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2007 CONSOLIDATED PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

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Executive summary

1. The purpose of this report is to provide the Executive Committee with an overview of the results reported in the project completion reports (PCRs) received during the reporting period, i.e., since its 50th Meeting in November 2006. The total number of PCRs received for investment projects in the year 2007 decreased to 70 (compared to 74 in 2006) while the total number of PCRs still due for completed investment projects has decreased from 85 to 47. For non-investment projects, the number of PCRs received in 2007 increased from 40 to 50, while the number of outstanding PCRs increased from 61 to 90.

2. The 70 PCRs submitted for investment projects were reviewed with respect to phase-out achieved, implementation delays, and completeness of information and data consistency, overall assessment and lessons learned. A number of interesting lessons were reported. They are partly technical but refer mostly to management issues of project preparation and implementation. The most useful ones are presented in Annex II-A.

3. Most of the 50 PCRs on non-investment projects contain substantial information and analysis. Lessons learned referred in particular to the implementation of refrigeration management plans (RMPs), highlighting the difficulties and monitoring requirements in working with small and medium-sized enterprises in the servicing sector. A list of selected lessons learned is reproduced in Annex II-B.

4. The terminal reports submitted for the extension of institutional strengthening (IS) projects show improvements of quality and completeness. While most provide concrete information and assessment, some present repetitive (copy and paste) texts, which make it difficult to determine the results achieved during the previous IS phase. The agencies are encouraged to continue improving their quality control over the IS reporting and ensure that the results achieved, lessons learned and remaining issues are properly highlighted in the terminal reports.

5. For the second time, and in accordance with decision 48/12, lessons learned during the implementation of multi-year agreements (MYAs) are presented in this document. They were received from UNDP, UNIDO, and the World Bank. Those lessons learned were not yet included in the progress reports of annual implementation programmes, as foreseen in decision 48/12, but were prepared on request by the Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Officer. Extracts are presented in Annex II-C.

6. The suggested decision at the end of the document concerns the schedule for next year's submission of PCRs by the agencies, further improvements in data consistency, and the provision of missing information.

I. Introduction

7. The purpose of this report is to provide the Executive Committee with an overview of the results reported in the PCRs received during the reporting period, i.e., since its 50th Meeting in November 2006. A draft of the report was sent to the implementing agencies as well as the bilateral agencies. Comments received were taken into account when finalizing the report. PCRs scheduled for submission by the agencies for 2008 are shown in Table IV in Annex I.

8. At its 48th Meeting, the Executive Committee decided to request the agencies to include lessons learned in the progress reports of annual implementation programmes, given that multi-year projects were currently the main modalities for project implementation. It also requested the Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Officer to include such lessons learned in the consolidated project completion report in addition to those reported in project completion reports (decision 48/12). A selection of the reported lessons learned is included in Annex II-C of this report.

II. Overview of PCRs received and due

9. The decrease in the number of PCRs received for 2007, as noted in paragraph 1 above, is partly due to the early cut off date (9 October 2007) and partly due to the decline in the number of PCRs due. Moreover, implementing agencies did not follow fully the agreed delivery schedule for the first three quarters of 2007 (see Table I in Annex I).

10. Implementing and bilateral agencies have submitted, as of 9 October 2007, a total of 1,738 PCRs for investment projects and 679 PCRs for non-investment projects, representing 97.4 per cent (compared to 95.1 per cent last year) of PCRs due for all investment projects and 88.3 per cent (90.8 per cent last year) for all non-investment projects completed as of 31 December 2006.

11. Tables 1 and 2 below present more detailed data by agency including comparative figures for the previous two reporting periods.

Table 1

INVESTMENT PROJECTS OVERVIEW (Except multi-year projects)

Agency	Completed projects up to December 2006	Total PCRs received for projects completed up to December 2006	PCRs still due	PCRs received in the reporting period		
				2005	2006	2007 ¹
France	13	9	4	0	1	0
Germany	16	16	0	1	7	6
IBRD	448	421 ²	27	57	26	20
Italy	5	5	0	4	0	1
Japan	6	5	1	2	1	0
United Kingdom	1	1	0	N/A	1	N/A
UNDP	876	864 ³	12	149	11	32
UNIDO	418	415 ⁴	3	69	26	11
USA	2	2	0	0	1	N/A
Total	1,785	1,738	47	282	74	70

¹ After the 50th Meeting of the Executive Committee (11 November 2006 to 9 October 2007).

² In addition, the World Bank submitted 2 PCRs for cancelled projects.

³ In addition, UNDP submitted 2 PCRs for cancelled projects.

⁴ In addition, UNIDO submitted 1 PCR for a cancelled project and 9 cancellation reports.

Table 2

NON-INVESTMENT PROJECTS OVERVIEW

(Except project preparations, country programmes, multi-year projects, ongoing projects like networking and clearinghouse activities as well as institutional strengthening projects)

Agency	Completed projects up to December 2006	Total PCRs received for projects completed up to December 2006	PCRs still due	PCRs received in the reporting period		
				2005	2006	2007 ¹
Australia	7	7 ²	0	0	6	N/A
Austria	1	1	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
Canada	46	42	4	7	6	2
Denmark	1	1	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
Finland	3	2	1	N/A	0	0
France	18	12	6	0	2	1
Germany	33	33	0	7	2	3
IBRD	27	24	3	2	2	0
Israel	1	1	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
Japan	7	6	1	5	N/A	0
Poland	1	1	0	0	1	N/A
Singapore	2	0	2	0	0	0
South Africa	1	1	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
Sweden	4	1	3	N/A	0	0
Switzerland	3	3	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
UNDP	175	158 ³	17	17	8	21
UNEP	310	258	52	18	8	7
UNIDO	89	88	1	9	3	16
USA	40	40	0	0	2	N/A
Total	769	679	90	65	40	50

¹After the 50th Meeting of the Executive Committee (11 November 2006 to 9 October 2007).

²In addition, Australia submitted 1 project cancellation report.

³In addition, UNDP submitted 2 PCRs for transferred projects.

12. By 9 October 2007 UNDP, which implements by far the largest number of investment projects, delivered 32 compared to 37 investment project PCRs scheduled for submission by the end of September this year and 21 compared to 28 non-investment project PCRs. UNEP submitted 7 compared to 12 PCRs for non-investment projects scheduled, and UNIDO sent 11 compared to 14 investment project PCRs scheduled and 16 PCRs for non-investment projects, 6 more than scheduled. The World Bank provided 6 compared to 11 investment project PCRs scheduled for submission by the end of September this year.

13. UNEP has the largest number of PCRs due (52 for non-investment projects), followed by the World Bank with 27 PCRs due for investment and three for non-investment projects completed by the end of 2006. UNDP has 12 PCRs due for investment and 17 for non-investment projects. For UNIDO as well as for several bilateral agencies, the combined numbers of PCRs still due for investment and non-investment projects range between 1 and 6 (see Tables 1 and 2 above). There are still 2 non-investment PCRs due for projects completed by the end of 2000 that were implemented by Singapore.

III. Analysis of project completion reports for investment projects

(a) PCRs received and due

14. By the end of 2006, UNDP had completed 876 investment projects for which it submitted 864 PCRs (98.6 per cent of total) as at 9 October 2007. UNIDO completed 418 projects and submitted 415 PCRs (99.3 per cent). The World Bank completed 448 projects and submitted 421 PCRs (94 per cent). Japan completed 6 projects and submitted 5 PCRs (83.3 per cent). Germany completed 16 projects and submitted 16 PCRs (100 per cent). France completed 13 projects and submitted 9 PCRs (69.2 per cent). Italy completed 5 projects and submitted 5 PCRs (100 per cent). The United Kingdom completed one project and submitted one PCR (100 per cent). The United States of America completed 2 projects and submitted 2 PCRs (100 per cent) (see Table 1 in section II above).

