Approved	Number of Phases Delayed	Approved Durations (Months)	Total Months Delayed	Percentage of Months Delayed
Gambia	4	3	111	40	36%
Georgia	6	2	156	6	4%
Ghana	7	3	200	8	4%
Grenada	3	2	74	58	78%
Guatemala	6	5	158	54	34%
Guinea	5	4	136	31	23%
Guinea-Bissau	3	2	61	18	30%
Guyana	3	2	86	55	63%
Haiti	3	2	62	10	16%
Honduras	5	2	135	24	18%
India	6	5	161	38	23%
Indonesia	6	4	161	57	35%
Iran	8	6	174	81	46%
Jamaica	5	2	139	13	10%
Jordan	7	4	166	62	37%
Kenya	7	3	152	38	25%
Kiribati	3	2	58	23	40%
Korea, DPR	5	2	136	19	14%
Kuwait	3	1	87	5	6%
Kyrgyzstan	3		86		0%
Lao, PDR	3	1	86	5	6%
Lebanon	5	4	148	25	17%
Lesotho	4	3	111	51	46%
Liberia	2	1	61	3	5%
Libya	1	1	38	48	127%
Macedonia, FYR	5	5	136	41	30%
Madagascar	3	3	85	25	30%
Malawi	6	3	159	43	27%
Malaysia	7	4	186	61	33%
Maldives	4	2	111	65	59%
Mali	4	2	111	11	10%
Marshall Islands	3	2	74	28	38%
Mauritania	4	4	110	61	56%
Mauritius	3	1	85	104	121%
Mexico	9	3	203	31	15%
Micronesia	2	2	46	23	51%
Moldova	4	2	111	15	14%
Mongolia	4		112		0%
Montenegro	1		12		0%
Morocco	3	2	85	74	87%
Mozambique	3	2	85	97	114%
Myanmar	1	1	38	73	195%
Namibia	5	2	136	31	23%
Nauru	3	1	37	12	33%
Nepal	4	1	112	5	5%
Nicaragua	4	4	110	57	52%
Niger	6	3	161	31	19%
Nigeria	4	2	111	76	69%
Niue	3	1	49	6	12%
Oman	2	2	62	28	46%
Pakistan	5	2	124	71	57%
Palau	3	2	70	23	33%

Country	Number of Phases Approved	Number of Phases Delayed	Approved Durations (Months)	Total Months Delayed	Percentage of Months Delayed
Panama	4	4	116	110	95%
Papua New Guinea	3	2	85	59	69%
Paraguay	4	2	111	41	37%
Peru	3	3	90	58	64%
Philippines	6	3	136	51	37%
Qatar	3	3	62	63	102%
Romania	2	2	61	74	122%
Rwanda	3	2	62	40	64%
Saint Kitts and Nevis	3	2	86	109	126%
Saint Lucia	5	4	136	30	22%
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	4	2	84	54	64%
Samoa	4	2	112	44	39%
Sao Tome and Principe	3	1	63	24	39%
Saudi Arabia	1		37		0%
Senegal	7	2	187	15	8%
Serbia	2	2	61	58	95%
Seychelles	4	3	111	71	64%
Sierra Leone	4	1	75	3	4%
Solomon Islands	3	1	79	14	18%
Somalia	2	2	25	81	320%
Sri Lanka	6	3	161	14	9%
Sudan	4	4	112	61	55%
Suriname	2	2	61	24	40%
Swaziland	3	2	97	79	81%
Syria	3	3	86	131	152%
Tanzania	3	1	85	63	74%
Thailand	6	3	152	106	69%
Togo	4	2	112	28	25%
Tonga	3	2	58	23	40%
Trinidad and Tobago	5	3	124	58	47%
Tunisia	4	3	112	86	77%
Turkey	3	3	107	107	100%
Turkmenistan	1		37		0%
Tuvalu	2	1	50	14	29%
Uganda	1	1	37	127	348%
Uruguay	7	2	194	25	13%
Vanuatu	1	1	38	32	86%
Venezuela	8	3	199	14	7%
Vietnam	6	2	159	12	8%
Yemen	6	1	147	6	4%
Zambia	3	3	89	87	98%
Zimbabwe	5	4	136	47	34%

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Annex II

Results from pilot questionnaire

1. In preparation for the full evaluation, the consultant sent a pilot questionnaire to 24 National Ozone Officers, of whom 16 replied, 14 of which replied in time to be included in this report. This Annex summarises their responses and suggests issues for the full evaluation.

NOUS WHICH RECEIVED AND ANSWERED THE PILOT QUESTIONNAIRE						
Funding Level	**REGION**					
US $ per tranche	**Africa**	**LAC**	**SEAP/SAP**	**West Asia**	**PIC**	**Europe**
>300		**Brazil** (UNDP)	China (UNDP)			
			India (UNDP)			
150 - 299	**Algeria** (UNEP)	Mexico (UNIDO)	Philippines (WB)			**Turkey** (WB)
	Egypt (UNIDO)	Chile (WB)				
	Nigeria (UNDP)					
<150	**Ghana** (UNDP)		**Viet Nam** (UNEP)	**Jordan** (WB)		Bosnia (UNIDO)
	Sudan (UNEP)			**Kuwait** (UNEP)		Romania (UNIDO)
<100	Niger (UNEP)	**Jamaica** (UNEP)			**Papua New Guinea (Germany)**	**Georgia** (UNEP/UNDP)
	Gabon (UNEP)				Samoa (UNEP)	**Croatia** (UNEP)

* Countries in bold responded in whole or in part to the questionnaire

National Ozone Officers – Terms of office and turnover

2. The 14 Ozone Officers who responded in time represent a range of experience. The longest serving was appointed 14 years ago (1994) while the most recently appointed started in 2007. Their dates of appointment were 1994, 1995, 1996, 2000 (2), 2002, 2003, 2004 (3), 2005 (2), 2006 and 2007.