15. As last year, the largest number of PCRs was received from UNDP, particularly for aerosol and foam projects. However, foam is still the sector with the largest number of PCRs due, followed by refrigeration. Foam (20) and refrigeration (12) projects combined account for 32 of the 47 PCRs still due for investment projects completed by the end of 2006 (see Table II in Annex I). The backlog of PCRs for early investment projects completed by the end of 1999 has been eliminated.

16. The 70 PCRs received in the reporting period (11 November 2006 to 9 October 2007) represent projects completed in 29 countries. 61.4 per cent of the completion reports are for projects implemented in nine countries (Argentina, Democratic Republic of the Congo, China, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Pakistan and Turkey).

(b) Ozone depleting substance (ODS) phase-out achieved

17. ODS phase-out in the projects covered in the project completion reports is found to be as planned in most cases, the total phase-out reported being slightly less than the planned amount (see Table 3 below). However, information on phase-out achieved in the PCRs is in some cases incomplete when unit production and ODS consumption data before and after the conversion have not been provided (see also Table IX in Annex I). Moreover, the ODS phase-out data reported in the PCRs are different in 25 of the 70 reports from the ODS data reported in the 2006 progress report. While this is in some cases due to different rounding of figures, for 9 projects significant differences are noted, which are being clarified with the agencies concerned. The number of cases with such differences and the volume of differences is less than last year, however.

Table 3

ODS PHASED-OUT BY PROJECTS WITH PCRS SUBMITTED

Agency	Number of projects	PCR		2006 progress report	
		ODP to be phased out	ODP phased out	ODP to be phased out	ODP phased out
Germany	6	289.8	289.8	289.8	0.0
Italy	1	93.9	93.9	93.9	93.9
UNDP	32	1,553.7	1,555.2	1,554.0	1,554.0
UNIDO	11	485.3	503.8	485.3	485.3
World Bank	20	1,693.3	1,603.8	1,703.7	1,666.7
Total	70	4,116.0	4,046.5	4,126.7	3,799.9

(c) Implementation delays

18. Out of 70 projects, 6 were completed before the planned date, 2 were completed on time, and 61 showed delays ranging from one month to 98 months and one project did not report an actual completion date. In 38 or 54.3 per cent of 70 projects, delays of more than 12 months occurred compared to 39 or 53.4 per cent of projects for which PCRs were received last year. Average delays reported in PCRs in 2007 increased to 22.04 months (from 18.84 months) while the average project duration increased from 45.56 months to 55.19 months (see Table 4 below). Fewer projects were completed before the anticipated completion date, partly as a result of shortened approved durations for a number of projects (between 12 and 24 months for 18 projects).

19. Delays cannot be related to particular sectors or implementing agencies. Delays are most frequently attributed to the receiving enterprise (39), followed by supplier (21), government (15), external factors (12), implementing agency (8) and funding (5).

Table 4

IMPLEMENTATION DELAYS
(Total figures in brackets show last year for comparison)

Agency	Number of projects	Average delays as per PCRs (months)	Average delays as per 2006 progress reports (months)	Average duration as per PCRs (months)	Average duration as per 2006 progress reports (months)
Germany	6	21.65	12.04	40.26	30.65
Italy	1	16.23	16.23	65.97	65.97
UNDP	32	18.88	18.93	52.18	52.36
UNIDO	11	14.57	13.46	57.83	56.72
World Bank	20	31.45	31.15	62.35	62.40
Total	70 (73)	22.04 (18.84)	20.93 (18.92)	55.19 (45.56)	54.25 (45.87)

(d) Completeness of information

20. Key information was more regularly provided than last year, for example the list of annual consumption of ODS and substitutes was included in 74.3 per cent of the PCRs, compared to 65.8 per cent last year (see Table 5 below). The list of equipment destroyed was less regularly provided than last year (48.6 per cent compared to 69.9 per cent last year). Information that was entirely missing in parts of the PCR was noted in 5 cases. However, it still happens too frequently that the information is not complete, in particular on equipment destroyed (30 per cent of the PCRs compared to 15.1 per cent in 2006), ODS and substitutes (20 per cent of the PCRs compared to 28.8 per cent the year before), operating cost and savings (14.3 per cent compared to 20.5 per cent in 2006) and list of capital equipment (11.4 per cent compared to 4.1 per cent in 2006).

Table 5

**INFORMATION PROVIDED IN INVESTMENT PROJECT COMPLETION REPORTS
RECEIVED DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD
(Figures in brackets show last year for comparison)**

	Provided		Incomplete		Not provided		"Not applicable"*	
	Number of projects	Percentage %	Number of projects	Percentage %	Number of projects	Percentage %	Number of projects	Percentage %
List of annual consumption of ODS and substitutes	52	74.3 (65.8)	14	20.0 (28.8)	0	0 (1.4)	4	5.7 (4.1)
List of capital equipment	62	88.6 (93.2)	8	11.4 (4.1)	0	0 (1.4)	0	0 (1.4)
Operating cost details	45	64.3 (63.0)	10	14.3 (20.5)	4	5.7 (2.7)	11	15.7 (13.7)
List of destroyed equipment	34	48.6 (69.9)	21	30.0 (15.1)	1	1.4 (0)	14	20.0 (15.1)

*According to indications of implementing agencies

(e) Overall assessment and rating

21. During the reporting period, implementing agencies rated 31.4 per cent of projects as highly satisfactory, which is a reduction from 38.3 per cent in the previous year; 61.4 per cent were rated as satisfactory, compared to 56.2 per cent in 2006, and 7.1 per cent as less satisfactory compared to 5.5 per cent reported in the year before (see Table 6 below).

Table 6

**NEW OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION BY THE AGENCIES
IN THE NEW PCR FORMAT
(Figures in brackets show last year for comparison)**

Assessment	Germany	Italy	UNDP	UNIDO	World Bank	Total	Percentage of total %
Highly Satisfactory	2		9	6	5	22	31.4 (38.3)
Satisfactory	4	1	21	5	12	43	61.4 (56.2)
Less Satisfactory			2		3	5	7.1 (5.5)
Total	6	1	32	11	20	70	100.0

IV. Analysis of non-investment project completion reports

(a) Overview

22. The largest number of the 50 PCR's received for non-investment projects, and also those still due, are for technical assistance projects implemented mainly by UNDP and UNEP. UNEP has continued to reduce the number of old PCR's due, but has submitted fewer PCR's than in previous years and has therefore an increase in the number of PCR's due. For bilateral technical assistance projects there are still 11 PCR's due, as well as 6 PCR's for training projects (see Table III in Annex I).

23. According to decision 29/4, country programmes, project preparation, as well as UNEP's recurrent activities including networking, do not require PCR's. According to the same decision, institutional strengthening projects are providing terminal reports on the previous phase at the same time as requests for extension (see Table 7).

Table 7

OVERVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING REPORTING

Agency	PCR's for IS projects received before decision 29/4	Terminal reports received with extension requests for projects completed up to December 2006*	Terminal reports received with extension requests in 2007**
France	1	0	0
Germany	0	2	0
IBRD	7	16	3
UNDP	1	89	13
UNEP	10	200	41
UNIDO	2	17	2
USA	0	1	0
Total	21	325	59

*Completed in the sense of a phase being completed.

**Excluding start-up projects and project where approval is only for one year. In those cases, no terminal reports are submitted.

The formats for terminal reports and extensions requests for IS projects approved at the 32nd Meeting of the Executive Committee continue to be used for renewal requests. While in the past, the terminal reports and plans of action submitted were of uneven quality and completeness, the current submissions for renewal requests show improvements in quality, and there is better control of information to help determine the results achieved during the previous IS phase. There are still a few cases where terminal reports look very similar and have obviously been prepared using copy and paste word processing, but these are fewer. The agencies are encouraged to continue improving their quality control over the IS reporting and ensure that the results achieved, lessons learned and remaining issues are properly highlighted in the terminal reports.

(b) Funding, delays, phase-out and assessment

24. Total actual expenditures for all completed non-investment projects with PCR's were reported to be 97 per cent of the planned expenditures which, as last year, indicates some overall savings (see Table 8) that in a number of cases still need to be confirmed once the final financial figures become available.