3. To get an idea of turnover, we asked how many ozone officers each country had appointed since 2000. The results are shown below:

Turnover of NOUs since 2000	
Number of NOUs since 2000	Number of countries
1	7
2	1
3	4
4	1
5	0
6	1
TOTAL	**14**

4. The picture is obviously mixed but four or six different ozone officers since 2000 implies a change at least once every two years and this is may well cause difficulties of continuity and follow up. It would be useful for the full evaluation to test the relationship between NOU turnover and performance of IS projects, to find out the reasons for different rates of retention and turnover, the implications for implementing the Montreal Protocol, how countries manage rapid turnover and what might be done to reduce it.

Sources of support for the NOU

5. We asked NOUs about the level of support they receive from different agencies. The results were overwhelmingly positive, with nearly everyone saying they received good support from their governments, their IS implementing agency, the Fund Secretariat, the Ozone Secretariat and Regional Networks. Bilateral agencies and other implementing agencies were less frequently mentioned and only 8 of the 14 respondents said that they received good support from their industries.

Main challenges for NOUs and usefulness of IS project

6. We asked each NOU to describe their main challenges, how they had responded and how the IS project had helped. The main challenges mentioned were:

(a) Heavy workload with no assistance;

(b) Complying with the national phase-out plan;

(c) Implementing phase-out projects;

(d) Establishing and monitoring of licensing system nationwide and combating illegal trade;

(e) Disposal of confiscated CFCs;

(f) Mislabelling of refrigerants in the market;

(g) Putting in place and updating legislation;

(h) Implementing decisions of the Meeting of the Parties and Executive Committee;

(i) Raising awareness and public enlightenment

(j) Learning about ozone issues; and

(k) Limited budget.

7. All NOUs said that the IS project had contributed "very much" to their country achieving phase-out and meeting compliance targets. Some of the particular benefits achieved through IS projects were:

(a) Preparing and implementing country programmes, RMPs, national and sector phase-out plans and assisting in formulating national policies;

(b) Strengthening the country's institutional arrangements and building staff capacity;

(c) IS project is at the heart of all ODS phase-out activities in the country, allowing technical personnel and other services to be made available to all projects as needed;

(d) Providing essential equipment and logistical support for the NOU;

(e) Enabling extensive awareness raising campaigns;

(f) Enabled the NOU to monitor and report data and to meet phase-out targets;

(g) Covering meeting costs;

(h) Provides regular and reliable financial support, unlike government contributions that can be irregular;

(i) Providing guidelines, information and learning experiences;

(j) Funds so that the NOU can monitor what is going on in the country;

(k) Covers the cost of support staff and recruitment of highly qualified consultants;

(l) Provides technical assistance and encourages private sector to get involved;

(m) Provides funds to distribute Code of Good Practice to service technicians, customs officers and environmental inspectors;

(n) Covered the cost of essential training activities.

8. We asked Ozone Officers to estimate the time spent on various activities and how they expected this to change in future. Twelve of the replies gave this information. Their answers showed that, on average, Ozone Officers spend their time as follows:

Activity	% time	Likely to take more, less or the same time in future?
Data collection	9	**More**
Data reporting	6	Same
Developing regulations	10	Same
Enforcement	11	**More**
Reducing illegal trade	8	**More**
Project management	22	Same
Co-ordinating the work of the implementing agencies	7	Less
Public awareness	17	Same
Regional co-operation	5	Same
Other	5	Same
TOTAL	**100**	

9. The full evaluation should look in more detail at how Ozone Officers allocate their time and prioritise activities and the support they receive to help them manage their time. For example, spending on average 22 % of time on project management might imply that the implementing agency could provide more help. The changing responsibilities and activities of NOOs in future is an important consideration for any decision on the future objectives and management of IS projects.

IS reporting formats

10. All those who responded said that they were content with the current templates for Terminal Reports (TRs) and Extension Requests (ERs). Some commented that the formats could be simplified and shortened to improve NOU efficiency. Another suggested that, when difficulties were highlighted, it would be useful to have a response from the Implementing Agency and the Fund Secretariat. One NOU said that the detailed lists of objectives and activities were useful reference documents for drawing up Action and Implementation Plans.