Table 8

**BUDGETS, PHASE-OUT AND DELAYS REPORTED IN PCRS RECEIVED
FOR NON-INVESTMENT PROJECTS**
(Figures in brackets show last year for comparison)

Agency	Number of projects	Approved funds (US \$)	Funds disbursed (US \$)	ODP to be phased out (ODP tonnes)	ODP phased out (ODP tonnes)	Average delays (months)
Bilateral	6	894,567	894,540	410.0	410.0	20.80 (22.86)
UNDP	21	2,373,343	2,217,063	129.6	125.3	7.38 (22.81)
UNEP	7	282,500	282,404	0.0	0.0	15.81 (11.17)
UNIDO	16	1,598,216	1,586,936	152.9	152.9	9.46 (13.22)
Total	50	5,148,626	4,980,943	692.5	688.2	11.06 (20.77)

25. The delays realized for project implementation continue to show a great deal of variance. Out of 50 non-investment projects, 8 were completed before the scheduled date, 7 projects were completed on time, while there were delays in 32 projects ranging from four months to 67 months and three projects did not report actual completion dates. In 11 cases, or 22 per cent of the projects, delays of more than 12 months occurred. No particular patterns with regard to delays by type of project are observable. UNDP shows a significant decrease in average delay (7.38 months compared to 22.81 months last year). The average delay of UNEP's projects increased from 11.17 to 15.81 months, and delays of UNIDO's projects decreased from 13.22 to 9.46 months. The overall average delay for non-investment projects is 11.06 months beyond the planned completion date, showing a significant decrease compared to 2006 with 20.77 months.

26. The difference in ODP phase-out planned and reported as achieved is almost entirely due to two projects implemented by UNDP for which the actual amount phased-out was reported to be less than planned.

27. Forty-four per cent of the projects were marked as "highly satisfactory", which is much more than last year (13.2 per cent); 40 per cent were rated as "satisfactory as planned" and 12 per cent as 'satisfactory though not as planned', which is less than last year when this figure was 13.2 per cent (see Table 9). The validity of such assessments can only be verified during evaluations. In several projects rated as "satisfactory though not as planned", no clear explanation for this rating has been provided. Two of 50 non-investment projects were rated as "unsatisfactory".

Table 9

OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF NON-INVESTMENT PROJECTS BY AGENCIES
(Figures in brackets show last year for comparison)

Assessment	Bilateral	UNDP	UNEP	UNIDO	Total	Percentage of total %
Highly satisfactory	3	6	1	12	22	44 (13.2)
Satisfactory or satisfactory and as planned	2	10	4	4	20	40 (60.5)
Satisfactory though not as planned	1	3	2		6	12 (13.2)
Unsatisfactory		2			2	4 (5.3)
Not provided					0	0 (7.9)
Total	6	21	7	16	50	100

(c) Quality of information received

28. Most PCRs on non-investment projects contain substantial information and analysis. The sections on causes of delays and corrective actions taken vary a lot in terms of concreteness of information provided. Usually governmental and external factors are given as causes for delays.

29. Comments on draft PCRs have been provided by national ozone units (NOUs) for only 15 of the 50 reports received, and by the implementing agency in 43 cases. However, that represents a much better output than last year. The reported lessons learned have in many cases been interesting and substantial, as evident in Annex II-B. The guidelines for the preparation of PCRs for non-investment projects, which include a section on lessons learned, may have contributed to this positive development.

V. Schedule for submission of PCRs in 2008

30. The implementing agencies submitted, as in previous years, schedules for submission of PCRs due. Table IV in Annex I shows PCRs due for projects completed as of 31 December 2006 and takes into account the number of outstanding PCRs as of 9 October 2007. The implementing agencies will, in addition to the above schedule, submit PCRs in 2008 for projects completed during 2007.

VI. Improve consistency of data reported in PCRs and in annual progress reports

31. Decision 50/8 (b)(i) requested implementing agencies, in cooperation with the Fund Secretariat, to establish full consistency of data reported in the project completion reports, in the inventory and the annual progress reports by the end of January 2007. The Fund Secretariat provided all agencies with detailed information on data completeness and inconsistencies of PCRs received in comparison to the Inventory and the Progress Reports. All cases of incomplete information and data inconsistencies in PCRs received in 2003 have now been solved (see Table V in Annex I), while this process still continues with UNDP (for some PCRs received in 2004 and 2005) and the World Bank (for PCRs received in 2005) (see Tables VI and VII in Annex I), several agencies for PCRs received in 2006 (see Tables VIII in Annex I) and has been started for those received in 2007 (see Table IX in Annex I).

32. During the reporting period, 48 PCRs were received with incomplete information and 100 PCRs with data inconsistencies (see Table IX in Annex I). Regarding PCRs with incomplete information, the number has decreased (48 PCRs compared to 62 PCRs last year). The number of PCRs with data inconsistencies also decreased (100 PCRs compared to 144 PCRs last year). While this is a positive development, the number of PCRs with various data problems is still too high.

33. In order to improve consistency of data and facilitate the preparation of PCRs, agencies can, since July 2004, download key project data from the website of the Fund Secretariat. When indicating the project number or title the first page of the PCR forms will be automatically filled in with data from the Fund Secretariat's project inventory database, including actual data and remarks from the last progress reports. However, the continued high number of reports with inconsistencies appears to indicate that this facility is still not regularly used.

VII. Lessons learned

(a) Investment projects

34. Lessons learned identified in the 70 PCRs submitted for investment projects in the 2007 reporting period were reviewed. They are partly technical but refer mostly to management issues of project preparation and implementation. Many relate to the need for close coordination with all relevant stakeholders. The most interesting ones are presented in Annex II-A. Lessons learned are particularly useful when they draw on experiences during project implementation and describe how particular problems have been overcome. Thus, they are also valuable for other projects which might face similar problems.

35. Although less frequently now, there are still lessons learned reported in some PCRs that are either too general, too specific or too short and thus do not provide any useful insights for other projects. Some also present instead a summary of results achieved or repeat the activities undertaken, and have been left out of Annex II. However, the full list is available on request and on the intranet of the Fund Secretariat in the evaluation section under PCRs.

(b) Non-investment projects

36. Lessons learned reported in PCRs on 50 non-investment projects were analyzed. In spite of their relatively low number, several of them are interesting in particular those regarding the implementation of RMPs, including recovery and recycling and related monitoring, which highlight the particular difficulties found in working with small and medium-sized enterprises in the servicing sector. A list of selected lessons learned is reproduced in Annex II-B. The full list is available on request and on the intranet of the Fund Secretariat in the evaluation section under PCRs.

(c) Multi-year agreements

37. For the second time, and in accordance with decision 48/12, lessons learned during the implementation of multi-year agreements are presented in this document. Lessons learned from selected multi-year agreements were received from only UNDP, UNIDO, and the World Bank. Those lessons learned have not yet been included in the progress reports of annual implementation programmes, but were prepared on request by the Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Officer. Extracts are presented in Annex II-C.

VIII. Action expected from the Executive Committee

38. The Executive Committee might wish to consider:

- (a) Taking note of the 2007 consolidated project completion report including the schedule for submission of project completion reports (PCRs) due and the lessons learned in Annex II;
- (b) Requesting implementing and bilateral agencies concerned:

- (i) To establish by the end of January 2008, in cooperation with the Multilateral Fund Secretariat, full consistency of data reported in the PCRs in the inventory and in the annual progress reports;
- (ii) To provide, by the end of January 2008, the information still missing in a number of PCRs;
- (iii) To clear by the end of January 2008 the backlog of PCRs for projects completed before the end of 2005.