Impact of the 1999/2000 evaluation and decision 30/7 of the Executive Committee

11. We asked Ozone Officers to assess the extent to which their NOU had changed since 2000 in response to decision 30/7 of the Executive Committee. There was broad agreement that all of the recommendations had been implemented, at least to some extent. The details for the 13 countries that responded to this question are shown below

Recommendation	YES	NO
NOU has more influence in Government	11	2
NOU is more able to drive change in the country	13	0
NOU has more and better staff and resources	8	4
NOU has better access to decision-makers	13	0
NOU receives more support from senior levels of government	11	2
NOU is subject to more checks by senior managers and/or auditors in your government	12	1

NOU work plan is better integrated into the Government's overall work plan	12	1
Your Government gives more priority to the Montreal Protocol and phasing out ODS	11	2
NOU has better links to the private sector and other external groups to assist with the phase-out	12	1

12. This supports the information that NOUs provide in their TRs and ERs, confirming that NOUs see themselves as much better placed now to drive change and to influence politicians and senior decision makers. Even where there is a suggestion that more staff and resources are needed, a majority of countries say that things have improved since 2000.

Adequacy of IS funding and future funding needs

13. We asked Ozone Officers to assess the extent to which the IS project funding covers the requirements of the NOU now and is likely to in 2011 and in 2015. The table below shows the responses received from 12 ozone officers;

Adequacy of IS funding	**Percentage of Total NOU costs covered by IS funding**			
	100 %	**75 %**	**50 %**	**<50 %**
Now	3	5	3	1
2011	4	2	2	4
2015	5	2	0	5

14. This presents a mixed picture. A small majority of countries are confident that IS funding will continue to meet most or all of their needs while the countries in the bottom right of the table (highlighted) think that IS funding is likely to provide a lower proportion of their costs in future. This is worth investigating further, as this table may not have been understood or NOUs may have completed it on the basis of particular (but undeclared) assumptions about future funding levels.

15. The adequacy or inadequacy of IS funding may not be a problem if NOUs can access funding from elsewhere. However:

(a) 8 of the 12 respondents said that, if funding remains at current levels, they would not meet their future needs. The other 4 did not see this as a problem. One country, however, said that funding would be adequate only if current IS plus PMU funding continued beyond 2010.

(b) 11 of the 12 countries said that their governments would not be in a position or willing to meet more of the costs. One respondent thought that the government might be able to pay a bit more but not make up the difference.

(c) 10 of the 12 countries said that they received no funding from other sources, such as industries or other ministries. One country said this was in-kind assistance from the Ministry of Environment.

16. We asked the ozone officers why they thought they would need additional funds in future. Their answers included:

(a) Additional surveys, control measures and consultants for HCFCs;

(b) Fully funded PMU required for HCFC phase-out plan;

(c) Salaries for qualified staff continue to increase and should not exceed 30% of the total budget or the project would not be efficient;

(d) More public awareness, workshops and seminars;

(e) Inflation means salaries, fuel prices and training costs are higher;

(f) Additional staff and training them in basic accounts and IT skills;

(g) Better communication;

(h) Updating legislation to reflect recent decisions of the MOP;

(i) The weakness of the US $ has led to cost increases;

(j) To reflect differences in the cost of living between countries.

17. Finally on funding, we asked whether the current system of deciding levels of funding based on ODS consumption should be changed. Opinions were divided. Six countries said that this was the best system while six said that a change would be beneficial. Those who recommended a change suggested a system of funding that:

(a) Was related to the real difficulties of achieving phase-out in each country and the additional activities required, such as surveillance of illegal trade;

(b) Included a standard amount to reflect the fixed costs of running an NOU;

(c) Reflected the population of a country and its geographical spread;

(d) Rewarded those countries that maintained the sustainability of phase-out;

(e) Reflected the number of small and medium enterprises and a country’s technical capacities.

18. One country noted that basing IS funding on consumption in ODP tonnes might have been fine for CFCs but would be unsuitable for HCFCs given their much lower ODP values.

19. The full evaluation should look in detail at the arguments for and against changing the current levels of IS funding. It should also review the opportunities and challenges of moving towards a more flexible system of funding that can reflect the particular needs of countries while providing stronger incentives for NOUs, countries and implementing agencies to achieve and maintain full compliance.

What would most help improve NOUs in the future?

20. We asked NOOs to rank a number of possible things that would help them to improve their NOU in future. There was a surprising degree of consensus among the 9 respondents. The table below summarises their views.

Suggestion	**Priority**		**Priority**
More funding for the NOU	1	More co-operation from other ministries	6
More support from senior levels of government	2	More assistance from other NOUs via the networks	7
More support from implementing agencies	3	Better links to climate change	8
More staff	4	Streamlining reporting requirements	9
Better qualified staff	5		

21. The full evaluation will want to test these conclusions with a bigger group of ozone officers before using this list, as amended, for planning the future of IS projects beyond 2010.

22. A detailed checklist of questions regarding the different aspects of IS projects in included in Annex VI.

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Annex III

COUNTRIES SELECTED FOR THE DESK STUDY SAMPLE

Country	IS start date	Phases to date	Phases delayed	One-year extensions	Implementing agency
AFRICA					
Algeria	Nov 1993	4	3	0	UNEP
Egypt	Jun 1993	6	3	0	UNIDO
Ghana	Oct 1992	7	3	0	UNDP
Nigeria	Mar 1993	4	2	0	UNDP
Sudan	Mar 1994	4	3	0	UNEP
EUROPE					
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Mar 1999	2	1	0	UNIDO
Romania	Jul 1995	2	2	0	UNIDO
Turkey	Oct 1992	3	3	0	IBRD
LATIN AMERICA and CARIBBEAN					
Brazil	Jun 1993	5	3	0	UNDP
Chile	Jun 1992	8	2	2	IBRD
Jamaica	Oct 1996	5	3	0	UNEP
Mexico	Jun 1992	9	3	0	UNIDO
SOUTH ASIA					
China	Feb 1992	7	4	0	UNDP
India	Oct 1992	6	5	0	UNDP
SOUTH EAST ASIA and PACIFIC					
Papua New Guinea	May 1996	3	2	0	Germany
Philippines	Mar 1993	6	3	2	IBRD
Samoa	May 1997	4	3	0	UNIDO
Viet Nam	Jul 1995	6	1	0	UNEP
WEST ASIA					
Jordan	Jun 1992	7	2	0	IBRD
Kuwait	Jul 2002	3	1	0	UNEP
TOTALS		101	52	4	