Annex I
STATISTICS

Table I

SCHEDULE FOR PLANNED SUBMISSION OF PCRS IN 2007 AND ACTUAL DELIVERY

	Schedule	Sector	Investment		Non-Investment	
			Schedule	Received	Schedule	Received
UNDP	January 31	Foam	9		-	
		Refrigeration	1		7	
	March 31	Aerosol	1	1FOA	1	8TAS
		Fumigation	4		-	
		Refrigeration	1		-	
			4		6	
	July 31	Aerosol	4		-	
		Foam	6		-	
	Refrigeration	-		7		
September 30	Foam	5		-		
	Halon	-		1		
	Solvent	1		-		
	Refrigeration	1		6		
October				6ARS, 20FOA, 4REF, 1STE		13TAS
Total			37	32	28	21
Status at October 9, 2007				-5		-7
UNEP	Schedule	Sector	Investment		Non-Investment	
			Schedule	Received	Schedule	Received
	December 2006	Technical Assistance			6	
		Training			3	
	January 2007	Technical Assistance			3	
March 2007					3TRA, 4TAS	
Total			N/A		12	7
Status at October 9, 2007						-5
UNIDO*	Schedule	Sector	Investment		Non-Investment	
			Schedule	Received	Schedule	Received
	January – May			1FOA, 2FUM, 1ARS		
	July	Fumigation	6	2FUM	6	
		Halon	1			
		Solvent	4			
		Refrigeration	3		2	
	September	Solvent	1	3REF		15TAS, 1TRA
		Fumigation			2	
	October			1REF, 1FUM		
November	Aerosol			1		
	Fumigation	3				
	Halon	2		1		
	Refrigeration	5				
December	Fumigation	1				
Total			26	11	12	16
Status at October 9, 2007				-4		+6
World Bank**	Schedule	Sector	Investment		Non-Investment	
			Schedule	Received	Schedule	Received
	January	Refrigeration (1)	3		--	
		Foam (1)				
		Solvents (1)				
	March	Multisector (1)	2	2FOA, 3REF, 1SOL	1	
		Refrigeration (1)				
	July	Foam (1)	4		--	
		Aerosol (2)				
		Refrigeration (1)				
September	Foam (1)	2				
	Refrigeration (1)					
October	Refrigeration (1)	2		--		
	Foam (1)					
November	Halon (1)	4		--		
	Methyl Bromide (1)					
	Refrigeration (2)					
December	Refrigeration (2)	5		--		
	Foam (3)					
Total			22	6	1	0
Status at October 9, 2007				-5		-1

* Will be submitted for projects completed in 2006 and 2007.

** Table includes expected PCRs for projects completed up through December 2005 with outstanding PCRs (40 total) and takes care of the number of outstanding PCRs as of September 2006 *minus* PCRs that will be submitted by 31 December 2006 (expected 17). The Bank will, in addition to the above schedule, be submitting PCRs in CY2007 for projects completed through 2006 and up to 30 June 2007.

Table II

**PCRS FOR INVESTMENT PROJECTS RECEIVED AND DUE BY IMPLEMENTING AGENCY, SECTOR AND YEAR
(FOR PROJECTS COMPLETED UNTIL THE END OF 2006)**

Agency	Sector	PCR(s) Received in:											PCR(s) Due in ¹ :						
		1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total
UNDP	Aerosol	1	-	9	4	11	-	-	4	3	6	38	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
	Foam	20	34	79	83	117	87	82	77	7	21	607	-	-	3	1	-	3	7
	Fumigant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
	Halon	-	-	3	13	-	1	-	1	-	-	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Refrigeration	1	22	2	33	9	22	39	42	1	4	175	-	-	1	1	1	-	3
	Solvent	3	-	-	19	-	-	1	2	-	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Sterilant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	25	56	93	152	137	110	122	126	11	32	864	-	-	4	3	2	3	12
UNIDO	Aerosol	6	6	10	6	4	2	-	7	-	1	42	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Foam	8	22	3	22	11	15	11	14	8	1	115	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	Fumigant	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	1	-	5	9	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	Halon	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Process Agent	-	-	-	-	1	3	2	4	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Phase-Out Plan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	Refrigeration	12	25	11	32	14	22	24	34	7	4	185	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Solvent	5	13	5	3	3	5	5	4	9	-	52	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	32	66	29	63	35	48	42	64	25	11	415	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	
World Bank	Aerosol	4	6	6	-	1	-	2	5	2	-	26	-	-	-	2	1	-	3
	Foam	18	25	38	20	20	18	8	26	12	3	188	-	-	-	8	-	3	11
	Fumigant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	2
	Halon	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
	Multiple Sectors	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	2
	Others	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Process Agent	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Production	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Refrigeration	18	24	22	26	15	16	12	21	9	4	167	-	1	-	1	2	2	6
	Solvent	15	4	3	1	-	-	-	3	-	1	27	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
	Sterilant	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
	Total	59	60	73	48	36	34	23	56	24	8	421	-	1	2	14	5	5	27
Bilateral	Aerosol	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Foam	-	-	3	2	2	2	-	5	6	6	26	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
	Fumigant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Halon	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Refrigeration	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	2	5	-	9	1	-	-	1	-	1	3
	Solvent	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
	Total	-	1	5	2	3	2	-	7	11	7	38	1	1	-	1	1	1	5
Grand Total	116	183	200	265	211	194	187	253	71	58	1,738	1	2	6	18	8	12	47	

¹6 months after projects completion according to the Progress Report

Table III

**PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RECEIVED AND DUE FOR NON-INVESTMENT PROJECTS
(FOR PROJECTS COMPLETED UNTIL THE END OF 2006)**

Agency	Sector	See PCR(s) Received so far for Year Due											PCR(s) Due in ¹								
		1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total	Before 1997	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total
UNDP	Demonstration	-	-	5	-	-	7	1	2	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	Technical Assistance	-	6	39	17	7	5	1	15	8	21	119	-	-	-	1	4	1	5	4	15
	Training	-	18	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	Total	-	24	50	17	7	12	2	17	8	21	158	-	-	-	1	4	1	5	6	17
UNEP	Technical Assistance	9	53	3	18	22	18	5	6	1	4	139	-	1	1	1	1	5	9	5	23
	Training	8	34	1	2	21	15	20	10	5	3	119	-	-	-	-	-	4	8	17	29
	Total	17	87	4	20	43	33	25	16	6	7	258	-	1	1	1	1	9	17	22	52
UNIDO	Demonstration	-	-	-	6	7	3	3	3	-	-	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Technical Assistance	-	6	8	-	4	1	3	4	3	15	44	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	Training	-	1	1	-	5	6	7	1	-	1	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	-	7	9	6	16	10	13	8	3	16	88	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
World Bank	Demonstration	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
	Technical Assistance	5	4	6	-	1	-	2	1	1	-	20	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	2
	Training	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	6	7	6	-	1	-	2	1	1	-	24	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	3
Bilateral	Demonstration	5	5	12	-	3	1	1	-	2	-	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Technical Assistance	-	-	13	1	1	9	14	15	8	4	65	1	-	1	-	-	2	6	1	11
	Training	1	3	19	1	9	6	5	6	6	1	57	1	-	-	1	-	1	1	2	6
	Total	6	8	44	2	13	16	20	21	16	5	151	2	-	1	1	-	3	7	3	17
Grand Total	29	133	113	45	80	71	62	63	34	49	679	2	1	2	3	6	13	29	34	90	

¹ 6 months after projects completion according to the Progress Report.

Table IV

**Schedule for Submission of Outstanding PCRs in 2008
(For Projects Completed until 31 December 2006)**

	Schedule	Sector	Investment PCRs	Non-Investment PCRs
UNDP	January	Aerosol (2) Foam (8) Methyl Bromide (3) Refrigeration (1) Recovery/Recycling (3) RMP (9) Technical Assistance (2)	17	11
		* In addition UNDP will submit 30 PCRs for 2007 completions in 2008	10	20
	Total		27	31
Total PCRs Due as of October 9, 2007			12	17
	Schedule	Sector	Investment PCRs	Non-Investment PCRs
UNEP	December 2007	Refrigeration Several		4 2
	March 2008	Refrigeration Halon		4 1
	July 2008	Refrigeration Solvent Several		8 1 2
	December 2008	Technical Assistance Several		5 3
	Total			30
Total PCRs Due as of October 9, 2007			N/A	52
	Schedule	Sector	Investment PCRs	Non-Investment PCRs
UNIDO	January 2007	Refrigeration	1	
	Total		1	0
Total PCRs Due as of October 9, 2007			2	1
	Schedule	Sector	Investment PCRs	Non-Investment PCRs
World Bank*	March	Refrigeration (1) Foam (1)	2	-
	July	Aerosol (2)	2	-
	September	Methyl Bromide (2) Foam (2)	4	-
	October	Solvents (1) Sterilants (1)	2	-
	December	Foam (3)	3	-
	Total		13	-
Total PCRs Due as of October 9, 2007			27	3

* Table includes expected PCRs for projects completed up through December 2006 with outstanding PCRs (30 total) and takes care of the number of outstanding PCRs as of September 2007 *minus* PCRs that will be submitted by 31 December 2007 (expected 17). The Bank will, in addition to the above schedule, be submitting PCRs in CY2008 for projects completed through 2007 and up to 30 June 2008.