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Annex IV

SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES GIVEN INDICATED IN IS TERMINAL REPORTS AND EXTENSION REQUESTS

a)	**Objectives common to nearly all reports**
	Prepare, draft, agree or enforce regulations
	Support the successful implementation of approved projects, including RMPs and NPPs
	Raise awareness
	Secure compliance with the Montreal Protocol
	Collect, verify and report data as required
b)	**Objectives found in around half of the reports**
	Monitor imports & exports and control illegal trade
	Implement and/or update the country programme
c)	**Objectives found in less than half of the reports**
	Prepare national strategies and phase-out plans
	Support other NOUs through networks and participate in international meetings
	Ensure that country ratifies the amendments
	Organise and monitor training activities
	Provide technical assistance to enterprises
d)	**Objectives found in small numbers of reports**
	Survey HCFC users and plan HCFC phase-out
	Strengthen NOU links with other parts of government
	Accelerate ODS phase-out
	Set up and support halon banking
	Liaise with the Secretariats and implementing agencies
	Build the capacity of the NOU
	Audit programmes, projects and activities
e)	**Objectives found in single or very few reports**
	Link Montreal Protocol to Kyoto Protocol, climate change and energy efficiency
	Compile inventory of new ODS uses
	Set up decentralised ODS control systems across country
	Make the IS project sustainable

Annex V

LOGIC CHAIN APPROACH TO PLANNING INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING PROJECTS



Annex VI

CHECKLIST OF EVALUATION QUESTIONS[1]

(a) Results and Impact of IS projects so far:

(i) What are the main activities funded through IS projects so far and what has been their impact on helping countries to comply with the Montreal Protocol?

(ii) To what extent have IS projects created a policy, administrative, economic, technical and political context essential for the success of investment projects and verifiable phase-out of ODS?

(iii) What examples of best practice in IS project management and implementation are there and how can they be shared more widely?

(b) Political and administrative context:

(i) *Were the NOU given a clear mandate and responsibility to meet its commitments under the Montreal Protocol, including access to decision-makers and enforcement agencies?*

(ii) *Is the NOUs' position, capacity, and continuity of officers, resources and lines of command within the authority in charge of ozone issues such that the NOU could carry out its task satisfactorily*?

(iii) *Has a specified high-level officer or a post within the authority given overall responsibility for supervising the work of the National Ozone Unit and ensuring that action taken is adequate to meet commitments under the Protocol?*

(iv) *Have necessary support structures, such as steering committees or advisory groups been established, involving other appropriate authorities, the private sector and non-governmental organizations, etc.?*

(v) To what extent have NOUs created effective partnership working with industry, NGOs and others to drive ODS phase-out?

(c) Planning:

(i) *Have annual work plans for the NOU been prepared and integrated in the authorities' internal planning processes?*

(ii) How do NOUs and implementing agencies set about planning their IS projects to ensure that a) the objectives and activities are targeted appropriately on key national priorities; b) there are clear links between

[1] The items of decision 30/7 taken up as evaluation issues have been included in the list and are shown in italics.

objectives, activities and expected results, c) action plans are followed up and d) useful results and value for money can be demonstrated.

(iii) How far could implementing agencies and the Regional Networks help to improving the understanding and ability of NOUs to plan their IS projects and to report on them in ways that provide better evidence of their impact, effectiveness and value for money?

(iv) Would the success, sustainability and credibility of IS projects be improved by applying more consistent planning based on some kind of logic chain approach?

(d) Implementation issues:

Delays

(i) What does a "project delay" mean for an IS project and why is it important?

(ii) Why are some IS projects delayed? How can delays be reduced and what are the impacts of delays on NOUs and country activities?

(iii) Why have some NOUs secured ratification of amendments by their governments while others continue to report difficulties, although it appeared more than once as an objective for the IS project? What further support is required and what lessons can be learned?

(iv) What are the impacts on a country and an NOU of renewing an IS project for one year rather than two years? To what extent does this policy provide a good incentive to resolve compliance issues?

Staffing

(i) Why are there such big differences in NOO retention and turnover between countries and what are the implications for achieving phase-out and compliance? How do countries manage rapid turnover and what might be done to reduce it?

(ii) What problems are NOUs facing in recruiting and retaining enough staff with the right qualifications, skills and experience?

(iii) Do NOU staff have enough access to training? (Only 5 of the 20 countries reported using IS funds for training NOU staff) Could this be improved by making more use of regional networks?

Monitoring and reporting

(i) Has a reliable system to collect and monitor data on ozone depleting substances imports, exports and production been established?

(ii) To what extent are the current reporting grids in TRs and Extension Requests accurately and consistently completed with useful information?

(iii) What is the role of implementing agencies in completing TRs and extension requests? What responsibility do they take for the completeness and accuracy of what is reported?

(iv) Why (and how) do some NOUs produce 15 or more reports per year? How widespread is this and what is the impact on the NOUs work programme and resources? What information do these reports contain? What is the value added? Could reporting requirements be reduced?

(v) What is happening in IS projects that is not being reported but which would be useful to the Montreal Protocol community to know more about? How could good ideas be more widely shared?

(e) Funding issues:

(i) *Have the personnel and financial resources and equipment provided by the Multilateral Fund been fully allocated to the task of eliminating ODS consumption and production and were made available to the NOU?*

(ii) Is there any relationship between the total IS funding received (or the amount received from the government) and the % funding spent on staff?

(iii) What issues arise when 'permanent' staff are supported exclusively from IS funds and where staff costs represent over 40 % of the available IS funding?

(iv) How have NOUs managed to recruit and retain staff where salaries have increased but IS funding remained the same?

(v) Why do some governments make significantly greater than average contributions, both in absolute and relative terms, to the costs of the National Ozone Unit in their countries?

(vi) What incentives do the current funding arrangements (level, stability, certainty, flexibility) create for the activities and performance of NOUs and implementing agencies?

(vii) What are the opportunities and challenges of moving away from a standard system of funding to one that includes incentives for NOUs, countries and implementing agencies to achieve and maintain compliance, to extend lessons learned from the Montreal Protocol to other environmental agreements and to play an active role in helping other countries through networks and bilateral assistance?

(viii) What is the longer-term scope for NOUs to raise a greater proportion of their funds from other sources and so rely less on the Multilateral Fund for their survival and core activities?

(ix) How should IS funding change to reflect changes to the role, objectives, activities and requirements of NOUs in future?

(f) Future work:

(i) What would be the consequences if IS funding were not or less available in its current form, and what could be the factors to encourage an NOU to achieve self-sustainability, taking into consideration the different needs of VLVC countries and LVC countries?

(ii) What particular challenges will the implementation of HCFC controls bring and how should IS projects change in response?

(iii) What other changes do NOUs expect during the compliance period post 2010? How should IS projects change in response?

(iv) What are the opportunities and challenges of bringing together IS projects with PMU funding and other non-investment support to create a single, flexible resource under direct NOU control? What other models are there for maximising impacts while minimising bureaucracy?

(v) More generally, what are NOU hopes and fears for the future and how might these be relevant to decisions on the future of IS projects?

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Annex VII

SUMMARY OF TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS

1. As part of the desk study, the consultant interviewed the following representatives of implementing agencies, all of whom have considerable knowledge and experience of IS projects.

Rajendra Shende	Chief, OzoneAction Unit, UNEP DTIE
Halvart Koppen and Yerzhan Aisabayev	RNC Europe, UNEP DTIE
Mirian Vega	RNC LAC, UNEP DTIE
Atul Bagai and Thanavat Junchaya	RNC SA and SEAP, UNEP DTIE
Abdulelah Alwadaee and Ayman El-Talouny	RNC West Asia, UNEP DTIE
Alejandro Ramirez-Pabon and Kasper Koefoed	Montreal Protocol Unit, UNDP, New York and Panama
Mary-Ellen Foley	Montreal Protocol/POPs Operations, World Bank

2. The consultant asked them to talk about their experiences and views of IS projects, addressing the following questions:

(a) General points;

(b) What are the strengths of IS projects and the reasons for them to continue in future?

(c) What are the problems with IS projects and how could they be solved? Are IS projects doing what they should?

(d) How should the approach to IS projects change after 2010, in particular to support the phase-out of HCFCs?

(e) Are current levels of IS funding about right, or should the Multilateral Fund provide more or less funding? What is the scope for national governments or others to provide more funding?

(f) What are the implications for NOUs and IS projects of the new project management units and national phase-out plans?

(a) General points

3. The approach to IS projects is the most important development of the Montreal Protocol and a key element of its implementation. Without IS projects, the successful implementation of the Montreal Protocol would not be happening.

4. For this reason, IS projects are irreplaceable and the most important projects to be supported in future. They must not only continue but should also be strengthened, particularly in light of the additional work required for phase-out of HCFCs.

5. It is wrong to think of IS projects in isolation. They are part of a series of activities that includes national ozone officers, regional networks and training programmes that, together, have enabled the successful implementation of the Montreal Protocol and the phase-out of ODS.

6. Most Article 5 countries would not be able to pay for a full-time ozone officer. While some larger countries could perhaps afford it, most would restrict funding to paying for staff and not provide enough for important activities like awareness raising. Smaller countries would certainly find it difficult to pay for an NOU out of the very limited funds they have for environmental programmes.

7. Unlike climate change and other global, regional and local environmental problems, the Montreal Protocol is not a priority for most Article 5 countries. This makes it all the more important to continue to support institutional strengthening.

(b) What are the strengths of IS projects and the reasons for them to continue in future?

8. Institutional strengthening projects have guaranteed a full-time ozone officer dedicated 100 % to supporting ODS phase-out and to ensuring smooth project implementation.