Table V

SUMMARY OF PCRs RECEIVED IN 2003 WITH DATA PROBLEMS
(As of October 9, 2007)

	Germany		UNDP		UNEP		UNIDO		World Bank		Total	
	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved
Incomplete Information			63	63			23	23			86	86
Solved as % of Total				100%				100%				100%
Data Inconsistencies												
Date Approved			4	4			1	1			5	5
Planned Date of Completion	4	4	2	2	1	1	6	6	3	3	16	16
Date Completed	5	5	11	11	11	11	2	2	7	7	36	36
Funds Approved			5	5			1	1	4	4	10	10
Funds Disbursed	5	5	8	8			1	1	4	4	18	18
ODP To Be Phased Out			8	8	1	1			2	2	11	11
ODP Phased Out			17	17	1	1	3	3	2	2	23	23
Total	14	14	55	55	14	14	14	14	22	22	119	119
Solved as % of Total		100%		100%				100%		100%		100%

Table VI

SUMMARY OF PCRs RECEIVED IN 2004 WITH DATA PROBLEMS
(As of October 9, 2007)

	Canada		Germany		Japan		UNDP		UNEP		UNIDO		World Bank		Total	
	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved
Incomplete Information			2	2	1	1	46	46			28	28	9	9	86	86
Solved as % of Total				100%		100%		100%				100%		100%		100%
Data Inconsistencies																
Planned Date of Completion	1	1	1	1							1	1	3	3	6	6
Revised Planned Date of Completion	1	1	3	3	1	1	15	15	4	4	2	2	24	24	50	50
Date Completed	1	1	3	3			11	10	1	1			9	9	25	24
Funds Approved							2	2			3	3	6	6	11	11
Funds Disbursed	2	2					9	9					6	6	17	17
ODP To Be Phased Out							2	1			2	2			4	3
ODP Phased Out							1	0			4	4	3	3	8	7
Total	5	5	7	7	1	1	40	37	5	5	12	12	51	51	121	118
Solved as % of Total		100%		100%		100%		93%		100%		100%		100%		98%

Table VII

**SUMMARY OF PCRs RECEIVED IN 2005 WITH DATA PROBLEMS
(As of October 9, 2007)**

	Canada		Germany		Japan		UNDP		UNEP		UNIDO		World Bank		Total	
	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved
Incomplete Information	1	1	1	1	1	1	33	28			32	32	11	10	79	73
Solved as % of Total		100%		100%		100%		85%				100%		91%		92%
Data Inconsistencies																
Date Approved	3	3					3	3							6	6
Planned Date of Completion			1	1			15	15			2	2	2	1	20	19
Revised Planned Date of Completion	3	3			2	2	23	21	3	3			27	26	58	55
Date Completed	2	2	1	1	2	2	22	22	1	1	1	1	6	6	35	35
Funds Approved	1	1	1	1									6	6	8	8
Funds Disbursed	1	1					4	4			1	1	5	5	11	11
ODP To Be Phased Out							2	2					3	3	5	5
ODP Phased Out							4	4			1	1	3	3	8	8
Total	10	10	3	3	4	4	73	71	4	4	5	5	52	50	151	147
Solved as % of Total		100%		100%		100%		97%		100%		100%		96%		97%

Table VIII

**SUMMARY OF PCRs RECEIVED IN 2006 WITH DATA PROBLEMS
(As of October 9, 2007)**

	Australia		Canada		France		Germany		Japan		Poland		UNDP		UNEP		UNIDO		World Bank		Total	
	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved
Incomplete Information	1	1	1	1	2		8	8					5		1		9	9	35	16	62	35
Solved as % of Total		100%		100%		0%		100%		N/A		N/A		0%		0%		100%		46%		56%
Data Inconsistencies																						
Date Approved	1	1			1		1	1											3	2	6	4
Planned Date of Completion	1	1	2	2	1										1				17	4	22	7
Revised Planned Date of Completion	1	1	5	5	1		4	4							3		1	1	43	8	58	19
Date Completed	2	2			2		3	3	1	1	1						1	1	5	3	15	10
Funds Approved			2	2	1		1	1											4	0	8	3
Funds Disbursed			4	4	1										1				4	0	10	4
ODP To Be Phased Out							2	2									1	1	5	2	8	5
ODP Phased Out			1	1	1		8	8	1	1							1	1	5	2	17	13
Total	5	5	14	14	8	0	19	19	2	2	1	0			5	0	4	4	86	21	144	65
Solved as % of Total		100%		100%		0%		100%		100%		0%		N/A		0%		100%		24%		45%

Table IX

SUMMARY OF PCRs RECEIVED IN 2007 WITH DATA PROBLEMS
(As of October 24, 2007)

	Canada		France		Germany		UNDP		UNEP		UNIDO		World Bank		Total	
	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved	Problems with PCRs	Problems with PCRs Solved
Incomplete Information	2	2			7	7	26	25			3	3	10		48	37
Solved as % of Total		100%				100%		96%				100%		0%		77%
Data Inconsistencies																
Date Approved									1				1		2	0
Planned Date of Completion									1	1			1		2	1
Revised Planned Date of Completion	1	1					1	1			5	5	15		22	7
Date Completed			1	1	6	6	9	9	1		1	1	5		23	17
Funds Approved											1	1	3		4	1
Funds Disbursed									1				4		5	0
ODP To Be Phased Out			1	1	2	2	12	12	2		1	1	2		20	16
ODP Phased Out			1	1	7	7	12	12			1	1	1		22	21
Total	1	1	3	3	15	15	34	34	6	1	9	9	32	0	100	63
Solved as % of Total		100%		100%		100%		100%		17%		100%		0%		63%

Annex II

LESSONS LEARNED REPORTED IN PROJECT COMPLETION REPORTS AND MULTI-YEAR AGREEMENTS

A. INVESTMENT PROJECTS

- (a) Complex group projects should reflect a longer timeframe than individual projects due to the logistics of completing all actions at all enterprises included in the project. Most actions at most companies may be completed in a timely manner, but delays at one enterprise can affect the timeliness of the entire project. (ARG/FOA/32/INV/113)
- (b) The costs for trials and site preparation need to be realistically estimated and the eligible part funded accordingly. (BAH/REF/29/INV/09)
- (c) Good cooperation between enterprises, growers, National Ozone Unit (NOU) of Bosnia and Herzegovina and implementing agency (IA) was basic for the success implementation of the project. Involvement of scientific institutions such as the Faculty of Agriculture in Sarajevo and the Tobacco Institute in Zagreb was essential for successful training, to transfer the new technologies to growers, cooperatives and local enterprises, and also for the implementation of the project without delays. (BHE/FUM/41/INV/17)
- (d) During the project planning and implementation stage, it is vital to understand any company plans that may impact project implementation. Any such plans must be taken into consideration and planned for in the implementation plans. In this case, a move to a new facility introduced major delays in project implementation. (BRA/FOA/36/INV/244)
- (e) (1) The confirmation of a technical committee was a key cornerstone, since it allowed all interested parties to agree on a common technical solution for the whole sector. This participatory approach developed a strong commitment and ownership of all participants, and this was critical for the success of the project.

(2) The project also helped in the development of a market that was very static for a long time and could refresh this sector with new technologies and procedures that improved the quality of the services brought to the community. (CHI/STE/35/INV/151)
- (f) (1) It is very important to follow up very closely all the beneficiary companies, especially the small ones. The smaller the company, the greater the follow up and assistance is required. Gathering information from multiple beneficiary companies (i.e., consumption figures, costs, dates, etc) is complex. It is in the interest of project implementation to develop simplified templates for data collection and to start the data gathering process as early as possible.

- (2) Given that the cost of equipment provided under this project was relatively low, smaller companies were more interested in receiving incremental operational cost (IOC) than incremental capital cost (ICC). (COL/REF/38/INV/57)
- (g) Ownership reform takes a long time, not only at Taizhou but also at other enterprises. Implementation of such projects requires better planning. (CPR/FOA/28/INV/294)
- (h) Lessons learned for future action are as follows:
- (1) Getting supervision and technical assistance in time is very important for effective project implementation.
- (2) Coordination and management from the government and DIA (financial intermediary) is very necessary for project implementation.
- (3) The situation that DIA and the procurement agent is the same organization is good for project implementation.
- (4) Technical strength, operation and management scale and active cooperation and understanding of the beneficiary enterprise are the foundation for successful implementation of the project. (CPR/FOA/29/INV/328)
- (i) (1) Enterprise's management support of the implementation is crucial to smooth implementation.
- (2) Enterprise's counterpart funding should be solid and on time.
- (3) The imported compressor introduced from HKT Company is relatively outdated and not much welcome in Chinese market. The enterprise had to renovate the imported technology based on its experience and market demand.
- (4) The operators of those imported equipments received good training during the implementation; they became popular in the local labour market. How to retain those trained operators for a long time in the beneficiary enterprise is a new challenge for WCMF Company. WCMF is now planning to train more operators of machining centres in coming years. (CPR/REF/28/INV/298)
- (j) Improved coordination with Customs is required to assure timely clearing of internationally procured equipment. (DRC/FOA/35/INV/06)
- (k) By planning in advance for the application of the eligible funds toward a larger-scale conversion project (replacement of boxfoam production by continuous production equipment), the project was able to be implemented and completed basically within the allotted project timeframe. This was a major improvement over other such projects where the technology upgrade was not planned or considered prior to project approval. (DRC/FOA/37/INV/10)
- (l) It is helpful to review the enterprise's operations completely to determine whether operational safety can be enhanced within the eligible project budget. In this case,

the enterprise was able to install a semi-automatic boxfoam unit within the budget allotted for retrofit of the manual unit, which contributes to improved overall employee safety. (DRC/FOA/37/INV/11)

- (m) (1) This was one of the earliest projects approved that covered a sector-wide phase-out in a country. As such, it served as a test case for the funding flexibility clause, and the logistics of making changes to the participant list during implementation. There was some confusion as to whether substituted enterprises had to get the Executive Committee's approval before being included in the project. Through discussions and negotiation, the process was developed whereby substitution of cancelled enterprises was possible by qualified enterprises by decision at the government level. The experiences of this project helped to pave the way for future sector phase-out plans, which were largely implemented during the period of country-driven projects, rather than agency-driven projects. This project helped to demonstrate how those types of plans can and should work, with the country taking ownership of the process and being allowed greater flexibility in disbursement of the funding. By allowing the country this control, it enhanced the involvement and understanding of the government in the entire process.
- (2) This substitution process created additional challenges in the timeliness of project completion however, as it was unclear how much funding would remain available for coverage of later-applying participants. In this case, approval of the final two participants was delayed until financial completion of the other projects, resulting in significant delays in completion of the overall project. Those activities point out the need for a targeted and aggressive awareness campaign early in the implementation stage of a sector phase-out plan, with an established mechanism for approval and management of late-identified participant enterprises. (EGY/FOA/22/INV/64)
- (n) (1) Doing projects with basically insolvent companies will lead to long delays.
- (2) Because of safety factors, aerosol projects were not subject to "one size fits all" or "cookie cutter" solutions. Despite spending much more time preparing projects than in other sectors, mistakes were possible. In the case of Syncaps, the owner was an excellent presenter, and convinced the consultants that the company had adequate financial capabilities and technical personnel. The reality is that the enterprise was almost insolvent, and had no technical personnel at all. (IND/ARS/28/INV/221)
- (o) The Hyderabad unit reported that it faced difficulty in stabilizing the operations using cyclopentane technology and therefore, there was a delay in decommissioning its existing CFC foaming lines. Technical experts had to revisit the plant for rectification of the foaming equipment and stabilization of the operations. The enterprises reported that to survive in a competitive market like India it is essential that those types of problems are minimized. (IND/REF/22/INV/126)
- (p) The use of the LCD technology for the production of mattresses and furniture using high pressure dispensing equipment is a perfectly viable proposition.

However, it requires a change of habits and methods in the production. The educational level of personnel is low and therefore, any change needs more training than is eligible under the Multilateral Fund. (IRA/FOA/37/INV/151)

- (q) In cases where the beneficiary enterprise manufactures a range of end-product models with different properties and applications, extensive trials are needed to establish performance of equipment for each formulation separately, therefore leading to higher costs of trials. Also, there are costs incurred for preparing the site, such as utility connections, air dryers, etc. The funding of trial and site preparation costs should adequately take those elements into consideration. (IRA/REF/35/INV/133)
- (r) It is essential to thoroughly discuss all technology options with an enterprise prior to project approval. It must be made clear that changes in technology during project implementation are not to be taken lightly, and must have sound reasoning for the change. Contemplation of technology changes can lead to implementation delays; therefore, thorough discussion of technology options should be ensured during project development. (LIB/FOA/32/INV/06)
- (s) (1) Equipment destruction should be implemented right after replacement and phase-in of the new technology in order to avoid problems with witnessing/documenting equipment destruction. In this case, the disposal certification was delayed until all plants were converted which led to some difficulties in the plant of Procon Company which had a fire that destroyed the baseline equipment. This prevented easy verification that the baseline was destroyed. (Baseline equipment disposal was not an Executive Committee requirement until two years after this project was approved.)

(2) Implementation in dynamic companies as master Enterprises is a challenge as continuous changes (not associated to CFC phase-out) are implemented and the project needs to be adjusted to those changes. Flexibility from both parties is required. (This is related to the company's relocation of plant and equipment from one place to another.) (PAK/FOA/17/INV/06)
- (t) PAECO Company made a mistake in dismantling the machinery prior to the installation of the new machine in anticipation that the new machine would arrive within two to three months. However, it ended up taking more than a year to order and deliver the equipment. It is therefore suggested that the enterprise should not make major changes in the plant until it is certain about the shipment and installation dates. (PAK/REF/32/INV/39)
- (u) Not only environmental but also technological and techno-economical benefits should be promoted prior to the project implementation to attract counterpart's commitment to implement the project. Good communication between UNIDO, NOU and counterparts is also fundamental for the success of the project. Counterpart's dedication is fundamental for successful execution of the project. (SYR/REF/38/INV/87)

(v) Chiller project – Thailand:

(1) Individual Loan Scheme was new to the World Bank: World Bank guidelines and regulations are suitable for national or large projects. But this program had to deal with many individual enterprises and some guidelines were not applicable. The Thai Military Bank (TMB) (financial intermediary) had to spend more time to settle the suitable guideline.

(2) Criteria were originally designed in such a way that the performance of old chillers should be more than 0.8 kW/ton while that of new chillers would not to exceed 0.63 kW/ton. This criteria was not flexible for many enterprises that would like to join this program. However, this problem has been solved by setting the new criteria that the new chiller must have better performance than the old one, not less than 0.27 kW/ton.

(3) Unclear definition on how to scrap and/or dismantle existing chiller: some enterprises withdrew from this project because of initial lack of clarity of the issue of equipment disposal. Enterprises did not initially understand whether they were required to scrap their old chillers. Sometimes they would have liked to keep some parts to use as spare parts.