9. Before IS projects, there was a type of “anarchy”, with different implementing agencies working with different ministries to prepare and submit projects, without any coherent national coordination. IS projects have enabled all countries to set up a national focal point to manage a country’s interaction with the different and Secretariats of the Protocol and to take responsibility for achieving compliance.

10. IS projects have helped to institutionalise the Montreal Protocol within Article 5 governments and to raise awareness among their ministries and different stakeholders, which has also facilitated compliance. IS projects have helped create a level playing field for Article 5 countries, large and small, encouraging and enabling them to network, share information and experiences and to represent their countries at international meetings. Through institutional strengthening, national ozone units have now accumulated much valuable experience, since most of them were established over 10 years ago.

11. Institutional strengthening has facilitated project implementation, data collection and data reporting, all of which are particularly complex issues under the Montreal Protocol. Success in these areas has been achieved largely because IS projects created an international network of

professionals dedicated to ensuring that the Protocol works well and is successful. With support from IS projects, NOUs have overcome the fragmentation of institutions and connected with the industry and business sectors in many Article 5 countries. Ozone officers have also driven forward the development, adoption and enforcement of legislation on ODS and have developed good relationships with a wide range of different stakeholders. Without NOUs supported by IS projects, this process would have been much slower and probably unsuccessful in many countries.

(c) What problems do you see with IS projects and how could they be solved? Are IS projects doing what they should?

12. Some NOUs are isolated from the rest of their ministries and from the wider government decision-making process in their countries. This is a real problem since, very often, ozone officers cannot take or influence political decisions and lack the support necessary to make changes happen. Some NOUs have so little influence that funding allocations and the work plan for their own office are decided elsewhere.

13. In general, NOUs in Africa and Asia tend to recruit more senior ozone officers, while other regions continue the trend of recruiting more junior officers who in most countries do not have adequate access to decision-makers. This can partly be remedied by setting up steering committees involving more senior people. They can take decisions on the action plans and goals for the NOUs, but also influence key decision-makers and stakeholders. At the same time, this kind of governance structure can provide more support, certainty and continuity to the operation of the NOU.

14. Some countries have given the responsibility for managing ozone issues to a joint team of government officers who also look after other Multinational Environmental Agreements (MEAs). This arrangement promotes the sharing of information and expertise from the Montreal Protocol to other MEAs. By splitting responsibility for ozone issues across a wider team, it also helps maintaining continuity and the institutional memory when ozone officers change, a frequent problem especially in smaller countries. Another way to mitigate this problem is to use the regional networks under UNEP's Compliance Assistance Programme to train not only ozone officers but also additional members of NOU staff. This has helped solving the difficulty that NOU staff training, although important, is not automatically part of an IS project.

15. Overall, IS projects tend to have more difficulties in smaller countries. This could be because ministries in these countries have fewer resources and may use their ozone officers for work related to other MEAs. Where this involves frequent travelling, the ozone officer ends up having less time to work on his core duties under the Montreal Protocol. One solution in these cases is to ensure that countries use the Multilateral Fund IS resources only for ozone issues. However, in small countries this may be impractical and might anyway lead to the NOU being so isolated from the mainstream government environmental programmes that progress on Montreal Protocol issues becomes very difficult.

16. Ozone officers, especially those paid as consultants by the implementing agencies, are sometimes paid higher salaries than other government officials. This provides a financial disincentive to mainstream the NOU within the government system. Similar difficulties have

been caused by the payment of incentives to some ozone officers. One solution would be for salaries to be determined by the governments concerned rather than by the implementing agencies. However, this could reduce the chances of recruiting well-qualified and experienced ozone officers to these demanding posts, and one might loose the advantages in terms of speed, quality, responsiveness and accountability when ozone officers are able to operate outside normal government systems.

17. Without good communication, NOUs cannot operate effectively. It is important that IS funding is available and can be used to get the necessary equipment and services so that NOUs have good access to email and Internet. Vital information (e.g. Meetings of the Parties and Executive Committee reports) is increasingly available on the web and NOUs can exchange material more quickly and efficiently by email.

18. Some ozone officers do not speak English, which makes it very difficult for them to participate appropriately in international meetings or to understand some of the information that is only available in English.

(d) How should the approach to IS projects change after 2010?

19. IS projects were established at the time that country programmes were being developed. However, at that time, the full picture of what was needed to comply with the Montreal Protocol was not available. Since then, needs have changed and this should be reflected in future IS projects. For example, IS projects have never taken into account inflation, and the current criteria to determine levels of finding cannot consider the particular circumstances of individual countries, such as ODS users being widely spread, which increases transport costs.

20. In future, IS projects should focus much more on outcomes to be achieved and less on lists of activities to be undertaken. The assessment and interpretation of results should be based on these outcomes – or long-term results of the project, rather than on a series of shorter-term deliverables.

21. After 2010 NOUs will face a larger workload arising from the new controls on HCFCs, the phase-out of methyl bromide and the need to change CFC metered-dose inhalers. All these will be more difficult than CFC phase-out to date. Methyl bromide, for example, involves farmers and the food sector, which is more complex and vulnerable. MDI work will require working with new stakeholders in the health sector. Data reporting for HCFCs will not be as simple as it was for CFCs, as they are more widely used and blends are more difficult to identify for trade controls. Customs officers will not have instruments to detect HCFCs, which made CFC control easier.

22. Monitoring trade will continue to be important, because illegal trade might increase but also because there will be the need to maintain zero consumption of CFCs. Awareness raising will be more necessary than ever, because, as most people think that the Montreal Protocol is ‘finished business’, they do not give it the required attention anymore and so are not aware of the need to control HCFCs.

23. Between 2009 and 2013, there will be an overlap between the completion of the CFC phase-out and the HCFC freeze. This means that NOUs will have more work and more complex work, including dealing with the remaining 15 % of CFC consumption, disposal of ODS and equipment, closing of projects and initial HCFC activities.

24. One idea for the future is to give incentives to those NOUs or ozone officers that perform better, subject to a performance evaluation. Alternatively, IS funding could become conditional on achieving specific goals, similar to the way that the Climate Change National Communications and other MEAs operate. Suitable goals could be sustained compliance, smooth project implementation without delays, phase-out in line with targets and timely completion of required reports.

25. There is no need to change the overall approach to IS projects to meet future compliance targets. The key to a successful project is how the country and the agency implement it. There are significant differences in the way IS projects are designed and implemented between regions. In Europe, a typical NOU will have a Coordinator, a Programme Assistant, a Financial and Administrative Assistant and experts (full-time for refrigeration and part-time for Customs, MDIs and other sectors). In contrast, African countries are less likely to have ready access to these kinds of experts. In South East Asia, ozone officers are usually paid by the Government and IS funding is used mainly for technical assistance. By contrast, in the Caribbean, IS funds are more usually spent for paying the NOU staff and for awareness raising activities.

26. Longer-term sustainability of the NOU meaning that it can survive and succeed without relying on external funding, will require NOUs to be less specialised and isolated and to share their responsibilities more with other government ministries and agencies, NGOs and the private sector. Environmental Authorities in Article 5 countries are often weak compared to the industry, commerce and finance ministries. Involving more powerful agencies in implementing the Montreal Protocol will raise its profile and improve the chances of success.

(e) How should IS projects change to support the phase-out of HCFCs?

27. The original country programmes were done by external consultants, as NOUs were not present or in their infancy. Data collection was often poor and information inaccurate or incomplete such that, eventually, they had to be updated. This time it will be important to use the NOUs and to build the capacity of national stakeholders to develop their own national strategies for HCFCs. This work needs to start soon in order to enable countries to meet their freeze obligation in 2013.

28. Ozone officers will need to build a much wider group of stakeholders to work with HCFCs, in particular making new links to those working on climate change and energy efficiency. The challenges that this represents, bringing ozone depletion and climate change together for joint implementation, should not be underestimated.

(f) Are current levels of IS funding about right, or should the Multilateral Fund provide more or less funding? What is the scope for National Governments or others to provide more funding?

29. If there were no MLF funding, IS projects would quickly cease to exist. In most Article 5 countries the Montreal Protocol would receive less attention and there would be very few NOUs left. Most governments would not allocate comparable resources for this one environmental treaty.

30. IS funding levels should reflect the needs of poorer countries in particular, as well as those IS projects that were approved within a country programme a long time ago, when they probably did not request enough funds as their needs were not fully understood. It is likely that, to maintain current activity levels and to manage successfully the new control and commitments, IS project funding will have to increase post 2010, perhaps by 20 %.

31. When IS levels of funding are relatively low, countries allocate most of it to staff, leaving very little, or nothing, for awareness raising activities or other important IS components.

(g) What are the implications for NOUs and IS projects of the new project management units (PMUs) and national phase-out plans (NPPs)?

32. In some countries the PMU and its cooperation with the NOU seem to be working well, particularly where NOUs have responsibility for overall monitoring and the PMUs focus on implementation of the NPP, the sectoral phase-out plan or terminal phase-out management plan. Some countries for example only hire one person to monitor TMPM implementation, working within the NOU.

33. In some larger countries, the existence of PMUs has caused some problems for the NOUs, since there are no clear rules about coordination of the different activities. This is happening in particular where several PMUs operate simultaneously and where NOUs are part of the Government and PMUs are clearly part of the Implementing Agency. This problem needs to be addressed, perhaps through guidance on how the PMUs can be better integrated with the NOUs.

34. The roles of the NOUs and the PMUs are different. Their work is complementary and PMUs should never replace the strategic responsibilities of the NOUs. NOUs deal with policy and legal issues and provide an enabling environment to facilitate the overall implementation of the Montreal Protocol. PMUs deal with day-to-day project management. NOUs are permanent while PMUs are temporary and will cease to exist once the projects are complete.

35. Most frequently, NOUs coordinate the work of PMUs but problems can arise if the NOU is not properly established within its own government. Equally, there can be problems where the PMU is accountable mainly to the implementing agency rather than to the NOU or the national government. Some PMUs are said to be more efficient than NOUs in implementing projects because specialist staff can be contracted for specific tasks and can be held accountable by the implementing agency for delivering them.