(4) It was the regulation that all participants had to pay for monitoring costs because the project needed to monitor the performance and energy saving of the new chiller. This requirement was the reason why some enterprises decided not to participate in the programme and instead changed the chillers by themselves.

(5) No previous investment demand in chiller: this project was a pilot, with no previous investment demand in chiller products before. Formerly, chillers were replaced only when their lifetime had expired. It was difficult to persuade enterprises to join this project. This problem was solved by demonstrating to them the benefits of the return on investment, payback period and by providing performance guarantees.

(6) Energy saving is also depending on the suitable size of chiller and load. TMB found that some enterprise had chillers that were over or under adequate load design. When the old chiller was replaced with the new one at the same size, the energy consumption was still high.

(7) Operating costs of TMB are high because TMB had to take on many responsibilities, starting from developing the project, designing the process, identifying the customers, preparing progress reports, collecting loan and taking its own risk, etc., while the loan amount for each chiller is small and the fee earning from each chiller is too low.

(8) It was difficult to balance the disbursement of the two loans (Multilateral Fund and Global Environment Facility), because differences in amounts and costs of projects for each participant. According to the project guidelines, each enterprise had to scrap the old chiller after finishing the installment and commissioning of the new chiller. Some enterprises requested to keep the old chiller as a spare one

until they were assured that the new chiller could run smoothly. This request was not possible to satisfy, and this caused the withdrawal of some of the enterprises that were originally interested in participating in the project.

(9) Problems of recovered refrigerants: i) no agent to take care of the refrigerant that was recovered from the old chiller, ii) no agent to clean up and check the quality of recovered refrigerant, therefore there is no confidence to reuse those recovered refrigerant.

(10) Data from data logger on the chiller is in text file that is difficult to manipulate in order to calculate the performance of chiller. Sometimes data cannot be recorded because the enterprise would turn off the data logger; therefore the actual performance of chillers was difficult to calculate. Suppliers should install data loggers that can calculate performance data automatically. ((THA/REF/26/INV/104)

B. NON-INVESTMENT PROJECTS

- (a) Provide more information to the customs officers about smuggling of ODS in other countries through video tapes and CDs. Such suggestions could be studied so that they could be implemented wherever similar situation exists. (BHU/REF/45/TRA/04)
- (b) (1) The participation of local stakeholders in the formulation of technical assistance activities was very important to achieve a realistic proposal that can be implemented and receives the support of the different groups involved.

(2) The permanent exchange of ideas between the NOU and the international consultants produced as a result a document that reflects the national needs and includes a strategy tailored for the particular case of Colombia. This strategy is currently in implementation with no changes from the original plan (COL/REF/32/TAS/46)
- (c) (1) At the beginning the main idea was to follow a centralized vision, having all workshops delivered at the capital city of Bogotá. However, a greater local content was the primary concern, since every customs office faces a somewhat different situation. For instance, inner customs offices have different operations than those from the borders or located at sea ports. Hence, a decentralized approach addressed those needs in a more efficient manner, since bringing local experts was radically less expensive than taking them to Bogotá.

(2) Attendance of an Environment Canada enforcement expert at Phase I training was a useful in-kind contribution. (COL/REF/35/TRA/52)
- (d) The enactment of environmental laws and regulations in developing countries is traditionally a very lengthy process and, what seemed a very good idea at first (passing all necessary regulations in only one all-encompassing decree, or "Super Decree", turned out to become a stumbling block that paralyzed Montreal

Protocol related activities for quite some time. The main reason was that the decree contained measures related to the use of methyl bromide, which affected a very critical economic sector, the melon-growing sector, which in turn reacted very strongly to the draft decree. (COS/REF/32/TAS/23)

- (e) We encountered some obstacles when it came down to the use of the recovery and recycling centres and believe that those can be of help for future projects:

(1) The centres were placed too far away from the technicians.

(2) More technical assistance and follow-up could have improved the efficiency of the centres.

(3) The machines were considered expensive for the affordable reach of midlevel technicians; we need to create strategies so that the prices of the machines become low enough for mid-level technicians. (DOM/REF/25/TAS/13)

- (f) (1) The monitoring required is a time consuming task that requires a person to establish contact with the beneficiaries of the project. Beneficiaries do not by themselves turn in the data that is needed for the Ozone Unit to efficiently monitor the use of the equipment. Proactivity and persistence is needed.

(2) More technical assistance and follow-up with the beneficiary workshops would probably have increased the efficiency of the equipments, as well as the documentation of the results. It is expected that much more R-12 was recovered and recycled than the official data show.

(3) It is difficult for the Ozone Unit to assume the monitoring given the daily tasks in the NOU. Additional people need to be hired. (DOM/REF/25/TAS/15)

- (g) (1) Documentation of the CFC recovered and recycled was initially a weak point in the monitoring system. While a standardized record-keeping and documentation system was put in place by the Government in 2005, it would be helpful to develop a standardized data collection method and reporting format earlier on and include it during the initial training sessions in order to facilitate proper reporting and ensure that accurate records were kept to during the monitoring period.

(2) In this project, a good program was put in place with criteria for possession of the equipment, so that during the monitoring period, equipment reallocation was possible from those companies not meeting the agreement. (FIJ/REF/29/TAS/04)

- (h) (1) Several issues were identified related to service items for the R&R equipment that should be budgeted for in project proposals. Consumables such as filters and vacuum pump oil should be included in the project budgets.

(2) Due to the popularity of the program, additional enterprises were contacting EPA to inquire about purchasing R&R units themselves. It may be helpful to set up a collaborative purchasing program for other interested enterprises that may

not be benefiting directly from the project, but express interest in completing the same activities.

(3) Local service arrangements are essential to assure the success of the program. Those arrangements should be anticipated and established as quickly as possible in order to assure the program can be implemented without delays for equipment servicing issues. This will also help to assure the long-term sustainability of the program. (GHA/REF/32/TAS/12)

- (i) (1) This particular project was developed out of the Indian Halon Phase-out Strategy document submitted and approved by the Executive Committee and was aimed to be the benchmark against which all other Article 5(1) countries would be able to follow and implement once completed. The project was one of significant technical complexity due to the much larger than expected tasks facing the personnel involved in its implementation.

(2) Whilst some of the earlier project milestones were achieved in accordance with the initial timetable, the pure complexity of developing both the 13 new standards and amending over 150 existing codes by going through each one word for word proved to be far more time consuming than first thought. Also, the dissemination of the finished products by way of workshops and conferences across as much of India as possible, again took far longer than anticipated. Irrespective, the risk of compromising the outcome of the whole project by simply compressing the overall timetable just to meet original estimates was certainly not an option and would have also proved to be a waste of MLF funds not to mention the confusion locally in India of having a mixture of half finished regulations. Adopting this approach would have caused continuation of halon use rather than its gradual elimination.

(3) Although accepting that the project exceeded by approximately 30 months the originally approved timetable, it became well known by most, if not all stakeholders during the project implementation. Consequently, it was observed even in the very early stages that installation of new halon based systems and products reduced dramatically as owners/users/manufacturers realized the changes were imminent and commenced embracing the various non-halon technologies well before legal requirements required them to do so. (IND/HAL/29/TAS/243)

- (j) (1) Removal of technical test support costs, incentive payments, and all funding associated with testing of alternatives by the University from the project (2/3 of the project cost), left the project fully dependent on the enterprises to fund and run their own tests. This did not lend itself to timely phase-out activities since the enterprises normally have much more immediate priorities, associated with their ability to function effectively in a competitive marketplace. Leaving some funds available would have provided the enterprises with some incentive to produce more timely results.

(2) The fact that the companies undertook to seek solutions using their own funds – but on their own timetable – is a tribute to their commitment to the environment

and to their responsible attitude regarding the treaty and the ozone layer.
(JAM/SOL/42/TAS/20)

- (k) (1) Continuing awareness campaign for vehicle owners about harmfulness of CFC-12 and retrofitting incentive is a very effective method of encouraging customers to have their vehicle retrofitted.
- (2) Awareness campaign including production of TV ads and other other media advertisements and publishing are very effective awareness raising strategy.
(KAM/REF/41/TAS/08)
- (l) (1) As in some other R&R projects, it was very beneficial to have the monitoring consultant selected and on-board to participate in the training workshops. This allowed for a segment of the workshop to be devoted to training in what data is to be collected and how, as well as to introduce the monitoring consultant to the participating enterprises. This also allowed prompt initiation of the monitoring program and reinforcement of the usage of the recovery and recycling equipment. This allowed for the agreements with beneficiary companies to include provisions about the reporting requirements, and in the training, the reporting obligations could be stressed, allowing better data collection and reporting through the monitoring program.
- (2) Regular reporting and contact between the UNDP international expert and the national consultant resulted in a rapid transfer of information and increased productivity from the participants. (KYR/REF/37/TAS/04)
- (m) (1) Proceeding with the plan and moving forward on specific activities at the regional and national levels simultaneously, offered the advantage that countries learned from the implementation of activities that have taken place and were thus able to design a more informed and realistic regional plan.
- (2) As this was the first project of its kind to receive funding under the Multilateral Fund, it is not surprising that the initial design of the project changed to suit the realistic needs of the countries as new and relevant information emerged over time. In this respect, the regional workshops and network meetings provided a much needed forum for all stakeholders to discuss meaningful ways forward to a number of problems countries were facing. This ultimately led to the successful completion of the project, including countries being able to meet their compliance targets for halon under the Montreal Protocol.
(LAC/HAL/26/TAS/28)
- (n) (1) Local suppliers for spare parts and consumables should be investigated for R&R projects. Often, many of those parts can be sourced locally at lower prices, avoiding of customs clearance and duties.
- (2) Special attention should be paid to varying conditions in different parts of a country when determining the optimal distribution of R&R equipment. The distribution should be implemented in a manner that maximizes the effectiveness

of the program, and not necessarily according to an equal distribution of equipment throughout the country. (VIE/REF/34/TAS/35)

- (o) In this case, hiring two consultants to work together on the monitoring project was a cost-effective and workable solution. The monitoring duties were split between the consultants by location, which allowed the most efficient use of resources. If this approach is used, it is imperative that the consultants have a good working relationship with each other in order to provide consistent and timely monitoring reports. (VIE/REF/34/TAS/38)
- (p) Hand pumps were found to be very useful and convenient for the participants who work in the field. They are convenient and easy to move from place-to-place. (VIE/REF/35/TAS/39)

B. MULTI-YEAR AGREEMENTS

1. UNDP

- (a) The annual reporting requirements for terminal phase-out plans (TPMPs) (usually around US \$300,000) as per present guidelines are more or less the same than for a national plan (usually several millions of US \$). It is rather labor-intensive and it is usually the IA and not the NOU who has to produce the report. UNDP wonders if a simplification of the annual TPMP reports (more to the point) may be contemplated. Maybe it can just be limited to the web-based cover-document plus a 2-3 page narrative description.
- (b) Implementation of tranches of multi-year agreements (MYAs) does not require a PCR for each tranche completed, however, annual progress reports are required to report on the implementation of activities of previous year (not specifically on a particular tranche, but as an overall sectoral/national plan-wise) when requesting release of a future/subsequent tranche, and reporting on each tranche is required when IAs prepare their annual progress reports due 1 May of each year.
- (c) In the implementation of the MYAs, activities are segregated into annual implementation programmes. However, in actual implementation, (most) activities are implemented on a continuous basis, i.e. one activity initiated in one particular tranche in one year may continue to be implemented during the next tranche in the subsequent years, or more activities are added to that particular category (e.g. awareness, policy development, etc.). This is the case even in investment activities at enterprise-level, unless if we distinguish activities at one enterprise to another enterprise. In the operating mode of the IAs tranches are added on top of previous tranches, and activities are treated in a continuous and cumulative manner from tranche to tranche.
- (d) Therefore, measurement of achievement should not be limited to each tranche, but should look at the overall cumulative effect, to see i) how effective the cumulative achievements of the sectoral/national plans have addressed the overall goals of the MYA, ii) what are the lessons/experience gained that may be applied to avoid

previous mistakes, and to improve, simplify, or add value to actions taken in future implementation actions/steps of the same sector plan, iii) what those experiences can contribute to phase-out plans in other sectors in the same country, same region and/or globally, iv) what experiences can also be adopted by other IAs to improve those implementation process, taking into account the fact that each IA operates with different organizational procedures.

2. UNIDO

Lessons learned from NPP Sudan:

- (a) Linking technicians training and provision of equipment is important.
- (b) Equipment is provided only to shops with certified technicians.
- (c) Equipment selection is important; durable recovery unit with fan-cooled 1/3 HP compressor, nitrogen cylinders, and small service tools such as piercing valve, piecing pliers are core service equipment.
- (d) Commitment of high-level officials in all related ministries (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry, and Ministry of Environment) helped a lot in implementing the project; the NOU played a key role in convincing those high-level officials.
- (e) Cooperation by industrial association helped the implementation.
- (f) High CFC-12 prices (higher than US \$ 10 per kg) encouraged recovery practice.
- (g) Recovery is done at site and not in recycling centres, and there is no issue on the recovery cost. Skilled technicians can do recovery practice quickly without any disturbance of other works.
- (h) Monitoring the activity is not easy, particularly in remote areas from Khartoum. (Project is going to assign a national expert for this purpose.)
- (i) Sustainability of equipment is now the issue, as more equipment will be damaged in the future; current ratio of damaged units is about 10 per cent.
- (j) Introduction of drop-in refrigerants containing HCFCs is an issue, since it may influence national infrastructure developed for CFC recovery and reuse practice.
- (k) Direct involvement of Sudanese Customs Administration (SCA) in the project has been highly beneficial; SCA is represented in the National Committee for implementation of the Montreal Protocol.
- (l) Empowering Customs Administration resulted in identifying mislabelled refrigerants, which contributed to the country's compliance. More than 6,000 mislabelled cylinders were identified by identifiers and returned to the country of origin.

- (m) Stocks of illegally imported CFCs are an issue as there is no clear idea how to treat them; currently about 1,000 cylinders of 13.5 kg each are stocked in the Customs warehouse.

Lesson learned from the NPP Pakistan:

- (a) Since the implementation of MYA means the implementation of an Agreement between a country and the Executive Committee, it is very important to establish correct working relations between the NOU and the IA.
- (b) It is important that a realistic country strategy for ODS phase-out and consolidated plan for country compliance with the ODS phase-out schedule is agreed in the preparatory stage of the performance based multiyear plan. The IA should insist on implementing what had been agreed and incorporated into the NPP as a reduction schedule. Permanent and stringent monitoring of import of controlled substances is vital for keeping reliable records. Good collaboration between government offices, e.g. Ministry of Environment and Custom Office is vital.
- (c) Frequent changes of the ozone officer (e.g. four ozone officers in three years) could mean that there is no continuity in filing and limited institutional memory. Hence the plan could be jeopardized despite of methodical preparatory works (survey of the sector, analysis of industrial statistics and trends in a demand for ODS, the level of public awareness, etc.) at the time of the project preparation and submission of the NPP.
- (d) The implementation of the NPP should be seen as one continuous process. The tranches should not be considered as individual projects, although they are being implemented in sequences.

3. The World Bank.

- (a) A project-by-project approach cannot ensure sustainable phase-out;
- (b) An effective ODS import/export control system is a priority and required before a sector/national plan can have positive impact;
- (c) Priority should be given to ban the production and import of ODS-based equipment when ODS-based manufacturing still exists;
- (d) Coordinated implementation of policy and regulatory interventions and investment and technical assistance activities is critical to the success of ODS phase-out;
- (e) Sector plans and national plans entail heavy administrative work for the NOUs;
- (f) Given the longer term trajectory of complete ODS phase-out under sector and national plans, more flexibility in the project design and more support for national execution need to be considered.