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Annex VIII

DECISION 30/7 OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

1. The Executive Committee, having considered the comments and recommendations of the Sub-Committee on Monitoring, Evaluation and Finance (UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/30/4, para. 10), decided:

(a) To take note of the final report on the 1999 evaluation of institutional strengthening projects and draft follow-up action plan (UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/30/6 and Corr.1);

(b) To urge all Article 5 countries with institutional strengthening projects to ensure that:

(i) National Ozone Unit is given a clear mandate and responsibility to carry out the day-to-day work in order to prepare, coordinate and, where relevant, implement the government's activities to meet its commitments under the Montreal Protocol; this also requires access to decision-makers and enforcement agencies;

(ii) National Ozone Unit's position, capacities, and continuity of officers, resources and lines of command within the authority in charge of ozone issues are such that the National Ozone Unit can carry out its task satisfactorily;

(iii) a specified high-level officer or a post within the authority is given overall responsibility for supervising the work of the National Ozone Unit and ensuring that action taken is adequate to meet commitments under the Protocol;

(iv) necessary support structures, such as steering committees or advisory groups are established, involving other appropriate authorities, the private sector and non-governmental organizations, etc.;

(v) personnel and financial resources and equipment provided by the Multilateral Fund are fully allocated to the task of eliminating ODS consumption and production and are made available to the National Ozone Unit;

(vi) annual work plans for the National Ozone Unit are prepared and integrated in the authorities' internal planning processes;

(vii) a reliable system to collect and monitor data on ozone depleting substances imports, exports and production is established; and

(viii) measures taken and problems encountered are reported to the Secretariat and/or the implementing agency in charge of the institutional strengthening project when required by the Executive Committee.

(c) To request the Secretariat, in collaboration with interested Article 5 and non-Article 5 countries and the implementing agencies, to prepare general principles for agreements between governments and the implementing agencies on new and renewed institutional strengthening projects which incorporate the elements under (b), while recognizing that the agreements should be appropriate and adaptable to the specific situation in different countries. These principles should emphasize that action to be undertaken should be stated in general terms only in the institutional strengthening agreement;

(d) To instruct the implementing agency in charge of the institutional strengthening project to follow up the phase-out status and problems encountered by the National Ozone Unit and discuss and propose possible solutions with them;

(e) To instruct all implementing agencies to ensure that their project proposals are based on the current strategic planning of the Article 5 country government and ensure that the National Ozone Unit is fully involved in the planning and preparation of projects, regularly provide National Ozone Units with information on the progress of project implementation and assist them in improving their capacity to monitor and evaluate projects implemented and their impact at the country level;

(f) To request the implementing agencies to define a procedure to justify reallocation of funds among the budget lines of institutional strengthening projects and report to the Thirty-first Meeting of the Executive Committee; and

(g) To request UNEP and UNIDO to review whether quarterly progress reporting can be extended to six-month intervals and to report thereon to the Thirty-first Meeting of the Executive Committee."

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Annex IX

LESSONS LEARNED REPORTED IN TRs OF 20 SELECTED IS PROJECTS

Political and administrative

(a) NOU needs more support from national government and institutions;

(b) Need to strengthen links and co-operation between the NOU and other parts of the government;

(c) NOU needs additional financial help from the government and good co-operation from other ministries;

(d) IS project is key to achieving phase-out;

(e) Legislation is essential to phase out ODS;

(f) Accelerated phase-out helps reduce illegal trade;

(g) National execution using market-based instruments works well;

(h) Compliance was achieved through regulation and by licensing refrigeration technicians;

(i) Introducing a quota system was vital for compliance; and

(j) Need to learn better from experience in other relevant projects. Should link the Montreal Protocol with Kyoto Protocol and climate change.

Implementation

(a) Need for better co-ordination between implementing agencies;

(b) An active implementing agency is a great help to a solitary NOU;

(c) Need better and more regular communication with the implementing agency;

(d) NOU participation in regional networks is very helpful to achieving phase-out;

(e) NOU needs good links to industry;

(f) Close co-operation with stakeholders improved project implementation;

(g) TPMPs are valuable tools;

(h) Sector plans to phase out ODS were vital;

(i) Awareness programmes need specific targeting, for example on local inspectors or technicians;

(j) It is hard to enforce rules and to control the supply of CTC for non-feedstock uses;

(k) NOU had to intervene to keep the halon bank project operating;

(l) More assistance needed to create an electronic data base;

(m) There is a problem with disposal of recovered ODS; and

(n) Establishing a national network for methyl bromide users was key to the success of the project.

Funding

(a) It is hard to get counterpart funding for projects;

(b) Need to improve arrangements for the release of funds;

(c) Direct disbursement helped IS project implementation;

(d) Insufficient funding for workshops and seminars to promote awareness;

(e) Should link phase-out to technical assistance or funding to produce non-ODS technology;

(f) Need more funds for awareness raising; and

(g) Extra funds were needed to translate and distribute documents.

Staffing

(a) Previous project suffered from lack of competent staff and poor implementation; and

(b) Changing NOO management and the Ozone Officer causes delays.

In addition, UNEP reported the following lessons learned:

(a) The work under IS projects and that of NOUs would be effective if complimented by the regional networks (there is indication of linkage between IS projects and regional networks under item D of implementation, but we feel that this lesson should be emphasized more strongly. IS projects cannot work in isolation.

(b) The regionalized CAP programme has worked closely with NOUs to make IS projects effective in setting up licensing systems which are necessary for meeting the targeted compliance (for IS project to be effective there is need for regionalized policy and technical assistance).

(c) Certain countries are in unique political situation (war-like) and therefore need unique IS assistance if universal compliance is to be achieved.